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INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1970s, following Mao Zedong's death and the arrest of the Gang 
of Four, Chinese officials began to bring to light the terrible excesses of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the ''anti-rightist" campaign 
(1957-1958). China's new leaders promised rehabilitation for all those 
wrongfully persecuted. 
During the Cultural Revolution, hundreds of thousands, even millions of 
Chinese suffered intense persecution and public abuse. Many were sub-
jected to brutal beatings, torture, imprisonment, forced labor, internal exile, 
or executions, often carried out by mobs under the leadership of Red 
Guards or party cadres sanctioned by the government. Those victimized 
were predominantly the educated, those with higher education and profes-
sional skills, teachers, writers, scientists, doctors, industrial managers, as well 
as local and national officials and minority and religious leaders. They were 
denounced and publicly humiliated for having "bourgeois" sympathies, 
"feudal" tendencies, ''old ideas," supporting the capitalist road, or being 
''counterrevolutionary," "rightist," or "revisionist.'' 
China's post-Mao leader Deng Xiaoping told the media that nearly one 
million people had died by mob action under the rule of the Gang of Four.1 
The president of China's Supreme Court similarly admitted that large 
numbers of Chinese had been wrongfully imprisoned.2 The Chinese press 
reported that many of the verdicts on the 1.13 million people convicted be-
tween 1966 and 1976 had been unjustified, and that many individuals had 
been "persecuted to death." 3 Some officials called the Cultural Revolution "a 
disaster without precedent in five thousand years of culture." It was 
1. Statement of Charles W. Freeman in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights 
in Asia: Communist Countries: Hearings before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific 
Affairs and on International Organizations, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, Committee Print, 
44 [hereafter cited as 1980 Hearings]. 
The Gang of Four, a group of radical leftists composed of Jiang Qing (Mao Zedong's 
wife), Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan, took over the leadership of 
the country during the last years of Mao's rule. The excesses of the Cultural Revolution 
have generally been blamed on them and their associates, although countless others 
were also involved. After Mao's death, the Gang was arrested and held without trial for 
four years, and then were sentenced for "criminal" acts. Two received suspended death 
sentences; one, life imprisonment; and one a twenty-year term. See David Bona via, Ver-
dict in Peking: The Trial of the Gang of Four, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1984). 
2. Amnesty International Report 1979 (london: Amnesty International Publications, 1979). 
87. 
3. Statement of James D. Seymour in 1980 Hearings, note 1 above, 134; see also R. Randle 
Edwards, louis Henkin, and Andrew Nathan, Human Rights in Contemporary China 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 169, n. 36; Amnesty International Report 
7980 (london: Amnesty International Publications, 1980), 193; Bonavia, note 1 above, 
179-202. 
(2) 
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estimated that altogether 100 million people had suffered political persecu-
tion.4 The Chinese also denounced the human rights abuses of an earlier 
period, the "anti-rightist" campaign, during which hundreds of thousands of 
intellectuals (high school and university graduates) were branded the "stink-
ing ninth category" for their "bourgeois" and "rightist" tendencies. Most suf-
fered arrest, demotion, internal exile, or death.5 
This unprecedented public airing by the Chinese of the massive cruelty 
and persecution of their past stood in sharp contrast to the near silence of 
the international community while these abuses were taking place. To be 
sure, the People's Republic of China (PRC) had been denounced in the 
West, particularly in the United States, by those who were bitter over the 
"loss" of China and saw the communist regime's triumph in 1949 as a threat 
to Western security interests. But when it came to the egregious violations 
that occurred, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, the PRC seemed 
to be accorded a peculiar immunity. No systematic or serious effort was 
made by governments or human rights organizations to call the PRC to ac-
count or even to document its abuses. No detailed analysis of China's 
human rights record appeared. China was admitted to the United Nations at 
the very height of the violence of the Cultural Revolution. Freedom House, a 
New York-based nongovernmental organization (NGO), one of the few 
which at times issued warnings about China, published in 1976 the harrow-
ing testimony of an escapee, who observed that "a conspiracy of silence sur-
rounds the Death Archipelago of China." 6 
In fact, it was the Chinese by their own public admissions who called 
forth the first governmental comment on their human rights practices. 
China's shocking revelations about the Cultural Revolution evoked a 
response from the Carter administration. Although the Carter administration 
made human rights a hallmark of its foreign policy, for its first two years in of-
fice it scrupulously avoided public reference to China's human rights prac-
tices. But China's admissions of its own violations forced the administration's 
4. See "Ye Jianying (Communist Party Deputy Chairman) on Cultural Revolution," Xinhua 
(New China News Agency), No. 092905, 29 September 1979; "Resolution on Certain 
Questions in the History of our Party Since the Foundation of the People's Republic of 
China," adopted by the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 
Xinhua, 30 June 1981; Jonathan Mirsky, "Long Look at Mao's Role," Observer News Ser-
vice, No. 41727, London, 27 July 1981; Fox Butterfield, China: Alive in the Bitter Sea 
(london: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982), 471-473; Merle Goldman, "Human Rights in the 
People's Republic of China," Daedalus 112 (Fall 1983): 116. 
5. See Arlette Laduguie, "China-Victims Old and New," Index on Censorship 10 (April 
1981): 7-10; Michael Weisskopf, "Ex-Inmate Recalls Life in China's Gulag," Washington 
Post, 12 February 1982, 1, col. 2, sec. A. 
6. "Escape to an Adjacent Cell," Freedom at Issue, New York, September-October 1976. 
See also Fre~dom a.t lss~e, Nov~mber-December 1975 and March-April1977, for reports 
on human nghts v1olat1ons dunng the Cultural Revolution. 
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hand. At the end of 1978, it issued a public statement on human rights in 
China, the first by a Western government. The statement, however, was 
cautious and bland- it limited itself to welcoming Chinese admissions of 
abuses and expressing the hope for further improvemenU It reflected a con-
tinuing hesitancy to take issue with China over human rights, mirroring the 
reluctance of most others in the international community to call attention to 
human rights violations in China. 
Nor was significant attention focused on China's human rights record 
thereafter. Other states- the communist countries in Eastern Europe and 
Third World regimes friendly to the West- saw their violations increasingly 
exposed before world opinion, especially in the 1970s when international 
human rights became a publicized issue. The Chinese, however, continued, 
with a few notable exceptions, to enjoy an inexplicable immunity. Amnesty 
International and to a lesser extent other NGOs did enter the field, par-
ticularly when China's Democracy Movement (1978-1981) was suppressed 
and scores of dissidents, writers, and human rights advocates were beaten, 
imprisoned, or forced to undergo re-education through labor under harsh 
conditions. 8 And by the 1980s, the PRC did find itself under scrutiny for the 
first time by governments, NGOs, and the media. In part, this was the 
natural and logical outcome of its normalization of relations with the outside 
world. But the change was hardly far-reaching. The PRC did not then, nor 
does it today, figure prominently in the programs of NGOs, international 
organizations, governments, or professional groups working to promote 
human rights. It is even reported that Deng Xiaoping told his colleagues in 
1987 that foreigners were not interested in China's human rights record. 
"Look at Wei Jingsheng," he said, "we put him behind bars and the 
democracy movement died. We haven't released him, but that did not raise 
much of an international uproar." He consequently did not think China's 
1987 crackdown on intellectuals would arouse much concern either. 9 
The purpose of this article is to examine why China has been treated so 
gingerly by those concerned with international human rights, despite the 
atrocities of the Cultural Revolution and the continuing serious violations to-
day. The article is divided into two parts. The first identifies the reasons why 
those concerned with human rights have avoided China. The second part 
addresses developments now taking place that make it more possible to deal 
with China and that rebut the arguments advanced to justify inaction. 
7. See State Department Press Guidance, 28 November 1978; "China Commended for 
Acknowledging Past Rights Abuses," Washington Post, 29 November 1978, sec. A. 
8. For initiatives of Freedom House, the Federation lnternationale des Droits de I'Homme 
(Paris) and other groups, see Part II, "NGOs Point the Way." For a full discussion of 
Democracy Movement, see Part II, "Relevance of International Human Rights to China." 
9. Edward Gargan, "Deng Breaks Silence," International Herald Tribune, 14 January 1987; 
see also Daniel Southerland, "Deng Hails Poland's Handling of Dissent," International 
Herald Tribune, 27 February 1987. 
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If the United States refusal to recognize the PRC after 1949 was one of 
the great blunders of our time, so too must be the exemption of China from 
the international human rights standards applicable to other nations. China's 
population numbers over a billion people, one-quarter of the world's popu-
lation. Since 1971 it has come to play an increasingly active role in the 
United Nations decisionmaking on human rights. Its government has ratified 
several important human rights treaties, thereby signalling some readiness to 
be held responsible for its human rights practices. China has opened its 
doors to the outside world and made itself more accessible to the ideas and 
influences of others. Nevertheless, its people remain largely exempt from 
the concerns of the international human rights community, and its govern-
ment, unlike others, is rarely held accountable for its human rights trans-
gressions. 
PART I. EXEMPTION FROM INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY- THE REASONS 
The Information Gap 
Paucity of information has been one of the major reasons cited by those in 
the human rights field who have refrained from publishing reports or issuing 
statements on human rights in China. Until the mid or late 1970s, foreigners 
had little or no access to most parts of the country, diplomats and tourists 
were restricted, and few journalists or academics were allowed entry to 
travel. It was difficult for NGOs to know precisely what was going on in the 
country. The Chinese Government did not publish facts or figures on human 
rights conditions. Because contacts with foreigners were deemed almost 
treasonous, Chinese citizens provided scant information to visitors from 
abroad. Even Chinese diplomats stationed in foreign countries travelled in 
twos, monitoring each other's dealings with foreigners. Few Chinese schol-
ars or students were allowed to travel· or study abroad. Information on 
China, therefore, came from whatever data government-controlled media 
did release or from those foreigners who managed to gain firsthand informa-
tion.'0 In the case of the many foreigners allowed entry for the first time in 
the early 1970s, most painted unwarrantedly favorable pictures of what they 
saw and failed to uncover the massive violations of the Cultural Revolution. 
10. See House Committee on International Relations, Human Rights Conditions in Selected 
Countries and the U.S. Response, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, Committee Print, 184-186; 
Nigel Wade, "How Much Has China Changed," Sunday Telegraph, 8 April 1980. 
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Human rights reporting about China as a result was much more tenta-
tive and qualified than about other countries. Amnesty International could 
not secure "hard" information about prisoners in China until the late 1970s. 
During the Cultural Revolution, Amnesty could obtain information only on 
foreign nationals detained in the PRC. It relied heavily on official sources to 
produce its first report in 1978, Political Imprisonment in the People's Repub-
lic of China. The introduction to the report cautioned that because of inade-
quate information, the report could not "present a picture of the conditions 
of detention prevailing in the whole of the country .... ": 
The lack of detailed information on political imprisonment in the People's 
Republic of China is due to ... the size and diversity of the country, the com-
plexity of the issues involved in the handling of political offenders, the restriction 
of movement and the lack of free access to information.11 
Similarly, Freedom House, which began in the late 1970s to publish the 
writings of Chinese dissidents, listed eighty-two Chinese unofficial journals 
but noted, "It is evident that we do not know the real extent of underground 
publication in China .... " 12 Its annual survey of freedom around the world 
reported "unknown thousands of political prisoners" in the PRC.13 
In the State Department's first testimony before Congress on human 
rights in China in 1980, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights 
pointed out that only "incomplete'' information was available. "What we 
know,'· Patricia Derian said, "documents serious human rights problems," 
but "we do not know the full extent to which human rights are denied": 
Our normal sources of information- our diplomats, the media, government 
statements or reports, assessments of, national, international or regional organiza-
tions, reports of individuals and nongovernmental organizations, are limited or 
nonexistent. ... Our Embassy in Beijing, which opened in 1979, reports on 
human rights conditions in the People's Republic of China. That country is vast 
and our Embassy staff lacks both the numbers of personnel and the access to all 
parts of the PRC necessary to prepare the kind of definitive, comprehensive sur-
vey of the subject we would like to see. 
Access ... by Western media and private individuals, particularly outside of 
capital cities, is also limited.14 
The first State Department human rights report on China, also published in 
1980, contained several disclaimers as well. It said that "an accurate 
estimate" of the total number of political prisoners in China was 
11. Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China (london: Amnesty International 
Publications, 1978) xii. 
12. Freedom House, "Reports of Recent Events," Freedom Appeals 10 (May-june 1981): 29. 
13. Raymond D. Gastil, Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1980 (New 
York: Freedom House, 1980), 230, and subsequent editions. 
14. Statement of Patricia M. Derian in 1980 Hearings, note 1 above, 24-25. 
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"impossible." It could find ''no accurate information" on whether PRC 
authorities were still using torture.15 
Even after China opened its doors to the outside world and lifted restric-
tions on tourists and journalists, difficulties abounded. The brief period of 
liberalization permitted in China in 1978 and early 1979, characterized by 
wall posters, unofficial journals, and calls for "free speech" quickly came to 
an end by 1980 with the arrest of those advocating greater political free-
doms. The end of the Democracy Movement also meant a tightening of the 
more relaxed contacts allowed with Chinese during that period. Human 
rights advocates found themselves imprisoned for having provided informa-
tion to foreigners. Wei Jingshen& China's foremost dissident, received a 
fifteen-year sentence both for his writings and for having provided what was 
deemed "military secrets" to foreign correspondents. 16 Liu Qing, editor of a 
leading unofficial journal, received a three-year sentence for making avail-
able the transcript of Wei Jingsheng's triaiY In 1979, firm restrictions were 
published prohibiting Chinese from meeting with foreigners unless officially 
approved. 18 Deng Xiaoping told senior members of the Communist Party 
that Chinese who had too many contacts with foreigners should be arrested, 
and in a number of cases they were.19 He issued strict warnings as well to 
those Chinese ''setting up illegal organizations, publishing illegal journals, 
spreading anti-party and anti-socialist sentiments and even establishing 
secret ties with one another." 20 
Warnings also were issued to journalists against reporting on human 
rights conditions. While the Chinese initially tolerated journalistic accounts 
of the violations of the past, they objected to stories about present abuses, 
namely the suppression of the Democracy Movement. Chinese officials in 
1981 thus warned foreign correspondents against reporting on the "illegal 
15. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 440, 441. 
16. A/ Report 1980, note 3 above, 189-190. 
17. Amnesty International Report 1982, (london: Amnesty International Publications, 1982), 
193. 
18. john Fraser, "Chinese Ordered to Avoid Contacts with Foreigners," International Herald 
Tribune, 5 June 1979; see also Nigel Wade, "Peking Crackdown on Careless Talkers," 
Daily Telegraph 8 June 1979; C.S. Wren, "As Party Forum Nears, China Reverts to Old 
Orthodoxy," International Herald Tribune, 2 August 1982; and M. Lucbert, "Les Autorites 
Multiplient Les Obstacles aux Contacts entre Chinois et Etrangers," Le Monde, 11 june 
1982. For reports on the close scrutiny of contacts between Chinese and foreigners, see 
Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, Intellectual Freedom in China After Mao, Fund for Free 
Expression, New York, 1984, 192-193; Amnesty International Report 1985 (london: 
Amnesty International Publications, 1985), 205. Department of State, Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices for 1984 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of· 
fice, 1985), 737. 
19. "Deng Said to Warn China about Laxity," New York Times, 23 March 1979, sec. A; see 
also Butterfield, China: Alive, note 4 above, 202. 
20. Michael Weisskopf, "China Ends a Fling at Free Thinking," Washington Post, 23 March 
1981, sec. A. ··· 
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activities'' of underground magazines. "[l]t is better not to report on such 
publications,'' asserted Vice Foreign Minister Zhong Xidong. He asserted that 
"there are people [i.e., dissidents] who would like to use our friends [i.e., 
correspondents] for their own inglorious activities. I just advise our friends 
here not to be taken in by others." 21 
The Chinese cracked down on journalists by expelling some who had 
wide contacts with dissidents, by reprimanding others for reporting on 
human rights activities, and by harassing and arresting still others.22 One 
European journalist was abducted and forced to undergo a month of "re-
education" in 1984. In 1986 the New York Times correspondent was ar-
rested and expelled after travelling to remote parts of the country without 
authorization. An Agence France Presse reporter, known for his wide con-
tacts with students and academies, was expelled in 1987 after being one of 
the first to report on student demonstrations.23 
NGOs as a result have pointed out that access to human rights informa-
tion in China remains fraught with danger despite its greater availability. 
Amnesty International noted that in 1982, several U.S. academics were ex-
pelled after trying to conduct research into social conditions and several 
Chinese students were arrested for allegedly furnishing them with "state 
secrets." 24 In 1980, the government republished a 1951 law, "Regulations on 
Guarding State Secrets," enumerating broad categories of information which 
cannot be revealed to foreigners. 25 Chinese officials as a result have re-
mained reluctant to give out information. Several, moreover, have been ar-
rested for divulging "secrets," so that most refuse to provide information on 
human rights to foreigners.26 Despite repeated requests from Amnesty Inter-
21. Michael Weisskopf, "China Bars Reporting on Dissidents," Washington Post, 2 
September 1981, sec. A. 
22. See Stanley Oziewicz, "China's Rebuke to Reporter Seen as Signal," Washington Post, 23 
September 1981, sec. A; James P. Sterba, "A U.S. Correspondent Admonished by China," 
International Herald Tribune, 22 September 1981; "Four Seized in Peking Pasting up 
Posters," New York Times, 5 April1979, sec. A; Jonathan Mirsky, "China's Great Wall of 
Secrecy," The Observer, Sunday, 22 August 1982, sec. 1; Butterfield, China: Alive, note 4 
above, 519. 
23. See Tiziano Terzani, "My 'Crimes' Against the Chinese State," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 
1985; "China Frees & Expels N.Y. Times Correspondent," International Herald Tribune, 
24 july 1986; Edward Gargan, "China Orders AFP Reporter to Leave," International 
Herald Tribune, 27 January 1987. 
24. Amnesty International Report 1983, (london: Amnesty International Publications, 1983), 
193; see also, Sarah Burgess, "Black Gloves Had His Way," International Herald Tribune, 
12 February 1987. 
25. See Butterfield, China: Alive, note 4 above, S18; "China Imposes Secrecy Law to Foil 
Spies," The Times, 12 April1980, Overseas section; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Political Developments and Human Rights in the People's Republic of China: Hearings 
before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on 
Asian & Pacific Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, Committee Print, 67-68, 81, 266-267 
[hereafter cited as 1985 Hearings]. 
26. See "The Press," Speahrhead 16 (Northern Winter 1982-1983): 22, "Peking Jails Editor 
Over Secrecy Leak," International Herald Tribune, 29 March 1982; China: Violations of 
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national, questions about prisoners and the judicial system have gone unan-
swered.27 Nor have human rights experts, in that capacity, been allowed 
into China to make contacts or study conditions. No foreign observers have 
been permitted to attend political trials said to be "open to the public.'' 
Although journalists on rare occasions have been given access to select 
prisons,2a the International Committee of the Red Cross has not been 
allowed to speak with prisoners or detainees. Local human rights groups or 
information networks-which formed in the late 1970s- have been barred 
from functioning. 
Conditions therefore essential to NGOs for the effective collection of in-
formation have not fully developed in the case of China. Many gaps in infor-
mation consequently prevail. One commentator recently highlighted the 
problem: "A chance statistic was recently tossed out by the New China News 
Agency: During the past two years, it reported, armed police squads patrol-
ling large and medium-sized cities arrested about 170 'counterrevolution-
aries.' Who are these people and what happened to them? No explanation 
was given." 29 An Amnesty International report of 1984 similarly noted that 
the organization's "information concerning prisoners of conscience often re-
mained incomplete since no official information on prisoners was 
published." 30 Even educated guesses have not been possible. The State De-
partment's 1985 human rights report on China used estimates of "labor 
camp" inmates ranging from 100,000 to ten million. 31 Similarly, estimates of 
those executed during the 1983 ''anti-crime" campaign, in which counter-
revolutionaries as well as common criminals were summarily tried and exe-
cuted, ranged from 600 to 20,000.32 
Human Rights (london: Amnesty International Publications, 1984) 16-17; Hugh Davies, 
"China Courteously Curbs Hospitality for journalists," Daily Telegraph, 24 October 1985; 
Fox Butterfield, "Hundreds of Thousands Toil in Chinese Labor Camps," New York 
Times, 3 January 1981, sec. A. 
27. See Political Imprisonment, note 11 above, ix-x; China: Violations, note 26 above, 2. 
28. See Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet 
Union, China and Cuba 1928-1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981 ), 
339-343; Political Imprisonment, note 11 above, 100; Hugh Davies, "China's Rugged 
Labour Camps Cleanse Minds," Daily Telegraph, 29 August 1984; Michael Weisskopf, 
"China Gulag Tries to 'Save' the Wayward Through Labor," International Herald Tribune, 
25 January 1963; j.F. Burns, "Chinese Prisons Filled by a 'Lost Generation,"' International 
Herald Tribune, 9-10 February 1985; Michael Weisskopf, "Chinese Make an About-
Face in the March to Rehabilitation," International Herald Tribune, 31 May 1982; China: 
Violations, note 26 above, 5. 
29. Miriam London, "China Mirages," Freedom at Issue (March-April 1986): 17. 
30. Amnesty International Report 1984 (london: Amnesty International Publications, 1984), 
217-218. 
31. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 740. 
32. For estimate that 5,000 to 9,000 Chinese were executed between August 1963 and 
January 1984 ~nd an additional 10,000 killed in 1984, see Statement of Hung-dah Chiu 
1n 1985 Heanngs, note 25 above, 67. For other estimates, see Department of State, 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
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Imprecise data has discouraged many human rights organizations from 
devoting their resources to collecting and analyzing information on China. 
They have preferred instead to work on situations about which information 
is readily and amply available. language has compounded the problem. 
Unlike other Asian and Third World countries where European foreign 
languages are spoken and human rights materials are published in these 
languages, those dealing with China must know Chinese. Even materials 
readily available from Hong Kong often require knowledge of Chinese. 
learning the language or hiring the services of translators are costly and 
time-consuming undertakings for NGOs with limited resources. Conse-
quently, Sinologists, rather than human rights organizations, have come to 
monopolize the study of and much of the activity on human rights in China. 
Perusal of the published materials of well-known NGOs in the human rights 
field, such as the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva), the lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights (New York), the Parliamentary Human Rights 
Group (london), the International league for Human Rights (New York), 
and the International Human Rights law Group (Washington), as well as 
others, reveals few, if any, references to human rights in China in the 1970s 
or 1980s. The information gap- or the belief in it- has been one of the most 
serious deterrents to human rights activity. 
Sheer Numbers 
The difficulty of coping with the enormous numbers of Chinese victimized 
by their government also has discouraged many from taking up the issue of 
human rights in China. The scale of violations has been simply overwhelm-
ing. An anecdote illustrates the problem well. A New York Times correspon-
dent during a 1977 visit to China reported that an official told him that 
"China is the country where human rights are best observed" because more 
than 95 percent of the people enjoy human rights. After making some quick 
numerical calculations, the journalist asked whether this meant that more 
than forty million people (his estimate of 5 percent of the population) were 
in labor camps or prison. 33 Mao Zedong in fact had deprived 5 percent of 
the population of their rights, after branding them members of the reac-
tionary classes (landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and bad 
elements). He reported to the Politburo in 1956 that "two to three million 
counter-revolutionaries had been executed, imprisoned or placed under 
ment Printing Office, 1984), 741-743; China Executes Thousands (New York: Amnesty 
Action, 1983); j.F. Burns, "Criminals Up Against a Wall," International Herald Tribune, 
30 january 1986; Liang Heng and judith Shapiro, "Executions Mark Year of the Tiger," In-
ternational Herald Tribune, 12 March 1986; john Copper, Franz Michael, and Yuan-li 
Wu, Human Rights in Post-Mao China (london: Westview Press, 1985), 51. 
33. Susan L. Shirk, "Human Rights: What About Chinal," Foreign Policy 29 (Winter 
1977-78): 118. 
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control. ... " 34 Two years later, during the "anti-rightist" campaign, as many 
as 700,000 were reported to have been arrested, imprisoned, or sentenced 
to do hard labor.35 During the Cultural Revolution, the number of those per-
secuted was estimated at 100 million, or one-tenth of the population. Deng 
Xiaoping announced in 1980 that ''according to incomplete statistics, 
2,900,000 people have now been rehabilitated, and many more have been 
rehabilitated whose cases were not put on file or tried." 36 
Such large, unmanageable, and imprecise numbers have created 
serious problems of analysis for those involved in human rights. When the 
China Desk in the State Department informed the Human Rights Bureau in 
1980 that "hundreds of thousands" of prisoners had been released from 
labor reform camps and prisons over the previous two years, the information 
raised more questions than it answered. No one could say whether hun-
dreds of thousands remained, whether additional hundreds of thousands 
had perished, or how many were political cases. Many had been arrested 
during the ''anti-rightist" campaign and others during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. This meant that many had been incarcerated for ten to twenty years. As 
for how many Chinese prisoners were still held, a news story in 1981 
reported that "hundreds of thousands'' still toiled in Chinese labor camps, 
where more than 80 percent of those imprisoned were reportedly held. The 
article noted that the total number could be even higher. "[E)stimates," it 
said, "by former convicts vary from several hundred thousand to a million." 37 
A tremendous amount of time and effort would be required to organize, 
categorize, and evaluate such information and then develop a strategy to 
deal with it. The limited resources of many NGOs have precluded this. NGO 
campaigns launched in the 1970s for the release of political prisoners in Asia 
focused on Indonesia, Iran, the Philippines, and South Korea, where infor-
mation was readily available and the numbers, it can be said, were more 
manageable. No comparable campaigns were undertaken for the hundreds 
of thousands held in Chinese camps. To the outside world, moreover, these 
prisoners were undefined hordes of people. Because of China's long isola-
tion and the absence of outside contact, Chinese prisoners, unlike those in 
other countries, were nameless, faceless, and anonymous. The tens of thou-
sands held in Indonesia from 1966 to 1977 were by contrast not unknown. 
Quite a number had personal ties abroad, whether to professional col-
leagues, fellow students, members of governments, international organiza-
34. See Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in Selected Works of Mao 
Zedong 4 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1961 ), 418; see also Political Imprisonment, 
note 11 above, 28; Jonathan Mirsky, "Mao Killed Millions: Deng Just Detains," The 
Times, 14 November 1984; Statement of Hung-dah Chiu in 1985 Hearings, note 25 
above, 97. 
35. Weisskopf, note 5 above. 
36. See AI Report 1980, note 3 above, 193; Edwards, Henkin, and Nathan, note 3 above, 
97-98, 106, 174 n. 58. 
37. Butterfield, "Hundreds of Thousands," note 26 above. 
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tions, or human rights groups. One could identify with them more easily as a 
result, and many NGOs and governments vigorously took up their cases. 
The much larger numbers imprisoned in China, about whom little was 
known, were not dealt with. 
A second consequence of the magnitude of numbers has been the way 
the freedom of emigration issue has been dodged. Because of the prevailing 
fear that China might unleash its population on the rest of the world, no gov-
ernment or NGO has ever urged that the PRC open its gates and allow emi-
gration. As one State Department official put it, "If we pressed for free emi-
gration and they opened up, what would we do then?" 38 Such a dilemma 
arose in the United States in 1979 over whether to extend most favored na-
tion (MFN) treatment to China. Under U.S. law, the extension of MFN status 
to communist countries must conform to the human rights provisions of the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment which prohibits trading concession to those 
restricting emigration.39 The Soviet Union was denied MFN status in 1979 
because it restricted emigration although it had allowed 51 ,()(X) Jews as well 
as members of other ethnic groups to leave the country. In the case of 
China, its restrictive emigration policies were set aside. The United States 
cited liberalization in the area of family reunification to justify its decision to 
extend MFN treatment to China. Apart from political favoritism, it was clear 
that no one was prepared to make freedom of emigration an issue with the 
Chinese, especially after Deng Xiaoping sent shock waves through American 
officialdom by telling President Carter, "If you want me to release ten million 
Chinese to come to the United States, I'd be glad to do so." 40 It is revealing 
that even those who criticized the United States for a double standard in ex-
tending MFN treatment to China but not to the Soviet Union did not urge 
that emigration become an issue in U.S.-Chinese relations. They urged in-
stead that the Soviet Union be extended MFN status.41 
President Reagan, in supporting continued MFN status for China, admit-
ted that "[t]he limiting factor on Chinese emigration remains ... the limited 
ability or willingness of ... other countries to receive large numbers of 
38. State Department Official, conversation with author, 1980. 
39. The Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 402, 88 Stat. 1978, 2056-60 (1975) 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1982)). 
40. jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 
209. 
41. See Statement of Ernest Lefever in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights 
and U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organiza-
tions, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, Committee Print, 218 [hereafter cited as 1979 hear-
ings]; Statement of james D. Seymour in 1980 Hearings, note 1 above, 137 -138; Sandra 
Vogelgesang, American Dream, Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights 
Policy (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1980), 78, 106-107. 
One NCO, the International Human Rights Law Group, did in 1979 oppose extending 
MFN treatment to China, but on general human rights grounds, not to increase emigra-
tion (see Hearings of Subcommittee on Trade, Senate Finance Committee, Washington, 
D.C., 1979). 
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potential Chinese immigrants." 42 Obviously this has not been the case with 
immigration from the Soviet Union or other East European countries. In 
1984, 33 percent of Poles who applied for political asylum received it, and 
11,000 were admitted as refugees from Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. In the case of China, only 7.2 percent of asylum applications were 
granted and only thirty Chinese were admitted as refugees. "Curiously, ex-
cept for the odd tennis star (remember Hu Na?),'' commented one immigra-
tion expert, ''we no longer go out of our way to grant either refugee or 
political asylum status to those who want to leave Communist China." 43 A 
combination of the politics and the numbers will probably continue to make 
China a special case in the future. 
Prejudices in China's Favor 
Several distinct prejudices have worked in China's favor and have made 
many reluctant to judge Chinese human rights practices too harshly- its 
time-honored civilization, its daring socialist experiment, and its tragic 
history. 
Reverence for China's centuries-old civilization has blinded many in-
tellectuals in the West to human rights realities in the PRC. A U.S. historian 
pointed out that whereas students of the Soviet Union generally become its 
worst critics, students of China are usually enamored of its history and tradi-
tions. They do "not want to believe that a country that had developed such a 
high level of civilization could be so cruel." Although Chinese newspapers in 
the late 1960s ''were filled day after day with pictures of intellectuals being 
paraded through the streets in dunce caps and being humiliated verbally 
and physically at mass meetings ... we knew but we didn't want to 
believe." 44 The awe and fascination in which Chinese civilization was held 
made many Sinologists hesitant to criticize China. As the New York Times 
aptly commented following revelations of Chinese cruelty to prisoners, 
"[f]oreigners often found it difficult to associate the polite Chinese leaders 
with such brutality." 4 s 
President Carter wrote in his memoirs about China with a wonder and 
euphoria not extended to other countries. Speaking about Deng Xiaoping's 
visit to the United States he remarked, "I learned why some people say the 
Chinese are the most civilized people in the world." 46 
42. Statement of President Ronald Reagan upon signing waiver to U.S. trade law for China, 
USIA Wireless File, AFR-419, Washington, D.C., 31 May 1984. 
43. Chuck Lane, "Open the Door," The New Republic, 1 April 1985, 20-25. 
44. Merle Goldman, "The Persecution of China's Intellectuals," Radcliffe Quarterly, 67 
(September 1981): 12. 
45. "The Chinese Gulag," New York Times, 10 May 1979, Editorial sec. 
46. Cart~r, note 40 above, 211. In the U.S. case, the enthusiasm produced nearly forty 
treattes, agreements, and protocols with the Chinese in 1979 and 1980 alone, spanning 
trade, tourtsm, scholarly exchange, consular, aviation, and maritime affairs. 
14 CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Those few Western intellectuals who were able to visit China in the 
1960s or earlier exhibited both veneration for the superior civilization they 
found and a strong belief in the Maoist revolution as an answer to China's 
problems. In those days, many intellectuals, especially academics, hoped 
that socialism would really work in China. Despite the "cruelties and in-
justices" of the Chinese communists, "most of us believed" that they were 
"the first rulers in a hundred years to bring China out of chaos, famine and 
weakness." 47 Disillusioned by Stalinism in the Soviet Union, those on the left 
and center looked to China to redeem their belief in socialist solutions. They 
did not, therefore, protest the ·'anti-rightist" campaign, despite its hundreds 
of thousands of victims. They gave the benefit of the doubt to the Great leap 
Forward, now held responsible for the starvation of 20 million Chinese.48 
They discounted as "biased" the hair-raising testimony of Chinese refugees 
who managed to escape from the abuse and suffering of the Cultural Revolu-
tion and flee to Hong Kong.49 These intellectuals wanted to believe the 
Chinese model was the exemplar of a new type of socialism, and they bent 
over backwards to do so. Some radical scholars even "praised the Cultural 
Revolution as the model for future societies in which there would be true 
participatory democracy." One eminent Harvard scholar wrote, "The Maoist 
revolution is on the whole the best thing that happened to the Chinese peo-
ple in centuries .... "A British intellectual wrote, "It is difficult to write about 
the Cultural Revolution without running into a plethora of super-
latives .... " 50 
Paul Hollander in his study, Political Pilgrims points out that there was a 
"strong disposition" among Western intellectuals to find virtue in China 
because of their dissatisfaction and disenchantment with their own societies. 
Thus, those who felt alienated in the West or bitter about the plight of intel-
lectuals saw in China's dispatch to the countryside of its intellectuals, dem-
onstrations of "social equality," government involvement with intelligentsia, 
and of the ''merging of intellectuals with the masses." They refused to see the 
47. See Goldman, "China's Intellectuals," note 44 above; Hollander, note 28 above, 
278-346. 
48. Chinese sources today hold Mao responsible for massive deaths following the Great 
Leap Forward in 1958 when the government launched a crash program to communize 
agriculture, establish people's communes, and end private production. The fall in grain 
production and widespread famine that followed sharply contrasted with "many 
Western accounts of growing rural prosperity and of peasant commitment to Marxist 
values published in the 1960s and 1970s," see Thomas Bernstein, "Starving to Death in 
China," New York Review of Books 30 (16 June 1983): 36. See also V. Graham, "Chinese 
Economist Tells of Starvation Under Mao," International Herald Tribune, 24 April1981; 
Hollander, note 28 above, 290; Copper, Michael, and Wu, note 32 above, 21 n. 2; 
Miriam London, Ivan London, and Ta-ling Lee, "Bread, Rice, and Freedom," Freedom at 
Issue (May-June 1983): 6. 
49. Anita Chan, "Chinese Dissidents Abroad," Index on Censorship 9 (February 1980): 32. 
50. See Goldman, "China's Intellectuals," note 44 above, 13; Hollander, note 28 above, 278, 
298. 
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political pressures to which China's intellectuals were being subjected, or to 
believe that they were being imprisoned, tortured, or forced to do menial 
Jabor. 51 
Many scholars who overlooked human rights abuses in China also were 
reacting to the McCarthy period in the United States. Its unthinking opposi-
tion to Chinese communism incensed them as did its denunciation of any-
one who spoke positively about Chinese communist efforts to unify the 
country and provide food, shelter, and education for its billion people. 
Many in the intellectual community highlighted the revolution's achieve-
ments or dismissed as untrue, portrayals of China as unfree, regimented, and 
totalitarian in order to counter repeated criticisms of the communist govern-
ment coming from those of the political right, especially those who had 
never visited the PRC. In short, these intellectuals tried to approach China 
without the political bias of the time but in exchange substituted a reverse 
bias. As China hand jonathan Mirsky explained, Western scholars were "fed 
up with a quarter-century's denial that 'Red China' existed and the insistence 
that the Chinese capital was situated in Taipei." Many as a result suspended 
critical judgment. While noting "imperfections" here and there, the~ gave 
China ''slightly qualified approbation." 52 The opposition of many Western in-
tellectuals to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war added to the existing 
tendency not to criticize China. Because the PRC was portrayed in the West 
as the culpable party, they reserved their criticism more for the United 
States. 
The desire for normalization of relations with China further put on ice 
any impulse to protest China's human rights violations. "Most of us in the 
China field ... feared that if we pointed out and criticized the darker side of 
the Commurist rule, we would impede the movement toward normaliza-
tion." 53 Eagerness to visit China and to establish contacts firsthand overcame 
critical judgment. It was not, therefore, surprising that when China finally 
opened its doors in the early 1970s, the commentators, reporters, scholars, 
and political figures, allowed in for the first time since 1949, were euphoric 
about what they saw. Even though the terrible persecutions of the Cultural 
Revolution still were going on, they were enthusiastic and uncritical in their 
initial reports. As one U.S. observer wrote upon entering the PRC for the first 
time, "You leave Watergate, the energy crisis, crime, privacy, dirty movies, 
cynicism and sex at the border, and step across into safety, stability, en-
thusiasm, clean streets, clean talk and positive thinking.'' A British visitor 
even wrote favorably about the penal system, describing reform through 
51. Hollander, note 28 above, 339-343. 
52. Jonathan Mirsky, "Back to the land of little Red lies," The Observer, Sunday, 28 October 
1979. 
53. See Goldman, "China's Intellectuals," note 44 above, 13. 
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labor as having "the flavor of the kibbutz combined with the Marxist week-
end school. ... " 54 
The rosy pictures painted by the visitors were later a source of embar-
rassment to many of them. In one celebrated case, actress-writer Shirley 
Maclaine found herself berated by Deng Xiaoping himself for having ex-
tolled the benefits of the Cultural Revolution: 
At the White House dinner, Miss Maclaine enthusiastically recounted to Deng a 
meeting she had with a Chinese nuclear physicist who had been sent to a com-
mune to grow tomatoes. The scientist had assured her he felt much happier and 
more productive on the farm than in his lab ... 'He lied,' Deng cut her off. 'That 
was what he had to say at the time.' 55 
It was not until the late 1970s that journalists and scholars began to take 
a more clear-eyed view of China. As one commentator pointed out after the 
trial of the Gang of Four, "deep inside all the obfuscation was what we might 
have guessed all along- terror, torture and the usual human skulduggery." 56 
China's history also has worked in its favor, helping to keep Westerners 
silent about human rights. The forcible opening and the shameful exploita-
tion of China in the nineteenth century and thereafter, by the West, Russia, 
and Japan, frequently has been invoked as a reason for the West to move 
slowly on human rights issues. In hearings before the United States Congress 
in 1980 and 1982, many who testified on China cited exploitation by 
foreigners and China's past humiliation as a basis for inaction today: 
The current government sees in China's past a century of humiliation, when 
foreigners could do what they wanted in China without willing approval of the 
central authorities. A significant strain of the Chinese revolution focused precisely 
on this issue, and US [human rights] action based on our evaluation of China's 
policy toward its own people runs very much against this grainY 
54. See Hollander, note 28 above, 292-293, 338; see also l. Ladany, The Catholic Church in 
China, Freedom House, 1987, 31-33; Anne Thurston, "The Conflicting Images of 
China," Christian Science Monitor, 24 February 1984, International edition; William F. 
Buckley, )r., "Human Rights and Foreign Policy: A Proposal," Foreign Affairs 58 (Spring 
1980): 781; Mitchell A. Silk, "The Crime of Dissent in China," Problems of Communism 
34 Uuly-August 1985): 68; Edward Friedman, "The Original Chinese Revolution Remains 
in Power," in China from Mao to Deng: The Politics and Economics of Socialist Develop-
ment, ed. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 
1983), 24; Butterfield, China: Alive, note 4 above, 25. 
55. Butterfield, China: Alive, note 4 above, 55. 
56. Flora Lewis, "Chinese Mystery Wrapper," International Herald Tribune, 3-4 January 
1981. 
57. Statement of Kenneth Lieberthal in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Reconciling 
Human Rights and U.S. Security Interests in Asia: Hearings before the Subcommittees on 
Asian and Pacific Affairs and on Human Rights and International Organizations, 97th 
Cong., 2d sess., 1982, Committee Print, 339 [hereafter cited as 1982 Hearings]. See also, 
Statement of Robert W. Barnett in 1982 Hearings, ibid, 316-326; Statement of Hans 
Konigsberger, Love and Hate in China (New York, 1966), 25, quoted in Hollander, note 
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PRC officials in line with this view have made it clear on several occasions 
that they would consider criticism by outsiders unacceptable. Renmin 
Ribao, the People's Daily, in 1979 questioned the West's authority to talk to 
China about human rights, in particular when it had committed so many 
abuses in China in the 19th century. Western "imperialists," the official daily 
charged, brought the Chinese people ''death instead of human rights." 
Westerners "instructed the Manchu emperors, the northern war lords and 
the autocrat Chiang Kai-shek to kill the Chinese people and sometimes even 
did it themselves. How can they be in a position to lecture us on human 
rights?" 58 
Suspicion of foreigners and their influence has been a repeated theme in 
China's history. During the ·'anti-rightist" campaign and the Cultural Revolu-
tion, Chinese authorities singled out for persecution those educated in the 
West, those who had Western books or materials in their homes, or those 
who expressed Western ideas in their teachings or writings. Even after China 
turned to the outside world, Chinese officials warned its citizens against "ex-
cessive learning from ... the West." Former Communist Party General 
Secretary Hu Yaobang, although known as a reformer, asserted that "items 
praising things foreign should not be published." Similarly, the Party journal 
Red Flag in 1982 denounced the spread of foreign ideas as ''poison" against 
which disciplinary actions should be taken. 59 The "spiritual pollution" cam-
paign of 1983 also launched attacks against Western ideas and influence.60 
This deep-rooted mistrust of foreigners of course has led many to con-
clude that it not only would be unwise but counterproductive for outsiders 
to raise human rights issues with the Chinese. China specialists repeatedly 
have insisted that foreign efforts on behalf of persecutees during the Cultural 
28 above, 280; and Statement of Norris Smith, at freedom House Conference on "Sup-
porting Democracy in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China 
(Taiwan)," Freedom in the World, New York, 1984, 291-292. 
58. Fox Butterfield, "Peking in Reversal of its Position, Revives Some Curbs on foreigners," 
New York Times, 15 April 1979, sec. A; see also "Beware of 'Human Rights,"' Index on 
Censorship 8 (September-October 1979): 11. 
59. See "On Things foreign," Speahrhead 18 (Northern Summer 1983): 41-43. See also 
G. Earnshaw, "Praise of West Banned in China," Daily Telegraph, 3 January 1983, 4, col. 
7; C. S. Wren, "Beijing Struggles for Purity in Dress," International Herald Tribune, 20 
October 1983. 
60. The "spritual pollution" campaign sought to increase ideological orthodoxy in art, 
literature, and official writings by stamping out"deviations" such as "bourgeois" theories, 
"anti-socialist" sentiments, and moral corruption. The campaign later spread to attacks 
on Western dress, lifestyle, imported goods and ideas. See James D. Seymour, "Spiritual 
Pollution," in China Rights Annals 1, ed. James D. Seymour (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 
Inc., 1985), 137-143; Heng and Shapiro, Intellectual Freedom, note 18 above, 24-26, 
39, 42-43, 124-165, 179-180; Copper, Michael, and Wu, note 32 above, 29; "Cam-
paign Against Spiritual Pollution," Human Rights Internet Reporter 9 (March-June 1984): 
555-556; C. S. Wren, "China Starts Drive Against Spiritual Pollution," International 
Herald Tribune, 7 November 1983; Mark Baker, "China in Drive Against 'Spiritual Pollu-
tion,"' Financial Times, 18 November 1983, Overseas News sec. 
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Revolution would have been "counter-productive," and that foreign efforts 
"at certain periods since" also would have failed. Western ability to influence 
the situation overall is limited.61 NGO positions have reflected this view. The 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group in London responded to requests to 
protest executions in China in 1983 with the statement, "the Chinese author-
ities are not influenced by the kind of public pressures which may be applied 
elsewhere." 62 The International Human Rights Law Group in Washington, 
after discussing the issue of human rights in China at a Board meeting in 
1985, concluded that at present, the organization "couldn't be effective with 
the PRC."&3 A U.S. ambassador during the Carter administration quipped 
from his vantage point that unlike other countries, the PRC "simply won't 
play ball if we criticize them." 64 
Treating China differently from other countries has meant that greater 
deference has been shown to its government in the area of human rights 
than has been shown to other governments of the Third World or Asia. 
While international human rights energies have focused readily on the In-
donesians, Koreans, Filipinos, and even Taiwanese without too much sen-
sitivity to their histories, traditions, or customs, the view has prevailed that 
China is ''different." China's communist government, it is pointed out, makes 
China different from other countries of Asia. Its official conception of human 
rights markedly diverges from that of the West's. Specifically it does not ac-
cept "Western human rights standards." Although it has joined the United 
Nations, acceded to the UN Charter, and even ratified several of its human 
rights agreements, China's own concepts of human rights sharply differ from 
those in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.6s Because of China's 
enormous population and lack of modernization, its authorities have had to 
give precedence to food, shelter, health care, and education over other 
rights. Chinese traditions and history have buttressed this view by emphasiz-
ing the collective good over individual freedoms. Consequently at the 
United Nations, China has defined human rights almost exclusively in terms 
of the economic and social needs of the collectivity and has championed 
''collective rights." Its officials have denounced civil and political rights as 
61. See Rhoads Murphey, "Scholars, Learned Societies, and the Defense of Human Rights," 
Speahrhead 17 (Northern Spring 1983): 8; Statement of June Teufel Dreyer in 1980 Hear· 
ings, note 1 above, 125-126; Goldman, "Human Rights in PRC," note 4 above, 137; 
Statement of Harry Harding in 1985 Hearings, note 25 above, 93-96. 
62. Parliamentary Human Rights Group letter, 10 October 1983 (unpublished). 
63. Amy Young, Executive Director, International Human Rights Law Group, interview with 
author, November 1985. 
64. Statement of William H. Gleysteen, )r., in 1982 Hearings, note 57 above, 35. 
65. For a comprehensive discussion of how the Chinese view human rights, historically and 
today, and how this contrasts with Western and international standards, see Edwards, 
Henkin, and Nathan, note 3 above. See also statements of Jerome Grieder and Lucian 
Pye at Freedom House Conference, see note 57 above, 148, 237-239; R. john Vincent, 
Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Chatham House, 1986), 41-42; 
"Notes on the Human Rights Question," Beijing Review 22 (Fall 1979): 17-20. 
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"bourgeois'' concepts irrelevant to China.66 Some Western scholars as a 
result have proposed that Western approaches to China should be different 
from those made to other Asian countries. Taking Chinese official statements 
as their guideline, they have suggested that Western initiatives focus not only 
on civil and political rights but also on the ''welfare" needs of China's popula-
tion.&? China's communist background has thus worked in its favor, serving 
to confound many on how to approach it in the human rights area. 
NGOs that seek to establish dialogue with the Chinese Government 
have sometimes ended up showing greater tolerance of Chinese human 
rights practices than for those in other countries. The International Commis-
sion of Jurists (ICJ), for example, has been seeking dialogue and friendly rela-
tions with the PRC, especially with China's lawyers. But a study of its pub-
lished materials shows that the ICJ has avoided any criticism of human rights 
practices in the country.68 It may well believe that a dialogue will be possible 
only if the organization does not take issue with the Chinese. The ICJ's ap-
proach to the Soviet Union has been strikingly similar. After muting criticism 
of Soviet human rights practices for years, the ICJ succeeded in 1984 in 
establishing a dialogue with official Soviet lawyers.69 But no specific human 
rights violations were reported to have been raised at the meeting. With 
communist governments, which hold markedly different views of human 
rights, some organizations have tended to apply different standards and ap-
proaches, believing these will prove to be more effective. 
Discussions in New York in the mid-1970s between officials of the Inter-
national League for Human Rights and the International Commission of 
66. See Shen Baoxiang, Wang Chengquan, and Li Zerui, "On the Question of Human Rights 
in the International Realm," Beijing Review 25 (Summer 1982): 13; Edwards, Henkin, 
and Nathan, note 3 above, 130-131; "The History and Present Condition of Human 
Rights," Renmin Ribao, 13 April 1982, quoted in Copper, Michael, and Wu, note 32 
above, 4-5, 23; Statement of june Teufel Dreyer in 1980 Hearings, note 1 above, 
122-124; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 7979, note 15 above, 438, 440. 
67. Shirk, note 33 above, 110-111, 126. 
68. The ICj did in the late 1950s and early 1960s publish major reports on Chinese human 
rights violations in Tibet. In 1968 it made reference to public trial rallies held in China in 
defiance of international standards. See Yearbook of the United Nations (New York: Of-
fice of Public Information, United Nations, 1961 ), 138-140; Yearbook of the United Na-
tions (New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1965), 192; "Public Trial 
Rallies in People's China," Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists 35 
(September 1968): 25-29. However, soon thereafter ICj criticism of the PRC and of the 
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69. The ICJ held a meeting in Moscow in 1984 with the Association of Soviet Lawyers. The 
groups discussed in general terms human rights, nuclear weapons, and the administra-
tion of justice. According to the records of the meeting, no specific human rights abuses 
in the Soviet Union were raised by the ICj. See justice 28th Annual Report, "The ICj in 
Moscow," London, jun~ 1985, 31; and the final statement of the discussions, 3-7 
December 1984 (unpublished). For the opposition of the ICj to the raising of the Andrei 
Sakharov case by governments or NGOs at the United Nations in 1980, see Commen-
tary, The Review 24 (International Commission of jurists, June 1980): 33. 
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Jurists resulted in both organizations agreeing that more information should 
be collected before making approaches on human rights to Chinese officials 
at the United Nations.7° In the discussions, it was noted that efforts were 
underway in China to strengthen the rule of law, which might lead, in turn, 
to greater acceptance of international human rights standards. It was the 
hope of both organizations that the Chinese government would open its 
record to UN scrutiny and ratify both the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. However, Chinese nonratification of the Covenants and 
reluctance during the 1970s to hold a dialogue with NGOs, resulted in the 
deferring to the future of any efforts to deal with the People's Republic. This 
was not, of course, the case with other countries that avoided NGOs and 
shied away from international scrutiny. 
A recent Asia Watch report on China applied markedly different stan-
dards to the PRC as well. Rather than evaluating China in terms of interna-
tional human rights standards, as would be the case with other Asian coun-
tries, it published the enthusiastic account of two China experts impressed 
with the political and economic reforms of post-Mao China. Their report em-
phasized the human rights improvements they found and dwelled little on 
the human rights problems that remained. Only one sentence was devoted 
to the continued internment of political prisoners, and no listing was pro-
vided of their names or conditions of detention (notwithstanding the State 
Department's human rights report for the same period with estimates of 
100,000 to ten million labor camp inmates/1 inclusive of "counterrevolu-
tionaries" and the "socially undesirable'1. In the authors' opinion, "those 
whose rights are being violated most conspicuously today are not 
'dissidents,' at all, but those charged with ordinary crimes." While acknowl-
edging that they might be "overly optimistic" and that China's Communist 
Party "has a history of some of the most fearsome totalitarianism of this cen-
tury," they nevertheless affirmed that "the story of China under the reforms 
will be one of the most remarkable tales of liberation ever told." 72 
70. The author was Executive Director of the International League at the time and can claim 
no more virtue than others cited here in dealing effectively with China. For the text of the 
International Covenants on Human Rights, see Human Rights: A Compilation of Interna-
tional Instruments, United Nations, New York, 1978. 
71. See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985, note 31 above. 
72. Liang Heng and judith Shapiro, Intellectual Freedom in China: An Update (New York: 
Asia Watch Committee of the Fund for Free Expressions, 1985), 2-3, 26-27, 55. Their 
earlier report, Intellectual Freedom in China After Mao, note 18 above, published by the 
Fund for Free Expression in 1984, did provide an excellent description of the climate of 
political and intellectual opinion in China but contained certain excuses which would 
never be put forward with regard to the Soviet Union or other countries, for example, 
"(t]he lack of intellectual freedom in China today is perceived as a problem by only a tiny 
minority of the Chinese people," 201. Or "the communist suppression of religion during 
the Cultural Revolution and its current slightly disapproving neutrality toward it should 
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The deference shown China sharply contrasts with the harsh criticism 
leveled against the communist government of the Soviet Union by Western 
academics, the Western press, and many NGOs. While Western groups 
regularly have publicized the workings of the Soviet Gulag, little interest by 
comparison has been shown in the Chinese labor system. One explanation 
is that the Soviets long have been the undisputed "enemy'' of the West 
whereas China has alternated between enemy and friend, and is often not 
considered really ''communist." As one commentator put it, "Now that the 
Chinese seem increasingly 'ours,' [because of their reforms], their lack of 
human rights is not at issue." 73 
Another explanation has been that the Chinese, unlike the Soviets, have 
confessed their atrocities and have made a greater effort to correct past 
abuses. But there also is a double standard, "one for the Russians, who are 
European, and another for the Chinese, who are Asians and therefore not 
supposed to have the same feelings for human rights and life.'' As pointed 
out by New York Times correspondent Fox Butterfield, "If a Russian writer or 
artist is banished to Siberia, it is front page news in Europe and the United 
States .... But if a Chinese dissident is exiled to Qinghai, Peking's equivalent 
of Siberia, the story is cut to a few paragraphs on an inside page or not 
printed at all.'' 74 There seems to be a widespread belief that the great hordes 
of Chinese simply are not to be judged by the same human rights standards 
applicable to Europeans and those Third World people raised in the 
Western tradition. 
Special treatment has been given the PRC frequently out of fear that 
China might forbid entry and access to those who criticize its human rights 
record too harshly. During congressional hearings, it was noted that 
witnesses often were difficult to find because of "the reluctance of some 
scholars to prejudice their welcome" by publicly criticizing the human rights 
record of China and other Asian communist countries.7s American 
academics themselves have acknowledged that the "practical consideration'' 
of obtaining a visa has silenced many on human rights. The case of Harvard 
Professor John Fairbank is a noted example. He was denied entry to the PRC 
not be seen as a great hardship for the majority of the Chinese people .... " 54. For the 
State Department human rights report for 1985, see Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1985, note 31 above. 
73. Anita Chan, review of Intellectual Freedom in China After Mao, note 18 above, in China 
Rights Annals 1, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1985), 186. 
74. Butterfield, Chma: Alive, note 4 above, 489-490. China specialist Simon leys also has 
emphasized this point. See leys, "Is China 'Different'?" The New Republic, Washington, 
D.C., 7 October 1985,20. See also Fox Butterfield, "Double Standard Seen in U.S. Views 
of Chinese, Soviet Persecution," International Herald Tribune, 12-13 December 1981; 
Robert W. Barnett, "Make an Issue of Rights in China? No.," New York Times, 2 April 
1978, Editorial sec. 
75. Opening Remarks of Congressman Edward ]. Derwinski in 1980 Hearings, note 1 
above, 6. 
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for several years following the publication of critical views.76 The Minority 
Rights Group, an NGO in the United Kingdom, acknowledged to the author 
the difficulty of finding a scholar willing to write a candid report about 
China's minorities. Even when academic specialists have been willing to 
criticize China, their own universities have restrained them at times for fear 
of jeopardizing their academic exchange programs with the PRC. In a most 
celebrated case, Stanford University went to the extreme by dismissing from 
its doctoral program a graduate student, Steven Mosher, who published a 
critical article on forced abortion in China following an academic field trip. 
According to some accounts, Stanford dismissed the student after Chinese 
officials complained about him.77 
Absence of a Lobby 
The absence of a lobby for human rights in China 78 during the 1960s and 
1970s meant that little or no pressure was exerted on NGOs or governments 
to take up the cases of victimized Chinese. When dissident Wei Jingsheng 
was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment in 1979, a news story com-
mented that "[t]he fate of Mr. Wei ... attracted none of the attention given 
Soviet dissidents, whose trials last year strained Soviet-American relations 
and led the United States to cancel a computer sale." Chinese dissidents, the 
article continued, "attracted little attention among members of Congress or 
among organized groups." One of the reasons was that no pressure group on 
China had come forward to interest Congress and NGOs in human rights 
conditions in the PRC.?CJ 
Although a Tibetan lobby did become active in the 1970s on behalf of 
the rights of its own ethnic group,80 no comparable lobby for human rights 
in China developed. But the role played by pressure groups in providing in-
formation and getting others to act often has been critical. Most NGOs do 
not have large research staffs and cannot afford to look into human rights 
cases not reported in the press or brought to their attention by special in-
terest groups. Frequently, the impetus behind the inclusion of specific 
human rights concerns in U.S. foreign policy has been human rights lobbies. 
76. See for example, Goldman, "China's Intellectuals," note 44 above, 13. 
77. Fox Butterfield, "Did Stanford Give in to Chinese," International Herald Tribune, 8 June 
1983. See also "China Scholar Sues Stanford," Washington Post, 30 September 1986. 
78. Reference to a lobby on China should not be confused with the well-known "China lob· 
by" in the United States, a conservative grouping which formed in the 1950s to oppose 
U.S. recognition of the PRC and which continued to exercise considerable influence 
thereafter. Today called the "Taiwan lobby," it opposes closer U.S. ties with Beijing and 
at times issues damaging information on human rights in support of its political pur!Joses. 
79. Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Gives China Public Rebuke Over Dissident Trial," New York 
Times, 18 October 1979, sec. A. 
80. See Part II, "Growth of a Lobby." 
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Although special interest groups on Asian countries multiplied in the 
1970s and 1980s in response to the new international focus on human rights, 
no equivalent lobby for China emerged.81 The interest groups on Asian 
countries which formed, maintained links in the country concerned with 
local monitoring groups who wanted their human rights problems brought 
to international attention. But in China no groups existed locally, except 
briefly during Beijing Spring (1978). And even then, many activists in China 
did not look to the West for help or support. They generally confined their 
calls for democracy or "socialist legality" to their own leaders, seeking to 
reform their system within the bounds of socialism.82 Perhaps that explains 
why during my time at the International League for Human Rights (1971-
1978) and at the Human Rights Bureau of the State Department (1978-
1981), no established group came forward to urge that NGOs and govern-
ments take up the case of China. The influential Coalition for a New Foreign 
and Military Policy, headquartered in Washington and composed of more 
than fifty organizations, pressed the U.S. government and NGOs to take up 
human rights in South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines, but never in 
China. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, human rights directories did begin to list a 
few committees and associations on China organized at universities.83 None 
of these, however, were ''activist" groups intended to become influential 
lobbies. The Chinese Human Rights Society, formed in 1975 by a concerned 
and knowledgeable scholar, Mab Huang, did alert human rights groups to 
the situation in China, but the organization mainly acted as a kind of 
academic study group, bringing together concerned Chinese-American 
scholars and professionals. They wrote articles about China, sent telegrams 
on occasion, and sought broadly to promote a better understanding of 
Taiwan, China, and those countries with overseas Chinese. The Society for 
the Protection of East Asians' Human Rights (SPEAHR), established in 1977 
by a U.S. academic, also was not a pressure group. It provided valuable and 
detailed information on human rights conditions in China but did not lobby 
others to take a stand on t~e information. When its President, James 
81. Asian groups that became active included the Friends of the Filipino People, the Cam-
paign for Indonesian Political Prisoners (TAPOL), the Committee for Artistic and Intellec-
tual Freedom in Iran, and the North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea. 
82. See Goldman, "Human Rights in PRC," note 4 above, 118-126, 136-137. For a discus-
sion of the obstacles to the formation of human rights groups in China, see Liang Heng, 
Freedom House Conference, note 57 above, 225-234. 
83. Marguerite Garling, comp., The Human Rights Handbook: A Guide to British and 
American International Human Rights Organisations (New York: Facts on File, Writers & 
Scholars Educational Trust, 1979), 216; North American Human Rights Directory (Gar-
rett Park, Md.: Garrett Park Press, Human Rights Internet, 1980), 92-93; North American 
Human Rights Directory (Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Internet, 1984); Laurie s. 
Wiseberg and Hazel Sirett, eds., Human Rights Directory: Western Europe (Washington 
D.C.: Human Rights Internet, 1982). ' 
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Seymour, testified before the U.S. Congress and urged that more attention 
be paid to human rights in China, he did so in his personal capacity.84 In fact, 
those testifying before the U.S. Congress on human rights in China in the 
1980s invariably were academics. In France too, Sinologists took the lead in 
drawing attention to human rights violations in the PRC.85 There emerged no 
effective Chinese lobby group in the United States or Europe to press for 
human rights action on China. 
In the United States, minority groups, much more than human rights 
groups, have played influential roles in the making of U.S. foreign policy. 
Because of their voter strength, groups such as Greeks, jews, Irish, Poles, 
and more recently Hispanics and blacks, have exercised influence over key 
decisions about countries of interest to them.86 Americans of East European 
descent, for example, have ensured that U.S. government interest does not 
flag in the area of human rights in Poland and Czechoslovakia. American 
blacks successfully have pressed for sanctions against South Africa's apart-
heid regime. American Jews have made the subject of Soviet Jewry a critical 
issue in U.S.-Soviet relations. 
Chinese Americans have not entered this arena. Unlike other ethnic 
groups, which have not hesitated to challenge foreign governments, many 
Chinese have not wanted to embarrass the PRC. In part it has been a ques-
tion of pride, but also there is the fear that exposing China's human rights 
abuses would serve to impede the normalization and strengthening of 
Beijing's relations with the United States.87 Other Chinese Americans have 
not wanted to jeopardize the safety of their relatives or friends in China or 
their future ability to visit them. As one journalist commented, overseas 
Chinese, first allowed to visit their relatives in 1971, did not talk about what 
they saw or heard because they were "too frightened for their kinfolk." 88 
Some also may have heard the warning of a leading Chinese intellectual who 
spoke out against exposing China's injustices internationally as Soviet 
dissidents had done in the case of the U.S.S.R.: 
84. Statement of James D. Seymour in 1980 Hearings, note 1 above, 131-139. 
85. See Appeal of the French Association of Chinese Studies in Le Monde, 22 November 
1980; a report of demonstrations by French intellectuals at the Chinese Embassy in Paris, 
"Devant I'Ambassade a Paris," Le Monde, 28 November 1981; the Letter to the Editor 
signed by twenty Sinologists, Le Monde, 8 June 1984; the articles on human rights in 
China by Professor Lucien Bianco, Le Monde, 12 December 1981 and 9 September 
1982; and L. Fanchelieu and W. Zafanolli, "La Chine et les Droits de I'Homme," Le 
Monde, 13 October 1979. 
86. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy," foreign Affairs 59 (Sum· 
mer 1981 ): 975-998. 
87. See Miriam London and Ta-ling Lee, "China's Intellectuals," Freedom at Issue, 
November-December 1984, 11; and Christopher Thomas and Mohsin Ali, "Taiwan Re-
mains Sticking Point After Zhao's Friendly American Visit," The Times, 16 January 1984, 
Overseas sec. 
88. Edward Friedman, "In China, 70's Horrors," New York Times, 13 August 1980, Editorial 
sec. 
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We must not follow in the steps of a certain writer from the Soviet Union who 
specializes in writing about political prison camps and went to Western countries 
to publish his works. This course of action does not benefit the Chinese people, 
nor does it strengthen our unity and stability.89 
Whether future generations of Chinese will exhibit stronger activism on 
behalf of human rights on the mainland is not predictable. At 1985 congres-
sional hearings, a professor of Chinese origin did call upon the U.S. govern-
ment to express its concern about human rights in China.90 Of the tens of 
thousands of Chinese now abroad travelling or studying, a small number 
have chosen to defect to the West to promote human rights in the PRC. 91 
Certainly, the United States and other governments would more readily raise 
human rights concerns with the Chinese government if Chinese residents 
urged that they do so. Congressional interest in human rights in Taiwan fre-
quently has been sparked at the insistence ofT aiwanese Americans. In 1981 , 
when members of this community publicly protested the murder of a 
Taiwanese-American professor at the hands of the Taiwanese police, Con-
gress held hearings and adopted speciallegislation.92 Until a lobby directed 
at China comes forward, human rights issues are not likely to become a 
serious component of Washington's relations with Beijing. 
Exclusion from Human Rights Policy Debate 
China remained conspicuously absent from the debates in the United States 
and Europe which led to the incorporation of human rights concerns in 
foreign policy. These debates, which took place in the 1970s, focused almost 
exclusively on the human rights records of countries which received military 
or economic aid from the West. 93 Human rights initiatives were assumed to 
89. For statement of Xia Yan, see Heng and Shapiro, Intellectual Freedom, note 18 above, 
99-100. 
90. Statement of Hung-dah Chiu in 1985 Hearings, note 25 above, 93, 96. See also 1982 
Hearings, note 57 above, 365; Douglas Martin, "Open Letter in U.S." in "Door Still Open, 
Deng Declares," International Herald Tribune, 27 January 1987; ~ick Ravo, "Students 
From China Defend Open Letter Over Stifling Dissent," New York Times, 26 January 
1987. 
91. See discussion below of journal China Spring. 
92. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Taiwan Agents in America and the Death of Prof. 
Wen-Chen Chen: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on 
Human Rights and International Organizations, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, Committee 
Print. 
93. See House Committee on Foreign Affairs, International Protection of Human Rights: The 
Work of International Organizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 
1973, Committee Print; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights in the 
World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership: Report of the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Organizations and Movements, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, Committee Print. See 
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depend on diplomatic leverage and the amount of foreign assistance avail-
able. Because China did not have economic, military, or diplomatic ties with 
the United States, it was considered beyond the range of U.S. human rights 
policy. Congressman Donald Fraser, one of the architects of this policy, ex-
plained: 
[w]e bear a special responsibility to be concerned about human rights in coun-
tries with whom we are prepared to have a special relationship .... When a 
country which likes to associate itself with us is committing egregious human 
rights violations, it seems to me it is appropriate that we respond, even though we 
can't do anything about Bulgaria or China or some of the other Communist 
nations. 94 
It was regularly argued in Congress and other public fora that the main 
purpose of a human rights policy should be to ensure that Western military 
and economic aid was not used to strengthen the repressive capabilities of 
foreign governments. Legislation adopted by Congress in the mid-1970s thus 
conditioned foreign governments' receipt of U.S. security and economic 
assistance on their observance of human rights, and made their records sub-
ject to annual review by Congress and the State Department.95 The United 
States government, as a result, paid the most attention to human rights in the 
nations with which it had military and economic ties. Former U.S. National 
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski observed in his memoirs that in Asia, 
"human-rights factors contributed to adjustments in allocations to Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand for military training .... " 96 Assistant Secretary 
of State for Human Rights Patricia Derian cited progress at the end of the 
Carter administration in Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand, and South 
Korea where the United States had played a role and where "significant 
numbers of political prisoners have been released." 97 The governments of 
Britain and Western Europe similarly exerted human rights pressures on 
those countries where they had the most access and leverage. 
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The attention given to the human rights problems of those governments 
receiving U.S. aid prompted right-wing columnist William Buckley to com-
plain that "since we do not give aid to the communist countries they are of-
ficially exempted ... an interesting means of achieving immunity." 96 A 
former U.S. ambassador likewise warned against "taking action only against 
countries with which we are associated and which receive aid from us .... " 
He noted that "we appear to be more vociferous on the subject of human 
rights violations in South Korea, for example, than we are about violations in 
the People's Republic of China." 99 Congressman Fraser regretted that aid 
reductions to countries close to the United States led to the ''accusation" that 
"this is not an evenhanded policy" with regard to communist countries, but 
noted that "there is no easy way'' to deal with this problem since aid is not 
extended to communist governments.100 
The communist nations of Eastern Europe, however, were formally 
brought into the human rights fold when the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 
1975 by thirty-five nations of Europe and North America. As a result of the 
Final Act, Western governments and NGOs began regularly to monitor 
Soviet and East European compliance with the Act's human rights provi-
sions, and governments raised violations at the review conferences. The 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974 also brought the human rights records of 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe into focus by linking communist coun-
tries' emigration practices to the extension of most favored nation treat-
ment in trade. 
China, however, remained singularly outside the human rights fold. No 
human rights report on China was required by Congress or the State Depart-
ment until1980. 101 In congressional hearings and NGO meetings on human 
rights, China rarely was mentioned. At a major conference at Notre Dame 
University in 1977 on U.S. foreign policy and human rights, China did not 
enter into the discussions at all. Even the global human rights assessment 
opening the meeting omitted reference to China. Human rights abuses in 
Asia were summarized as follows: "In a number of Asian countries abundant 
evidence exists of prolonged detention without trial, of inhuman prison con-
ditions, and of executions. Indonesia, Iran and Iraq are those countries most 
frequently accused of such violations. Wholesale massacres in Cambodia 
have been reported." 102 Similarly, congressional hearings on "Human Rights 
and United States Foreign Policy" in 1979 mentioned China only in 
98. Buckley, note 54 above, 787. 
99. Statement of Charles S. Whitehouse in 1982 Hearings, note 57 above, 49. 
100. See note 94 above. 
101. See c;oun.try Report~ on Human R!ghts Practices for 1979, note 15 above. This report for 
the f~rst ttme contatned human rtghts information on communist countries and other 
non-aid recipient countries. 
102. A. H .. Robe~son, "Human Rights: A Global Assessment," in Human Rights and American 
For~tgn .Poltcy, Donald P. Kommers and Gilbert D. Loescher, eds. (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
Untverstty of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 7. 
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passing. 103 Concern with human rights in Asia focused on the situation in 
South Korea and the Philippines, and on the role human rights might have 
played in the downfall of the Shah of Iran. Most NGOs and members of Con-
gress wanted to make sure that U.S. assistance did not bolster repressive 
regimes with which the United States had ties. 
By 1982, the omission of China from foreign policy debates on human 
rights began to cause expressions of concern in Congress. One member 
warned: 
If we don't apply some human rights standards to China, even if ... it will 
perhaps have a marginal, negligible effect, or no effect at all- it makes us hypo-
critical when we apply pressure to any place else in the world . . because they 
can say, as they have said to my face when I traveled to some of these 
countries ... why do you write off the Soviet Union and China? It is almost half 
the world. 104 
However, even after Congress required a human rights report on China and 
held hearings on its human rights practices, the U.S. government tended, for 
political and strategic reasons, to continue to view China as largely exempt 
from the human rights initiatives applied to other countries. 
Exemption from Western Governments' Human Rights Policies 
President Richard Nixon set the tone for U.S. relations with China. Prior to 
his historic visit in 1972, which paved the way for the establishment of 
U.S.-Chinese diplomatic relations, he made it clear that the internal practices 
of the Chinese would not affect the United States seeking normal relations 
with them. His Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, emphasized in his 
memoirs that he did not even want to hear about the negative aspects of the 
Cultural Revolution. When Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai "turned to 
the subject," Kissinger recalled, and "recounted being confined in his office 
for a couple of days by the Red Guards ... I demurred that this was China's 
internal affair." 1os In Nixon's and Kissinger's view, it was imperative for the 
United States to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and to seek rap-
prochement with China. The sharp deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, 
which became evident in the 1960s, gave the United States an opportunity 
both to normalize relations with the PRC and to further drive a wedge be-
tween the Soviet Union and China. The importance of this geo-political goal 
made successive U.S. administrations pay little attention to China's treat-
ment of its own people. Although both the Carter and Reagan administra-
tions adopted human rights policies which they applied to a wide variety of 
103. See 1979 Hearings, note 41 above. 
104. Statement of Congressman Robert K. Dornan in 1982 Hearings, note 57 above, 360. 
105. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), 750-751. 
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countries, they noticeably exempted the Chinese- albeit to different 
degrees. Other Western governments omitted human rights from their 
agenda with the Chinese as well. For the United Kingdom, the status of 
Hong Kong and the Chinese economic market were major considerations. 
For the United States, political and strategic concerns were paramount, 
in particular, containment of Soviet power in Asia, curbing potential Chinese 
and North Korean aggression, gaining an edge for the United States in its 
global competition with the Soviet Union, and increasing military and 
political stability in Asia. 106 Such objectives consistently have overriden the 
issue of human rights, even when Western expressions of concern might not 
have jeopardized achieving these larger goals. 
The Carter Administration (1977-7981). Although the Carter administra-
tion made human rights a central feature of its foreign policy, it basically did 
not apply this policy to China. A Congressional Research Service report 
published in 1979 pointed out that "it was widely accepted within the 
b~,Jreaucracy that the People's Republic of China was not an appropriate 
target of human rights initiatives." 107 While some government officials feared 
that "ill-timed human rights efforts" 108 might jeopardize the establishment of 
full diplomatic relations, others, including human rights advocates, accepted 
that a relationship with China first had to be developed before leverage 
would be forthcoming to promote human rights. Assistant Secretary Derian 
thus readily expressed support for first developing these ties with China in 
1978, "It is our view that you can't really get very far if you are not talking to 
people .... " 109 However, when political and strategic concerns continued 
to be used to deter human rights initiatives, even after relations were 
established in 1979, Derian decried the administration's failure to take 
meaningful steps: 
Efforts to extend the work for human rights ... improvement to the com-
munist government of the People's Republic of China ... were stymied time and 
again .... Set to music the courtship of the PRC is 'Home on the Range,' where 
never is heard a discouraging word. 11 o 
In its diplomatic exchanges with the Chinese, the United States general-
ly made only passing references to human rights. Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance irr 1977 and 1978 described to the Chinese the importance attached 
by the United States to human rights but did not raise or intercede on behalf 
106. See ibid., 182; "Richard Nixon," The Times, 8 March 1986, Overseas News/law sec.; 
Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1983), 78; Brzezinski, note 96 above, 404, 542. 
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of specific Chinese cases. He stated the U.S. position on human rights and 
the Chinese stated theirs. His Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Af-
fairs, Richard Holbrooke, later told Congress, ''although we could, and did, 
argue the case for habeas corpus in certain countries, we could not, and did 
not, raise Western concepts such as due process of law in ... the People's 
Republic of China." 111 President Carter in his memoirs, while describing his 
discussions of human rights issues with visiting leader Deng Xiaoping, made 
it clear that he was not ready to press hard. Deng, according to the Presi-
dent, ''said the Chinese were struggling to make changes in their system of 
justice" and "that China favored the unification of any divided families, was 
not censoring the press, and had recently been permitting substantial 
freedom of speech and expression." The President did not question this 
statement or go over these points again. 112 
In 1977, the New York Times reported an administration effort to keep 
the issue of human rights in China from the public eye. It reported that the 
State Department was resisting a proposed visit to the United States by the 
exiled Tibetan Dalai Lama for fear that the visit might prompt public discus-
sion of human rights in China and meet with strong disfavor in Beijing. 113 It 
was U.S. policy to avoid public criticism of Chinese human rights practices 
for fear that it might jeopardize other foreign policy objectives. 
The first public statement made by the Carter administration on human 
rights in China thus commended the Chinese. Issued in November 1978, the 
statement praised China's acknowledgement of past violations as "a positive 
development reflecting what we hope represents an intention to seek further 
improvement." 114 But even this bland assertion occasioned controversy 
within the State Department. The Bureau of East Asian Affairs objected to the 
issuance of any statement that could be construed as critical and thereby 
upset the fragile U.S.-Chinese relationship. The Bureau of Human Rights 
advocated the statement on the grounds that a human rights policy which ig-
nored China had no credibility. Amnesty International, it pointed out, had 
just issued its first report on political imprisonment in China and the State 
Department could not remain silent. The compromise reached evoked the 
following comment in the Washington Post: "Despite a strong stand pro-
moting human rights globally, the administration has been exceptionally re-
served about criticizing the Chinese .... " 115 Other newspapers defended 
China's exemption from the Carter human rights policy. The International 
111. Statement of Richard Holbrooke in 1982 Hearings, note 57 above, 12. 
112. Carter, note 40 above, 207. 
113. Paul Grimes, "State Department Blocking Visit by Dalai Lama, Exiled in India," New York 
Times, 23 October 1977, sec. A. It took more than a year of wrangling between the 
Human Rights and East Asian Bureaus of the State Department before the Dalai Lama 
was allowed entry into the United States. 
114. State Department Press Guidance, 26 November 1978. Press Guidance, note 7 above. 
115. See note 7 above. 
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Herald Tribune specifically asserted, in the case of China, "[w]here human 
rights policy conflicts with incontrovertibly more compelling security inter-
ests, the human rights policy must give way." China's strategic importance to 
the United States, it argued, should override all other concerns: 
China is pivotal in the world power balance. Now that the Soviet Union has 
nuclear parity or better with the US and clear superiority in conventional forces, 
as well as a tactical advantage in most of the world's tinder boxes, the Peoples 
Republic is de facto, the most important single ally of the United States. 116 
This overblown evaluation of China's relationship to the United States 
typified the temper of the time and the dominant view in the State Depart-
ment. Nevertheless, when China's leading dissident Wei Jingsheng was sen-
tenced to fifteen years imprisonment, after advocating a more democratic 
political system, the State Department did issue its first critical public state-
ment. The department said it was "surprised and disappointed by the sever-
ity of [the] prison term" and revealed that U.S. officials had raised the case 
with the Chinese authorities. 117 
The Carter administration, however, did not issue any subsequent state-
ments on human rights in China during its term of office, although arrests of 
human rights advocates continued unabated with the new leadership crack-
ing down harshly on political dissent. Nor did the Carter administration raise 
privately any additional human rights cases with the Chinese authorities. 
Assistant Secretary Derian, in fact, complained to new Secretary of State 
Edmund Muskie in 1980 that the absence of any strategy for the PRC 
threatened the integrity of the human rights policy. In a memorandum to the 
secretary she noted that since 1979 no statement had been issued on China 
and no human rights cases raised. She characterized the U.S. human rights 
dialogue with the PRC as notable for its non-existence. 
When Congress in 1980 announced hearings for the first time on human 
rights in China, Derian seized the opportunity to break with the official 
silence. Over the strenuous objections of the East Asian Bureau, Derian 
asserted to Congress and the public that despite "the encouraging trends" in 
China under the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping: 
[E]ntrenched patterns of harassment, arbitrary arrest and harsh punishment 
without fair trial for political dissent still exist. Chinese Public Security officials are 
engaged in roundups of dissidents and do not generally respect the provision in 
the Constitution providing that 'the citizens' freedom of person and their homes 
are inviolable.' 
The Govern~ent sentenced the best known activist, Wei jingsheng, to 15 
years in prison in October 1979, and an editor ofthe 'April 5th Forum' has been 
116. "Human Rights Dilemma," International Herald Tribune, 16 April 1980, Editorial sec. 
117. Gwertzman, note 79 above. 
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in jail since November. Another activist was sentenced by the police to three 
years in prison for distributing transcripts of the trial. 
[T]he senior Deputy Premier's speech of mid-January 1980 ruled out any early 
return to China's recent period of free wheeling, open discussion, and urged the 
abolition of Chinese constitutional guarantees of the 'four big freedoms' i.e., 
speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding debates, and writing wall posters. 
New legislation was adopted in September 1980, which abolished these 'four big 
freedoms' ... wall posters, which had become in the post-Mao period a genuine 
outlet for freedom of expression, have been outlawed.118 
Her forthright testimony, which for the first time drew attention to ex-
plicit human rights violations in China, occasioned an unprecedented rebut-
tal by the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau of the State Department. Its 
Deputy Assistant Secretary John Negroponte, also present at the hearings, 
announced that he would "supplement" Derian's testimony and countered 
her evaluation by reporting that "an encouraging trend has begun to emerge 
in the direction of liberalization and away from the lawlessness and repres-
siveness of the cultural revolution which has been publicly condemned." 119 
A Chinese expert testifying at the hearings challenged the East Asian 
Bureau's assessment, "I would take strong exception to Mr. Negroponte's 
statement that things have gotten extremely better ... the situation has not 
gotten better since 1978. It has gotten considerably worse." 120 The chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs also took issue with Mr. 
Negroponte's description of an ''orderly transition of power" since Mao's 
death, reminding him that the Gang of Four had been arrested and were 
now on trial for their lives. 121 Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, stung by the im-
pact of Derian's statement, also decided "to supplement" her testimony and 
sent a lengthy letter to members of Congress after the hearings. "We offer 
these additional observations," he wrote, "to supplement other testimony,'' 
and affirmed that over the past two years, "the general climate for the ex-
pression of divergent views on economic, political and cultural matters has 
improved very broadly and significantly." 122 Since no reconciliation of the 
Human Rights and East Asian Bureaus' positions took place, a sharp diver-
gence of views became apparent in the administration over how to charac-
terize China's human rights record in public. 
The State Department's first human rights report on China in 1980 123 oc-
casioned a similar controversy. The Embassy in Beijing, to the consternation 
118. Statement of Patricia M. Derian in 1980 Hearings, note 1 above, 37-38. 
119. Statement of john D. Negroponte in 1980 Hearings, note 1 above, 43. 
120. Statement of june Teufel Dreyer in 1980 Hearings, note 1 above, 101-102, 117. 
121. Statement of Congressman Lester L. Wolff in 1980 Hearings, note 1 above, 43. 
122. Richard Hoi brooke, letter to Congressman Don Bonker, Chairman of Subcommittee on 
International Organizations, contained in State Department unclssified cable, 19 Octo-
ber 1980. This letter never reached Congressman Bonker and therefore did not appear in 
the record of the Hearings, as intended. 
123. Country Reports, note 15 above. 
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of the East Asian Bureau, sent a candid account of the Chinese human rights 
situation to the department for publication in the annual reports. Although 
the East Asian Bureau tried to water down the text, its position was under-
mined by the contradictory information being provided by its representa-
tives in the field. The report, as a result, was issued essentially as drafted. Its 
information certainly influenced the Carter administration's decision not to 
sell police equipment to the PRC, 124 which turned into the State Depart-
ment's most acrimonious dispute over human rights in China. 
The East Asian and Economic and Business Bureaus joined by the Policy 
Planning Staff, lined up against the Human Rights Bureau to argue that 
despite the arrests of dissidents and other serious abuses, the human rights 
situation in China had improved sufficiently since the death of Mao to war-
rant the sale of police equipment to the PRC. They alleged that refusal to do 
so would damage U.S.-Chinese relations. Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher did not, however, accept their view. He decided to ban the pro-
posed sale, and his decision was influenced by the human rights report on 
China which told of "a large prison system and numerous labor camps,'' 
ongoing political trials, and an ''extensive police system'' monitoring "the 
political activities of China's citizens." 125 Even more importantly, no "extraor-
dinary circumstances" could be said to warrant assisting the PRC in exercis-
ing internal controls over its own people. Unlike munitions list items, which 
the Carter administration had begun to sell China, 126 no national security 
considerations could be said to justify sales in support of the police. Another 
consideration in the department's decision was U.S. denial of police equip-
ment to several noncommunist Asian countries on human rights grounds; 
approving such sales for China would be too difficult to defend politically. 
On balance, the Carter administration did exempt the PRC from most 
human rights initiatives reserved for other countries. U.S. diplomatic repre-
sentations on human rights were low key, infrequent, and mostly unspecific. 
Public expressions of concern about PRC violations were generally avoided. 
This sharply contrasted with the vigorous private diplomacy and frequent 
public statements made about human rights violations in other countries. At 
the same time, toward the end of 1980, with full diplomatic relations 
established, the administration did demonstrate some willingness to apply its 
human rights policy. While it entered into an economic and security rela-
124. See Bernard Gwertzman, "Peking Police Seek Equipment from U.S.," New York Times, 
21 September 1980, sec. A. Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits the sale 
of police equipment to countries which engage in "a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights" unless "extraordinary circumstances'' 
warrant their provision, (see note 95 above), 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982). 
125. See Country Reports, note 15 above. 
126. T~~ Carter A?mi~istration beg~n to s~ll military support equipment and technology with 
m1htary apphcat1on to the Chmese 1n 1980 9n geo-political or "extraordinary circum-
stances" grounds in accordance with Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, see 
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tionship with China with little or no reference to human rights, it did draw 
the line at police equipment and even began to tolerate some critical assess-
ments of the human rights situation. Both Derian's testimony before Con-
gress and the State Department's Human Rights Report presented a more 
candid view than previously thought possible. 
The Reagan Administration (1981-1987). The Reagan administration 
went significantly further than the Carter administration in exempting China 
from human rights consideration. The Reagan administration took office 
determined to downgrade the role of human rights in foreign policy; it felt lit-
tle compunction about ignoring Chinese human rights violations. It also 
espoused rewarding its "friends" in the United States global struggle with the 
Soviet Union, which generally meant overlooking their human rights 
records. Although the administration repeatedly characterized communist 
regimes as the worst human rights violators, it did not apply such character-
izations to China. Thus, its preoccupation with forced labor and suppression 
of trade unions in communist countries never extended to China. Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, John Holdridge, told Congress that 
China would be differentiated from the Soviet Union and other communist 
nations because it "is not our adversary but a friendly, developing 
country .... " 127 
Although the administration came in on a platform to strengthen rela-
tions with Taiwan, which caused friction with the PRC, it showed no disposi-
tion to disagree with the Chinese over the issue of human rights. In fact dur-
ing the administration's first few months in office, it reversed the policy ofthe 
Carter administration and approved the sale of police equipment to 
China. 128 Providing direct assistance to China's security forces, known to be 
responsible for some of the worst human rights violations in the country, 
openly contravened U.S. law. The sale moreover was approved at a time 
when the Public Security Bureau was engaged in a systematic crackdown on 
dissidents and newspaper stories were describing forced labor camps and 
the arbitrary role of the police at these camps. A front page New York Times 
story, for example, entitled "Hundreds of Thousands Toil in Chinese labor 
Camps" reported that "[d]espite a recent effort to create a fair legal system 
and prevent a renewal of the arbitrary persecutions of the Cultural Revolu-
tion era, China still operates a vast network of labor reform camps populated 
by hundreds of thousands of prisoners." The article pointed out that many of 
those sent to labor camps were sentenced by the police without trial despite 
a newly adopted criminal code.129 Several reports in the Washington Post 
127. Statement of john Holdridge before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 16 july 1981, 
reprinted in Department of State Bulletin 81 (October 1981 ): 38. 
128. Approval was given for the sale of finger-printing equipment, computers, and other 
items; lethal equipment like shotguns were excluded. 
129. Butterfield, "Hundreds of Thousands," note 26 above. Re-education through Labor, an 
administrative decision approved in 1957 and republished in 1980, empowers the police 
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further emphasized the "harsh interrogation, physical beatings and injustice" 
to which political prisoners in China were being subjected by the police. 130 
The Reagan administration also failed to apply U.S. law on development 
assistance and human rights to China. Section 701 of the International Finan-
cial Institutions Act requires that the United States oppose development 
loans to countries in ''gross violation of internationally recognized human 
rights standards" unless the loans directly serve "basic human needs'' (i.e., 
the poorest elements of the society). 131 Pursuant to this law, the Human 
Rights Bureau in the State Department contested U.S. support in 1981 for a 
$200 million Asian Development Bank loan to China, pointing out that 
China had serious human rights problems and that the project did not meet 
the basic human needs criterion. The department nevertheless rejected the 
bureau's position and approved the loan, signaling that China's human 
rights record would not influence decisionmaking. 
The potential Chinese market for U.S. goods strongly affected the 
Reagan administration's attitude towards China. Assistant Secretary 
Holdridge told Congress in 1981: 
In the first quarter of this year, China became our third leading export market in 
Asia, behind Japan and the Republic of Korea. It is now our third largest 
agricultural market in the world. We want to help U.S. companies employ their 
technology edge fully and gain greater opportunities in the China market. 112 
U.S. government restrictions on the sale of advanced military technology 
and weapons to communist countries were lifted in the case of China after 
the administration reclassified the country as a "friendly non-ally." U.S. firms, 
with U.S. government support, actively began to seek a part of the Chinese 
market. By the end of 1985, Vice President George Bush announced on a 
visit to China: 
[Our economic] ties are central to the evolving Chinese-American relationship. 
Look how they have grown. 
In 1972 our two-way trade came to less than $100 million. This year it will ex-
ceed $7 billion. In 1972 the United States had almost no investments in China. 
Today America is the largest foreign country investor. Americans have committed 
to detain people without trial in labor camps or prisons for one to three years (with 
renewable sentences). The detainees receive pay for their work, unlike those tried and 
sentenced to long terms in prison, labor camps or mobile units under the Labor Reform 
Law of 1954. For detailed information on these two penal practices and their merger in 
1980 into a single re-education through labor system, see Copper, Michael, and Wu, 
note 32 above, 64-65; and China: Violations, note 26 above, 89-90. 
130. See Michael Weisskopf, "Glimpses of Chinese Prison Life,• Washington Post, 15 
September 1981, sec. A; Michael Weisskopf, "China's New Party Chief Vows to Quash 
Dissidents,• Washington Post, 26 September 1981, sec. A; Weisskopf, "China Ends a 
Fling," note 20 above. 
131. The International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, Pub. l. No. 95-118, § 701, 91 Stat. 
1067, 1069-70 (1977) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262d (1982)). 
132. Statement of John Holdridge, note 127 above. 
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$150 million to more than 60 joint equity ventures and another $550 million in 
off-shore oil exploration .... Some of America's most extensive involvement is in 
areas that China has identified as those most in need of development- energy, 
transportation, telecommunications, and management. 133 
Because of its growing economic interests and political objectives, the 
Reagan administration repeatedly has refrained from making any public 
statements about China's human rights record. Secretary of State George 
Shultz when asked by the press in 1984 whether he had raised human rights 
issues with the Chinese, expressed annoyance: 
We haven't had a- any major discussion of their internal governmental opera-
tions other than the comments made by the Chinese themselves .... 
I don't know what you mean by human rights approaches. There are matters 
that we'd like to see some action on and one or two of these have been men-
tioned privately. The excesses of the Cultural Revolution, we hope, and they 
seem to hope, are behind them, but I don't know what you have in mind and the 
idea that we should go around ... the world- everybody all the time, I don't 
quite buy it.134 
Human rights were conspicuously absent from President Reagan's agenda 
when he visited China in 1984. The Public Affairs Guidance prepared by the 
U.S. Information Agency omitted any reference to human rights in the trip 
objectives. The Guidance emphasized the ''many areas of agreement" be-
tween the United States and China. It caused the Washington Post to com-
ment that ·'a whole other side of China- its repressive side" has been 
omitted from the president's itinerary and agenda. 135 
Before Congress, administration officials regularly sought to minimize 
the extent of human rights violations in China. They managed this by em-
phasizing "improvements." The Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs af-
firmed in 1981 that "with some exceptions, the generally positive trend of the 
past few years continued." When questioned about the extensive Chinese 
labor camp system which was being widely reported in the press, he admit-
ted he knew ''very little indeed" about that.136 The Assistant Secretary of 
133. "Vice President Bush Visits China," Department of State Bulletin 85 (December 1985): 
18. 
134. Statement of Secretary of State George Shultz on "This Week with David Brinkley/ 
Beijing, 29 April 1984. 
135. See USIA Public Affairs Guidance No. 84-27: "President Reagan's Trip to the PRC," 21 
April 1984, Washington, D.C.; "An Unsentimental Visit," editorial, Washington Post, 
reprinted in International Herald Tribune, 28-29 April 1984. In an address intended for 
broadcast, the President did extol the free enterprise system and make reference to polit-
ical freedom in the context of criticizing the Soviet system. The Chinese government 
censored these remarks. See C.S. Wren, "Chinese Again Delete Remarks," International 
Herald Tribune, 30 April 1984; "The New China Hand," editorial, New York Times, 
reprinted in International Herald Tribune, 3 May 1984. 
136. Statement of John Holdridge, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Implementation of 
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on Human Rights and International Organizations and Asian and Pacific Affairs, 97th 
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State for Human Rights, Elliott Abrams, in 1982 also noted improvements in 
the Chinese record, "it is better than it was a few years ago under the Gang 
of Four. There has been an improvement since the years of the Cultural 
Revolution." 137 
Administration officials arrived at the determination of "improvements'' 
in several ways. First, they made sure to contrast current human rights viola-
tions with those under the Cultural Revolution. By using this cruel and brutal 
period as a point of departure, improvements always could be found. (This 
would be roughly comparable to making the Stalinist period in the Soviet 
Union the benchmark for evaluating human rights in the Soviet Union, an 
approach never even remotely contemplated by the Reagan administration.) 
The arrests, beatings, and detentions without trial of China's dissidents in 
1981 thus could be portrayed as improvements rather than setbacks since 
during the Cultural Revolution they would have been executed. Second, ad-
ministration officials placed great emphasis on expected changes in the 
human rights situation, as if they had already occurred. Thus, the adoption 
of a new criminal code was hailed as if the entire system of justice had al-
ready been revamped on the basis of the code. The non-self-executing 
nature of most of China's announced reforms, their restrictive application, 
and their repeated violation were invariably overlooked. Third, administra-
tion officials compared human rights conditions in China to those in other 
communist countries where they deemed the situation worse. Thus, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Thomas Shoesmith of the East Asian Bureau, when asked 
about China by members of Congress in 1982, answered by comparing 
China to other communist countries: "The Government of China is neither 
as brutal toward its own citizens or as threatening to its neighbors as either 
North Korea or Vietnam .... In contrast to the USSR, China is not attempt-
ing to undermine democratic regimes .... " 138 
Not all Reagan administration officials have felt comfortable about 
treating China differently. Assistant Secretary Abrams, when asked by Con-
gress about the evident contradiction between U.S. human rights require-
ments and the United States growing military and economic relationship 
with China replied, "China is probably the best example of countervailing 
considerations- namely, the geopolitical and strategic considerations." 139 
Assistant Secretary Richard Schifter who replaced Abrams as head of the 
Human Rights Bureau in 1985, also exhibited uneasiness on the subject. He 
sought to justify China's exemption by claiming that the Carter administra-
tion had also applied a double standard to China: 
As we all know, we have not made a major issue of the human rights record of 
the People's Republic of China, not during the Carter years and not since then. 
137. Statement of Elliott Abrams, Hearings, note 136 above, 23 February 1982. 
138. Statement of Thomas Shoesmith, 1982 Hearings, note 57 above, 438. 
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We have seen the wave of democratization which crested in 1978, recede. We 
have refrained from public criticism not for lack of sympathy for the brave souls 
who came forward a few years ago to put posters on Democracy Wall but 
because we did not think it was in our national interest to speak up .... 
What I have thus suggested is that relating our human rights policy to other 
foreign policy concerns and then acting on the basis of what we consider to be in 
our national interest is not a new approach, invented by the Reagan Administra-
tion. It is a perfectly understandable and wholly defensible aspect of our conduct 
of foreign affairs.140 
No doubt those in the administration who found it untenable regularly 
to ignore China were responsible for its first public mention of China's 
human rights. Vice President Bush, on a visit to China in 1985, disclosed to 
the press that "he had raised the question of human rights in China during his 
meeting with Chinese leaders." 141 Although he refused to reveal any 
specifics, it was clear that after five years in office, the Reagan administration 
wanted it known that at least in the area of quiet diplomacy, its human rights 
policy extended to China. Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pa-
cific Affairs James Lilley also told Congress that the United States had raised 
human rights with the Chinese but added typically, "[w)e don't necessarily 
see a great advantage in banging them over the head with it, they are very 
sensitive people .... " 142 
China's human rights record also came to the fore when tennis star Hu 
Na applied for political asylum in 1983, claiming a well-grounded fear of 
political persecution should she return home. The East Asian Bureau in the 
State Department and others in the administration advocated that asylum 
should be rejected because the political costs would be too great, and in-
deed, the Chinese did cancel cultural and athletic ties with the United States 
after asylum was granted. 143 Assistant Secretary Abrams, however, strongly 
supported Hu Na's request for asylum on legal grounds, pointing out that it 
is U.S. law that counts, and that, "(i]t is really irrelevant what the view of the 
Chinese Government is .... " 144 The Congressional Subcommittee on 
Human Rights, prior to Abrams' statement, had informed him that it would 
like to serve public notice on the Reagan administration that there would be 
140. Statement of Richard Schifter (then Alternative Representative to the UN Human Rights 
Commission), "The United States Government's Commitment to Human Rights," Coun-
cil of Americas, New York, 3 June 1981. 
141. "Bush Reticent after Raising Chinese Human Rights Issues," The Times, 16 October 1985, 
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tional Herald Tribune, 8 April 1983; P. Taubman, US Down plays Chinese Warning," In-
ternational Herald Tribune, 5 August 1982. 
144. Statement of Elliott Abrams, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Review of U.S. Human 
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Organizations, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, 16-17. 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 39 
a tremendous congressional uproar and fight if the decision were not made 
in the affirmative. 
Although the Reagan administration in the end did stick by U.S. laws 
and principles and grant Hu Na asylum, it was not so principled in subse-
quent cases. The administration rejected the request for asylum of Chinese 
physicist Xia Yunen, arguing disingenuously that the publicity generated in 
his case would protect him from reprisal upon his forcible return to the PRC. 
Other prospective defectors from China also fared poorly. 145 Essentially the 
Reagan administration continued to exclude China from its human rights 
policy despite the rapid development of economic and military ties with the 
PRC, which under U.S. law should have made human rights considerations 
an integral part of foreign policy. 
The United Kingdom and Europe. Former British Foreign Secretary 
David Owen, in affirming his support in 1977 for the Carter administration's 
human rights policy, said: 
In Britain we will take our stand on human rights in every corner of the globe. 
We will not discriminate. We will apply the same standards and judgments to 
Communist countries as we do to Chile, Uganda and South Africa.146 
The human rights policy adopted by the British government, however, like 
its U.S. counterpart, never extended to China. In 1979, a group of Chinese 
dissidents appealed to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to raise the case of 
Wei Jingsheng with Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng who was visit-
ing Britain at the time. The appeal, which was also sent to the British press, 
said: 
We feel sure that you will lend us your aid. If Wei Chingsheng gains a speedy 
release through your help, the Chinese people will be eternally grateful to you, 
for this is not just an issue for one individual, Wei Ching-sheng, nor of a certain 
magazine, Exploration [of which he was editor], but it is an issue which affects the 
whole future of democracy in our country.147 
Prime Minister Thatcher, according to press reports, did not reply to the ap-
peal or express any concern about the case to Hua Guofeng; she claimed 
she had never received the letter. 
According to a Foreign Office official, it is not British government prac-
145. Jay Mathews, "US Judge Orders Expulsion of Chinese Defector," International Herald 
Tribune, 24 January 1984. Over 1,000 Chinese on exchange programs have applied for 
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Herald Tribune, 28 March 1983, editorial sec. See also statements of Hung-dah Chiu and 
John Copper, 1985 Hearings, note 25 above, 72 n.21, 252; statement of )ames D. 
Seymour, Freedom House Conference, note 57 above, 299-300; Lane, note 43 above. 
146. Congressional Record, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, 123, pt. 6: 6850. 
147. See C. Hollingworth, '"Free Dissident' Plea from China," Daily Telegraph, 8 November 
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tice to raise human rights issues with the Chinese. The PRC, in Britain's view, 
would find this offensive and the United Kingdom has to give overriding 
consideration to the future of Hong Kong, its crown colony. Chinese off.icials 
had begun to insist by the 1970s that the territory be returned to China. The 
weakness of the British bargaining position was well known. All China had to 
do to retake the territory was to shut off Hong Kong's water supply. Britain 
wanted to assure a peaceful transition to Chinese sovereignty and a special 
economic and political status for Hong Kong, including guarantees of indi-
vidual rights for its 5.5 million residents. In addition, Britain had approx-
imately $2 billion directly invested in Hong Kong which it wished to protect. 
The United States had another $2 billion invested. Britain was loathe to take 
any step that might irritate the PRC, such as raising the subject of Chinese 
human rights practices. 
Negotiations over Hong Kong's future began following Prime Minister 
Thatcher's visit to Beijing in 1982. Under the terms of the Anglo-Chinese 
agreement, signed in December 1984, it was agreed that Hong Kong would 
be returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 with the status of a ''special ad-
ministrative region." The agreement provided safeguards both for the terri-
tory's free enterprise economy and for the political rights and freedoms of its 
inhabitants. These safeguards were to remain in force fifty years after 1997, 
at which time the PRC could make amendments. The agreement affirmed 
that all the rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong's population prior to 
the transfer of sovereignty would be preserved, including "freedom of the 
person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form and join 
trade unions, of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike, of 
demonstration, of choice of occupation, of academic research, of belief, in-
violability of the home, the freedom to marry and the right to raise a family 
freely." 148 
Although the British Foreign Office maintains that China will honor its 
policy of "one country, two systems" for Hong Kong after 1997, there are 
good reasons to doubt whether the safeguards agreed to in the political 
sphere will in fact apply after the territory reverts to Chinese rule. When the 
British instituted Hong Kong's first local elections in 1985 as a first step 
toward representative government, the Chinese strongly objected. The PRC 
evidently saw in the elections a threat to its plans to make the territory's gov-
ernment more like its own political system. The British as a result seem to 
have backed off from trying to make Hong Kong politically autonomous 
prior to 1997.149 
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But even before the Anglo-Chinese agreement was signed, the PRC 
began to suppress the political viewwf publications and individuals in the 
territory. In 1981, the Chinese forced the closure of the Hong Kong daily 
Zhengming Ribao by pressuring Hong Kong firms which did business with 
the PRC to withdraw their advertisements from the daily. The Chinese had 
been angered by the paper's staunch support of the Democracy Movement. 
Similar pressure by Chinese authorities resulted in the closure of the publica-
tion Seventies, which also had been deemed too critical of the PRC. 150 Some 
Hong Kong publications have begun as a result to shift their positions along 
more pro-Beijing lines. 151 It is reported that the Chinese authorities have a 
list of sixty Hong Kong writers and intellectuals who will be arrested if they 
enter the PRC; nearly 100 Hong Kong residents already have been arrested 
or have disappeared on visits to China, some because of their activities on 
behalf of human rights. 1s2 
The U.K.-Chinese agreement on Hong Kong's status provides that the 
territory's legal system will be maintained so long as its laws do not conflict 
with the Basic Law for the region, which the PRC currently is drafting. The 
detention, however, in the PRC of Hong Kong residents because of views 
they expressed while in Hong Kong strongly suggests that the Chinese gov-
ernment already considers its criminal justice system applicable to the terri-
tory. It remains highly questionable that Hong Kong residents will enjoy the 
same degree of political, civil and religious rights they do now after Hong 
Kong reverts to Chinese sovereignty. Some Hong Kong Chinese have begun 
to fear that Britain's political and economic interests in China will take prece-
dence over the continued defense of the rights of Hong Kong's inhabitants. 
The British press has reported "a widely held view among many Hong Kong 
inhabitants" that "Britain cares less about their fate than it does about im-
proving relations and trade with China." 153 
Expanding trade and developing new markets with China has been a 
major British concern. Although the British government has restricted the 
sale, on human rights grounds, of lethal equipment to the Chinese police, it 
has placed no bars on nonlethal equipment such as computers. Britain has 
vigorously vied with its Western European competitors for shares of the 
Will Delay Further Reforms," International Herald Tribune, 21 January 1986; Patrick 
Smith, "Beijing and the Future of Hong Kong," International Herald Tribune, 11 February 
1987. 
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Chinese market in energy, transportation, and telecommunications. Accord-
ing to The Times of London, "the settlement last year with China over the 
future of Hong· Kong, coupled with the prospect of the Queen's visit here 
next year, has created the climate for a big push for new business." 154 For 
both the British and West Europeans, the potential Chinese market serves as 
one added reason for avoiding the issue of human rights. 
When the Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang visited Brit-
ain in 1986, Mrs. Thatcher did not raise human rights cases with him. 
Amnesty International had brought to the Prime Minister's attention the 
cases of ten political prisoners, among these a Catholic priest detained for 
thirty years, a Catholic Vicar-General detained since 1983, and imprisoned 
members of the Democracy Movement, in particular Xu Wenli and Wei 
Jingsheng, both sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. The Prime Minister 
informed Amnesty that she told Hu Yaobang only that Britain considered im-
portant "the current development of legally-enshrined rights in China." 155 
Although the French government has been known to raise individual 
cases with Chinese authorities, in particular those involving some tie with 
France, most West European governments have remained silent. The foreign 
ministers of the European Economic Community (EEC) have made no 
human rights representations to China, though they have to other govern-
ments. In 1985, a delegation of the EEC's European Parliament deliberately 
did not raise human rights issues with Chinese officials while visiting the 
PRC, although the European Parliament earlier had adopted a resolution 
noting ''widespread human rights violations in China." 156 The Parliamen-
tary delegation decided against placing human rights on the agenda of its 
meetings with the Chinese because it took the view: 
[T]hat its mandate and terms of reference required it to seek areas of agreement 
and to develop good relations and not to raise matters which were bound to 
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prove a stumbling block. And indeed, having only recently emerged from isola-
tionism, the Chinese authorities were not yet ready to agree to their laws, 
customs, and penal traditions being the subject of international debate let alone 
in public. 157 
At the United Nations 
When China entered the United Nations in 1971, some of the worst ex-
cesses of the Cultural Revolution were taking place. Arbitrary arrests, forced 
labor, and summary execution were the fate of hundreds of thousands, 
possibly millions, of Chinese. UN human rights debates and resolutions, 
however, made no mention of these massive violations. Although Chinese 
violations in Tibet were debated by the UN General Assembly in 1959, 1961, 
and 1965 and resolutions calling upon China to cease depriving the Tibetan 
people of their fundamental rights and freedoms were adopted, 158 no discus-
sions took place of violations in China as a whole and UN concern for the 
Tibetans lessened as support developed for China's entry into the United 
Nations. 
To a large extent, China's exclusion from the United Nations for more 
than twenty years explained the general reluctance to raise the subject of its 
human rights practices. Many felt that China had been wrongfully denied its 
place at the United Nations and now should be welcomed and integrated 
into the United Nations system. The United States, having blocked the PRC's 
entry for so long, was eager to develop its relations with China and to avoid 
new irritants. The Chinese were newcomers to the international scene; it 
was generally felt everyone should go slowly. NGOs reflected this view. 
They waited for China to familiarize itself with the UN's human rights 
standards before making approaches. Amnesty International did not seek 
dialogue with China's UN representatives until the mid-1970s. The Interna-
tional League for Human Rights did not call upon China to ratify the Interna-
tional Covenants on Human Rights until 1979. 
The first years of China's participation in the United Nations were also a 
time in the UN's history when it did not act on human rights violations in 
member states. There were two exceptions- Southern Africa and the Israel-
occupied territories- where it was argued that international peace and secu-
rity were threatened. Most UN members were opposed to investigations, 
reports or resolutions on the "internal affairs" of their own or other countries, 
157. Ibid., A2-121/85/ll, 20. 
158. See G.A. Res. 1353 (XIV), 1723 (XVI), and 2079 (XX) and summary of debates on the 
Question of Tibet, contained in Yearbook of the United Nations (New York: Office of 
Public Information, United Nations, 1959), 67; Yearbook of the United Nations (New 
York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1961), 138; Yearbook of the United 
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arguing that the United Nations had no jurisdiction in these matters. This 
position did not begin to erode until1974 with the adoption by the General 
Assembly of a resolution on Chile. Thereafter, a fundamental change oc-
curred. UN human rights bodies began to take action on specific violations 
in a range of countries. If Chile could be singled out, it was argued, other 
states also could be criticized. This reflected a slow but growing acceptance 
of the view that states should be held accountable to the international com-
munity for their domestic human rights practices. The Carter 
administration's human rights policy, NGO lobbying, a strong Western 
stance, and the support of many Third World countries accelerated this new 
approach. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the UN Human Rights Com-
mission began to take up, either in confidential or public sessions, human 
rights conditions in Poland, Argentina, Kampuchea, Iran, Afghanistan, El 
Salvador, Sri Lanka, and other countries. The commission also began to pro-
vide technical assistance to states, such as Equatorial Guinea, Bolivia, and 
Uganda, to help them restore the rule of law after having suffered serious 
human rights upheaval. 
China, however, remained untouched by these initiatives and delibera-
tions. Its human rights record did not come up for discussion or action. Nor 
was UN technical assistance offered to the PRC following the Cultural Revo-
lution. NGOs and governments, in fact, scrupulously avoided reference to 
China in their statements and proposals in the 1970s and early 1980s. Even 
UN reports on human rights subjects made no mention of China. A revised 
and updated report on the prevention and punishment of genocide, for ex-
ample, made no reference to the Tibetan case in a listing of post-Holocaust 
examples of massacres. 159 Yet, the United Nations had earlier denounced 
China for suppressing the cultural and religious life of the Tibetan people, 
and reports published by the International Commission of Jurists in the 
1960s had found that Chinese policies intended to destroy the Tibetan peo-
ple as a distinct ethnic group. 160 Neither Third World countries, whose 
causes China championed at the United Nations, nor the major powers, 
with their own political and economic objectives, wanted to antagoni~ the 
Chinese by raising their human rights record. 
China also came to enjoy the immunity at the United Nations reserved 
for the permanent members of the Security Council. To date, no resolutions 
have been adopted, studies prepared, or investigations undertaken on any 
of the great powers' human rights records. Although NGOs have pointed 
out violations occurring in the Soviet Union, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom during Human Rights Commission debates and have sub-
159. See Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 2 july 1986, 9-10. 
160. See note 158 above. 
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mitted complaints against all three countries under the UN's confidential 
1503 procedures, no action has ever resulted. Most states and NGOs have 
preferred to focus their energies on countries of more marginal political sig-
nificance where the votes are more obtainable and the retaliation is less 
severe. They have also sought to prevent superpower confrontation from 
overly politicizing human rights debates. As a result, scrutiny has fallen 
mainly on smaller countries that are less capable of retribution. This situa-
tion, of course, could change, but during the fifteen years that China has 
been represented at the United Nations, the system essentially has operated 
to exempt the PRC from any close look at its human rights record. 
PART II. BREACHING THE WALL AROUND CHINA 
Occasionally the reasons put forth for not pursuing human rights issues with 
the Chinese have been persuasive, but all too often they have been excuses. 
Basically, governments and NGOs have not wanted to tackle the formidable 
problems involved- the collection, analysis, and translation of information 
on a country so long isolated and beyond reach, the development of a dia-
logue with the Chinese on a subject as sensitive as human rights, and the fear 
that raising such issues would jeopardize good relations with the PRC. It has 
been easier to fall back on well-trod, accepted rationalizations. 
Yet the potential today for dealing with human rights in China has never 
been greater, even though the same stale arguments continue to be mus-
tered against doing so. Thus, it is still alleged that there is insufficient infor-
mation on which to act, that the Chinese don't accept international human 
rights standards, that they brook no criticism, and that it would be counter-
productive to raise human rights issues with them. But as will be seen, each 
of these reasons has lost a great deal of validity. New developments have oc-
curred that are breaching the wall which for so long has shielded China from 
accountability. 
Availability of Information 
The most promising new development has been expanded access to China 
which has made human rights information more available. Although many 
persist in emphasizing the difficulties in obtaining information, since the late 
1970s China has allowed large numbers of tourists, businessmen, scholars, 
professionals, and government officials into the country. As many as 1.38 
million foreign tourists traveled to China in 1985. Of U.S. citizens alone, be-
tween 100,000 to 200,000 now visit annually. By 1986, China opened a total 
of 286 cities to foreigners; only 179 of these required special police 
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permit. 161 The opening has encouraged those interested in human rights to 
visit and report. China experts Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro went to China 
in 1985 to evaluate human rights conditions. They traveled widely with few 
restrictions from the middle of January to the end of March: 
[W]e traveled freely in China, making a large circle through seven of the central 
provinces: Hunan, Guangdong, Guizhou, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Hibei. 
We spoke with a great many people, including peasants in poor and in prosper-
ous areas, workers, artists, writers, journalists, engineers, scientists, students, pro-
fessors, dissidents, beggars, shopkeepers, entrepreneurs, policy makers, and the 
unemployed. We lived, most of the time, as the Chinese do and visited regions 
few foreigners have seen .... 16 2 
The two brought to light much valuable information on the current human 
rights situation. They reported on the status of political prisoners, local party 
elections, the revival of religion, enforced abortion, the return of collectiv-
ized land to families, and other relevant issues. They observed that the 
"Chinese are sometimes more open with outsiders than they can afford to be 
with one another,'' and therefore were willing to be more revealing with 
them. 163 Similarly, New York Times correspondent John Burns reported that 
''more and more Westerners ... were venturing without permits into 
remote regions of the country and returning with accounts of a climate in 
which suspicion seemed absent." 164 
China's opening to the outside world also has enabled large numbers of 
foreigners to live in China for extended periods of time. Thousands of foreign 
students today study in the PRC, and more than 5,000 foreign firms operate 
in China. In 1981, foreign correspondents in Beijing totalled over 100. Being 
able to live in the country has helped many foreigners to penetrate what one 
journalist has called the "two Chinas," the "official version ... smiling, 
selfless, and dedicated to the cause" and the "other China ... partially hid-
den ... whose one billion inhabitants had gone through three decades of 
cataclysmic change, sometimes for the better, but often ... involving 
brutality, waste, and a terrible personal suffering." 165 Having been charged 
161. See 1985 Hearings, note 25 above, 179, 184-185; Heng and Shapiro, Intellectual 
Freedom, note 18 above, 21-22. "Tourism in China Increases," International Herald 
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by their papers to provide information, foreign correspondents have made it 
their business to circumvent official restrictions and they have been less 
preoccupied than visiting scholars with the problem of next year's entry visa. 
Articles on Chinese human rights conditions, as a result, began to 
multiply in the late 1970s and reporters for the first time were able to base 
their stories on direct interviews with dissidents and former prisoners. The 
Chinese authorities, in fact, at first encouraged the victims of the Cultural 
Revolution to speak out and they paid tribute to those who had suffered in-
human treatment. A Washington Post correspondent was allowed in 1977 to 
interview by name a former actress who had been imprisoned during the 
Cultural Revolution. The story reported that she had been isolated in one 
room for four years, had undergone 500 "accusation meetings," and that she 
blamed her arrest on the Gang of Four. 166 Other newspaper stories focused 
on Wang Guangmei, wife of China's former President Liu Shaoqi. She had 
been imprisoned for eleven years during the Cultural Revolution and had 
"suffered all kinds of brutal treatment, both of the spirit and of the body." 167 
Most Chinese, of course, were not able to risk being quoted in inter-
views. Public accounts of personal tragedies began to be curbed when they 
threatened to get out of hand and undermine confidence in the communist 
system. A Washington Post article in 1982 about a school teacher imprisoned 
for twenty-one years thus cautioned: 
Like other prison camp refugees, she demanded anonymity to protect her 
from possible reprisals. She asked to be identified only as 'Wang,' and the Post 
also agreed to delay publication of her story for several weeks to help ensure her 
anonymity. 168 
Journalistic accounts also went beyond the abuses of the Cultural Revo-
lution and provided significant information about current conditions in labor 
camps where political prisoners continued to be sent. An article in 1980, en-
titled "China Revives Labor Camp System,'' provided the names and where-
abouts of labor re-education camps in Beijing's rural outskirts to which it said 
thousands of young people were being sent by the police without trial or 
court review. 169 ALe Monde feature in 1982, "China: The Gulag Has Not 
Disappeared," also provided information on the continued use of labor 
camps in the PRC. 170 Interviews with ''several dozen former camp inmates" 
166. See Amnesty International Report 1977, (london: Amnesty International Publications, 
1977), 176, 177. 
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produced a New York Times story in 1981 which gave the location of camps 
throughout the country and described the conditions of former and current 
inmates. A seventy-year old Chinese Protestant minister was reported to 
have worked 
in a coal mine, along with 10,000 other prisoners, scraping up chunks of black 
rock with his bare hands for 23 years .... The prisoners in his camp worked from 
6:00a.m. to 6:00p.m., seven days a week, with a day off every two weeks .... 'If 
you didn't meet your daily quota of coal, measured by baskets filled, they ... cut 
your food ration or might eventually put you in solitary confinement.' 
The article then turned to the camps today, where it said "the work is hard, 
the food is scanty and the punishment often brutal. ... Each city and prov-
ince maintains its own camp or set of camps.'' The "biggest and most 
dreaded camps" can be found in sparsely populated frontier regions, some 
near the Soviet border, where prisoners are put to work clearing swamps 
and forests or building roads. 171 
Although government officials have generally refused to discuss condi-
tions in camps or prisons, Chinese citizens have provided information to 
reporters, sometimes at considerable risk to ensure that the system becomes 
known to the outside world. Political prisoner Liu Qing in 1981 smuggled 
out a 196-page manuscript from a Shanxi labor camp to HonR Kong, which 
described his interrogation, ill-treatment, and detention witftlhal. 172 Similar-
ly, a "resident of Shanghai" sent to the Far Eastern Economic Review a letter 
exposing the labor reform system in the Shanghai region. Speaking for 
"young intellectuals of all of Shanghai," the letter listed twenty-four prisons, 
detention centers, and labor-reform camps in the Shanghai area. 173 Prior to 
his arrest in 1979, dissident Wei Jingsheng wrote an expose of the Qin 
Cheng prison outside Beijing. Providing information about this prison to the 
media was a daring challenge to the Chinese regime because the prison was 
a closely kept secret. The prison had contained high ranking detainees, 
among them the Panchen Lama, Tibet's second most important religious 
leader, and Wang Guangmei, wife of China's former president. According to 
Wei's accounts former inmates reported "frequent beatings and torture by 
electric shocks, strong lights and drugs." Prisoners received near starvation 
rations of food and were permitted "one change of clothes a year, a monthly 
shower and ... work or exercise only if they are deemed to have a good at-
titude." 174 
171. Butterfied, "Hundreds of Thousands," note 26 above; see also Butterfield, China: Alive, 
note 4 above, 489-499. 
172. Weisskopf, "Glimpses of Chinese Prison Life," note 130 above. 
173. A/ Report 7977, note 166 above, 176, quoting Far Eastern Economic Review, March 
1977. 
174. Nigel Wade, "Torture in Chinese Bastille," Daily Telegraph, 19 March 1979, 4, col. 7; 
Fox Butterfield, "Peking Dissident in Rare Account Tells of Political Prisoners' Torture," 
New York Times, 7 May 1979, 1, col. 1. 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 49 
Reporters, on rare occasions, also managed to secure information about 
China's prison system from officials. Government sources, for example, 
revealed the use of torture against Chinese prisoners in 1979 and 1980. 175 In 
1984, when correspondents were allowed into Qinghai Province (north of 
Tibet) for the first time since 1949, they glimpsed labor camps disguised as 
factories and managed to secure information about them from officials on 
hand. 176 Correspondents on occasion have been permitted to visit select 
prisons and labor re-education camps, notably the Beijing and Shanghai mu-
nicipal prisons and Round River Farm. 177 journalists also have discovered 
cases of political prisoners having been incarcerated in mental hospitals, a 
practice thought confined to the Soviet Union.178 
Because of the international press' efforts to obtain information and the 
willingness of courageous Chinese to provide it, the outside world has 
gained a greater appreciation of the appalling conditions in China's prison 
and labor camp systems. The 1978-1979 Democracy Movement, which 
spontaneously erupted after Mao's death, also came to the world's attention 
through the press. News photographs showed tens of thousands of people at 
Democracy Wall in Beijing and in other cities reading wall posters that called 
for democracy and human rights. Public demonstrations in support of 
greater political and economic freedoms were reported in many large cities 
as well. The media's coverage of the hopes and aspirations of large numbers 
of ordinary Chinese citizens made it more difficult for the Chinese govern-
ment to claim, as it later did, that only a handful of dissidents had been 
involved. 179 
Nor could the subsequent crackdown on the free speech movement be 
hidden from public attention. The international press publicized the arrests 
of dissidents, reported on the closure of unofficial journals, and published 
the essays of those imprisoned. 180 The New York Times published the tran-
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script of Wei Jingsheng's trial and excerpts from his autobiography, which 
had been written before his arrest and smuggled from China to Taiwan.181 
By the early 1980s, the Chinese government did try to restrict journalists' 
access by barring Chinese citizens from speaking to foreigners, except on of-
ficial business. This certainly did reduce some of the information flow. But 
the effort was only partially successful, and reporters found ways to pene-
trate official restrictions and secure the information they were after. A Daily 
Telegraph article in 1986, which described in detail Wei Jingsheng's condi-
tions in detention, was based on information gleaned from his "friends" and 
from ''a former inmate." 182 Other reporters published information about the 
trial of the Gang of Four, the restrictions placed on religion, the censorship 
of literature, enforced abortion, and the arbitrary executions of thousands of 
common criminals and ''counterrevolutionaries'' during the "anti-crime" 
campaign. 183 
Journalist;c.accounts of severe economic problems previously hidden 
from public view also surfaced. Officials admitted for the first time that food 
and housing shortages, unemployment, and inflation existed. Demon-
strating peasants sought out reporters, despite government bans, to 
publicize their economic grievances.184 Journalists were also able to ferret 
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out from the remarks of Chinese officials information about workers' strikes, 
slowdowns, and calls for independent trade unions.185 
The opening of parts of Tibet to foreign visitors in the late 1970s pro-
vided up-to-date information on conditions in the Tibetan ''autonomous 
region" for the first time since the 1950 Chinese invasion.186 Both foreign 
correspondents and representatives of Tibetans abroad were allowed entry 
and could begin to evaluate the extent to which Tibetan culture, religion, 
and social traditions had survived the Chinese occupation and the onslaught 
of the Cultural Revolution. Certainly, Tibetans risked punishment for pro-
viding information to foreign visitors. Several were arrested in 1980 after 
welcoming representatives of the Dalai Lama, Tibet's religious leader who 
fled in 1959 and set up a ''government-in-exile" abroad. Hundreds were ar-
rested and several reportedly executed in 1983 after handing petitions to 
foreign journalists on Tibetan independence. And more than 100 Tibetans 
were reportedly arrested in 1986 for alleged ties to Tibetan groups abroad. 187 
Although difficulties clearly abound, access to China has become much 
greater today and information on conditions of human rights more readily 
available than in the past. Moreover, with large numbers of Chinese now 
traveling and studying abroad, opportunities for obtaining information have 
increased even more. The Chinese government in the late 1970s began to 
allow tens of thousands of its citizens to go abroad each year to study, con-
duct business, or visit relatives. Beginning in 1980, more than 100 PRC 
delegations started to visit the United States each month. From October 
1983 to October 1984, the U.S. government alone issued 24,000 visas to 
Chinese. In 1986, between 30,000 to 40,000 Chinese were estimated to be 
studying abroad, up to 20,000 in the United States and thousands of others 
in Western Europe and japan.1ss 
As a result of this influx of Chinese visitors, both Western scholars and 
NGOs have been presented with abundant opportunities to learn about 
185. Michael Weisskopf, "Chinese Official Confirms Reports of Labor Unrest;' Washington 
Post, 30 April 1981, sec. A, 30, col. 4; see also C. S. Wren, "China's Unrevolutionary 
Constitution;' International Herald Tribune, 4-5 December 1982. 
186. Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, "Buddha Smiles Again as Tibetans Triumph;' Guardian, 25 
May 1985; Michael Weisskopf. "Separatists Keep Up Struggle for Free Tibet;' 
Washington Post, 13 August 1985; G. Taylor, "Terms of Reference;' Guardian, 2 
September 1985; Letter to the Editor from Chinese Ambassador, The Times, 20 
September 1985, 15, col. 4; Letter to the Editor from james Gordon Mackie, The Times, 5 
October 1985, 9, col. 14. 
187. See "Tibetan Exiles' Delegates Return Disappointed," Tibetan News Agency, London, 29 
September 1980; Press Release, Office of Tibet, New York, 26 September 1985; Op. Ed., 
International Herald Tribune, 3 june 1986. 
188. See Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 743; 1985 Hearings, note 
25 above, 179; statement of Patricia M. Derian in 1980 Hearings, note 1 above 31· 
George Shultz, "China and the U.S.," Current Policy 930 (Department of State March 
1987). ' 
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human rights conditions in China. Certainly, the Chinese have tried to 
monitor the activities of their citizens abroad to ensure that they do not pro-
vide information that could be compromising to China. 1B9 Despite the 
restrictions, however, several Chinese academics studying in the West have 
taken up the cause of human rights in the PRC. In 1982, 132 Chinese aca-
demics studying in the United States and Canada sent a letter to the PRC pro-
testing the arrest, secret trial, and imprisonment of Wang Xizhe, a Marxist 
intellectual. They called his fifteen year sentence unconstitutional and a 
breach of criminal law. They requested that the record of his trial be made 
public and that public trials be given to all Chinese arrested for association 
with unofficial journals. 190 In 1987, 1,000 Chinese studying in the United 
States endorsed an open letter to their government (480 actually signed their 
names), protesting the crackdown on intellectuals following student demon-
strations for greater democracy and freedom. The letter expressed "fear" 
about a ''recurrence" of the Cultural Revolution "in which 'ruthless struggle 
and merciless criticism' were rampant." 191 
Still other Chinese academics have defected in order to take up the 
cause of human rights. A Chinese medical doctor in Canada, Wang Bing-
zhang (the first Chinese to earn his Ph.D. abroad on a government scholar-
ship since the 1960s), defected in 1982 to found the journal China Spring. 
Contributors to the journal included Chinese studying in the West who, in 
order not to jeopardize their return, used pseudonyms. The journal's name 
was both a reminder of Prague Spring 192 and of the brief flowering of the 
Democracy Movement in China. Its aim was to sL:pport the development of 
democracy in China and "give our people (including those in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong) a real opportunity to choose what they want in terms of govern-
ment and political beliefs." China Spring's first issue, published in December 
1982 in the Chinese language, gave information on China's democratic 
movement and included an open letter to the Chinese people urging sup-
port for democracy, freedom, and human rights. In 1986, China Spring 
serialized the 262-page prison memoirs of dissident Xu Wenli, which had 
been smuggled from a Beijing prison to Hong Kong the previous year. The 
memoirs revealed that Xu underwent 200 interrogation sessions, and tho..! 
prisoners were beaten and ''electronically shocked" in Chinese jails. 
189. j. Mann, "U.S. Warns China on Envoys' Activities," International Herald Tribune, 3 
December 1985. 
190. See 1982 Hearings, note 57 above, 365. 
191. Martin, note 90 above; Ravo, note 90 above. 
192. The Prague Spring was the brief period in Czechoslovakia in 1968 when proponents of 
reform and democracy took over the government, only to be arrested and crushed 
following the arrival of Soviet troops. For a description of China Spring, see North 
American Human Rights Directory, note 83 above, 69; Speahrhead 16 (Northern Winter 
1982-83): 2-4, 19; Speahrhead 18 (Northern Summer 1983): col. 44; "China Spring," 
Freedom Appeals, Freedom at Issue (September-October 1983); "China Activists Find 
Voice in West," International Herald Tribune, 12 january 1983; Robert Boorstin, "China 
Opposition Emerges in Queens," New York Times, 17 May 1987. 
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Although the Chinese abroad who are involved in human rights remain 
few in number, they and other Chinese visitors have contributed substantial-
ly to the information available about the PRC. They also have served another 
important function. With increasing numbers of Chinese academics and 
professionals becoming personal friends of Westerners, the ties forged have 
produced a greater Western involvement, interest, and stake in the human 
rights situation in China. Thus, in 1982, when a Harvard-educated Chinese 
lawyer was arrested in Beijing, his friends and colleagues in the United States 
launched a successful campaign for his release by sending letters to Chinese 
officials, by intervening directly with Chinese embassies and consulates, and 
by giving messages both to those visiting China and to Chinese visitors to the 
United States.193 
Hong Kong, especially in the late 1970s, became another excellent 
source of information on human rights developments in the PRC. Hong 
Kong has traditionally been a listening post for events in China, and Hong 
Kong's journalists, intellectuals, political leaders, and students were able to 
travel more freely to the PRC after China's open door policy was introduced. 
Articles in Hong Kong journals and newspapers, although often in Chinese, 
proliferated on the Democracy Movement, the trial of dissidents, China's 
new constitution, and other issues bearing on human rights. 194 Hong Kong 
journals sometimes had better information than the foreign press because 
Chinese government officials occasionally leaked information to the Hong 
Kong papers. From 1975 to 1980, it is estimated that 460,000 Chinese 
entered Hong Kong, most of them illegally, bringing with them first-hand in-
formation about the PRC. 195 A number of those who fled to Hong Kong in 
the wake of the Cultural Revolution, in particular former Red Guards, openly 
began to engage in activities in support of greater liberalization in China. 
And in intellectual circles in Hong Kong, considerable support developed 
for China's burgeoning Democratic Movement. At both the University of 
Hong Kong and the Chinese University of Hong Kong, groups formed to de-
fend Chinese human rights activists. The Hong Kong Student Union pub-
lished the essays of democratic activists in 1982 together with its own ob-
servations on the Democracy Movement. 196 
In 1981 the Resource Center for the Chinese Democratic Movement es-
tablished itself in Hong Kong to facilitate communication between the 
Democracy Movement and the outside world. It issued statements on behalf 
193. "Disappeared Lawyer: Hanson Huang," Speahrhead 19 (Fall1983): cols. 34-38. 
194. See "The Heavies Struggle to Make Ends Meet," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 
February 1986, 30-31; Speahrhead 18 (Northern Summer 1983): cols. 16-18, 34. A large 
amount of material from Hong Kong has been translated into English by the U.S. govern· 
ment's Foreign Broadcast Information Service and Joint Publications Research Service. 
195. See Butterfield, China: Alive, note 4 above, 503; Shirk, note 33 above, 109, 122; Jean de 
Ia Gueriviere, "Chine: Selon d'Anciens Gardes Rouges," Le Monde, 17 April1979; Chan, 
note 49 above, 32-34. 
196. Speahrhead 16 (Northern Winter 1982-83): 13, col. 2. 
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of arrested dissidents and published a Monthly Bulletin in Chinese and 
English which provided infcrmation on political arrests, summarized the 
contents of unofficial journals, and printed the texts of open letters and other 
documents. 197 
A more activist group also formed the same year to work for the release 
of arrested dissidents. Called the Hong Kong Association for Solidarity with 
the Chinese Democratic Movement, 198 its members sometimes visited China 
at considerable personal risk. Liu Shanqing, an Association member, was ar-
rested in the PRC in 1981 after making inquiries about arrested dissidents 
Wang Xizhe and He Qui, and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for 
"counter-revolutionary" offenses. 199 A "Save Liu Shanqing Committee" 
formed in Hong Kong but was unable to secure his release although its 
members met with Chinese officials and obtained British intercession with 
the Chinese as well. Others who undertook similar missions were more for-
tunate; they did not meet with reprisal, and they secured important informa-
tion. Student leaders who undertook a ·'mission" to China in 1982, also to 
determine the status of Wang Xizhe and He Qui, were able to confirm the 
trial and imprisonment of the two, and returned to Hong Kong with the in-
formation.200 
Religious groups in Hong Kong also became important sources of infor-
mation about China.201 The United Methodist Church of Hong Kong regular-
ly reported about the resurgence of religion in China following the Cultural 
Revolution's efforts to stamp it out, and about the release of religious leaders 
from prisons and labor camps. It also published the texts of open letters from 
official Christian bodies in China to their co-religionists abroad. Hong Kong 
church organizations also began to develop direct contact with both official 
and unofficial church members in the PRC. The Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Hong Kong in 1985 became the first Chinese Catholic bishop to visit the PRC 
since 1949.202 
197. See Human Rights Internet Reporter 6 (January-February 1981): 378; (May-June 1981) 
752-753; Human Rights Internet Reporter 7 (January-February 1982): 579-80. 
198. Human Rights Internet Reporter 7 (September-October 1981): 142. 
199. Wang Xizhe, together with He Qui, founded the unofficial journal The Road of the Peo-
ple in Guangzhou. See A/ Report 7 984, note 30 above, 220; Speahrhead 16 (Northern 
Winter 1982-83): 18. 
200. See Human Rights Internet Reporter 7 (June-August 1982): 1 033-34; Human Rights In-
ternet Reporter 9 (September-November 1983): 115-116. The Association also orga-
nized a campaign in defense of the right to strike following reports, which proved true, 
that this right was to be omitted from the 1982 Constitution. Its Bulletin reported on pro-
longed "wildcat strikes" in China which it said •are almost unknown to the outside 
world," on the low wage system, harsh working conditions, and on housing shortages. 
201. Human Rights Internet Reporter 9 (March-June 1984): 556-557; see also China Talk, 
(Hong Kong: United Methodist Church) 5 (April, June, September 1980) and subsequent 
issues; Ching Feng and Bridge: Church Life in China (Hong Kong: Tao Fong Shan 
Ecumenical Centre). 
202. See "China Invites Bishop Home to See Mother," The Times, 4 January 1986, 5, col. 4, 
Hong Kong Link 1, (March 1986); for visit of Chairman of China Christian Council to 
Hong Kong, see Human Rights Internet Reporter 10 (September-December 1984): 212. 
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Although Hong Kong's transfer to Chinese administration in 1997 will di-
minish its role, it is at present an important source of information on human 
rights in China. Certainly, Hong Kong residents have taken risks when they 
have sought to collect sensitive information from the PRC, intercede on 
behalf of arrested dissidents, or engage in publicized human rights activities. 
PRC students in Hong Kong have run the risk of being barred from returning 
to China. Hong Kong writers and editors have been arrested on visits to the 
PRC, and there have also been cases of arrests or dismissals of PRC officials 
because they provided information to publications in Hong Kong.203 While 
these and other actions by the Chinese government undoubtedly have dis-
couraged the efforts of many, they have not stopped some in Hong Kong 
from collecting and disseminating information and from undertaking activi-
ties in defense of human rights. 
The information made available by Chinese and Hong Kong sources 
gradually found its way into Western publications and journals in the late 
1970s. As a result, full, first-hand accounts became available in English of the 
trial transcripts of political prisoners, the prison diaries of detainees, profiles 
of human rights activists, and the texts of wall posters and unofficial journals. 
In the forefront of providing such information to NGOs and the public were 
Index on Censorship in London, Freedom Appeals and Freedom at Issue in 
New York (publications of Freedom House), and Speahrhead in New York. 
Index translated and published in English extracts from the prison memoirs 
of Xu Wenli and provided biographical data on arrested dissidents. Freedom 
Appeals and Freedom at Issue made available in English the testimony of 
Democracy Movement activists and published lists of unofficial jo1.1rnals. 
Speahrhead, drawing on Chinese official sources, unofficial journals, and 
Hong Kong publications, categorized human rights information on China ac-
cording to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.204 In 
1985, a publication devoted exclusively to human rights in China appeared 
under the title of China Rights Annals 7. 205 Sponsored by Speahr (the Society 
203. See "Visitors from Hong Kong," Speahrhead 16 (Northern Winter 1982-83): 17-18; 
Speahrhead 18 (Northern Summer 1983): cols. 31-32, 45-47; Speahrhead 19 (Fall1983): 
cols. 42-46, 52-53. See also, Amnesty International Report 1981 (London: Amnesty In-
ternational Publications, 1981), 211-212 (for arrest of Hong Kong writer and art critic 
Fang Dan); 1985 Hearings, note 25 above, 72 n.17, 98, 290 (for dismissal of law journal 
editor Hu Yaochang after his interview with a Hong Kong journal). 
204. See Index on Censorship, in particular, July-August 1978, September-October 1979, 
February 1980, April 1981. For Xu Wenli's "My Self Defence," see Index on Censorship 
15 (May 1986): 18-25; see also a listing of "Imprisoned Members of the Democracy 
Movement," Index on Censorship 15 (May 1986). See Freedom Appeals, in particular, 
September-October 1979, May-June 1980, November-December 1980, March-April 
1981, May-june 1981, September-October 1981, january-February 1982 and subsequent 
issues. See Freedom at Issue, (May-june 1979): 8-1 0; (May-june 1980): 1 0-13; Lui 
Guokai, "The Democratic Movement in China: Personal Testimony," (March-April 
1982): 20-24; Wang Xizhe, "A Challenge to Party Leadership," November-December 
1982. See Speahrhead 1-19, 1979-1983. 
205. China Rights Annals 1, note 60 above. 
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for the Protection of East Asians' Human Rights), the book examined both 
political and economic rights in the PRC from October 1983 until September 
1984, pulling together "much of the current information about human rights 
in the People's Republic of China'· and analyzing it in terms of international 
human rights standards. China Rights Annals 1 relied on information mainly 
derived from ''official Chinese sources,'' noting that in recent years "Chinese 
reporting has become much more accurate." Many other books, articles, 
and reports appeared in the West on human rights development in China as 
well, 206 making it increasingly difficult to argue that an information gap still is 
a serious impediment to dealing with human rights in China. 
NGOs Point the Way- The Role of Amnesty International 
Although most NGOs did not add human rights in China in any significant 
way to their programs, a few did begin to challenge the prevailing assump-
tions against dealing with China. In France, the Paris-based Federation lnter-
nationale des Droits de I'Homme intervened with the Chinese authorities in 
1979 on behalf of arrested members of the Democratic Movement. The or-
ganization also began to publicize human rights information on China, and 
protested the executions of the "anti-crime" campaign. 207 ln the United 
States, the executive director of Freedom House presented a list of eighty 
banned publications to Chinese officials. The organization also convened a 
conference to consider ways of promoting democracy in the PRC and 
Taiwan. Although most scholars at the conference opposed overt actions by 
NGOs or governments to advance democracy in the PRC, they did support 
206. See, for example, Edwards, Henkin, and Nathan, note 3 above; Copper, Michael, and 
Wu, note 32 above, Heng and Shapiro, Intellectual Freedom, note 18 above; james D. 
Seymour, ed., The Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement 1978-7-:J, 
(New York: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, 1980); International Press Institute Reports, 
May 1981, October 1982, Zurich and London; Merle Goldman, China's Intellectuals: 
Advise & Dissent (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1981 ); Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Wall 
and the Unofficial Journals (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Califor· 
nia, 1982); Huang San, Angel Pino, and Lionel Epstein, eds., Un Bol de Nids 
d'Hirondelles ne Fait pas le Printemps de Pekin (Paris: Christian Bourgois Editeur, 
Bibliotheque Asiatique, 1980); Victor Sidane, ed., Le Printemps de Pekin: Oppositions 
Democratiques en Chine, Novembre 1978-Mars 1980 (Paris: Collection Archives, 
Gallimard/juillard 1980). 
207. See "After Mao, Democracy?" Le Cri des Hommes 6 (FIDH, December 1979); "Legal 
Practices and Human Rights in China," Le Cri des Hommes 22 (FIDH, November 1984); 
China Rights Annals 1, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1985), 42. The Federation's 
French affiliate also organized public appeals by leading intellectuals on behalf of ar-
rested dissidents. One of its members, jean Pasqualini, himself had been interned in a 
Chinese labor camp for seven years and sought to mobilize French opinion on behalf of 
human rights in China. See "Ad of Ligue des Droits de I'Homme; Le Monde, 29 March 
1985. According to Human Rights Internet Reporter 7, note 198 above, 141, a group 
called Comite International Contre Ia Repression campaigned for Wei jingsheng's 
release in 1981. 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 57 
public and private diplomacy to counter individual human rights 
violations. 208 
Most other NGOs took no major steps or sustained actions.209 Religious 
organizations had special reasons. Because they sought to re-establish con-
tacts with their co-religionists in the PRC, they did not want to take any ac-
tion that might offend the Chinese government. A representative of the Pres-
byterian Church of Canada wrote, prior to a visit to the PRC in 1973: 
In planning our visit ... we purposely excluded contact with the Church as one 
of our objectives .... [w]e felt it better not to seek Church contact lest it might be 
embarrassing to Chinese Christians trying to carry on church activities quietly.210 
To be sure, the renewal of contacts was fraught with difficulties, especially 
for Roman Catholics. Chinese religious leaders who communicated too 
readily with foreigners, who acknowledged allegiance to the Vatican, who 
distributed unofficial church literature, or who refused to join the official or 
''patriotic" religious bodies created by the government were subject to 
harassment, arrest, or imprisonment.211 At the same time, the post-Mao 
leadership, unlike its predecessors, tolerated and encouraged organized 
religious activity, allowed houses of worship to reopen, and permitted 
foreign church representatives to visit China and official church delegations 
to go abroad.212 To preserve these new ties, many Western-based religious 
organizations, while publishing information on religious persecution in 
China, 213 generally refrained from undertaking campaigns on behalf of ar-
rested or harassed church members. While Pope john Paul II in 1982 did call 
208. See Freedom House Conference, note 57 above, 298-299, 302-305, 316-317. 
209. The International Human Rights Law Group did on one occasion testify before the 
Senate on arrests of democracy activists, a commendable initiative; see note 41 above. 
The International league for Human Rights added Wei )ingsheng to its Human Rights 
Defenders Project, a program mobilizing support for endangered human rights ad-
vocates. See ILHR Human Rights Bulletin, Summer 1983. The Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights in 1984 included a section on China in its annual Critique of the State 
Department's Human Rights Reports, published jointly with Helsinki Watch and 
Americas Watch, New York, March 1984. 
210. Hollander, Political Pilgrims, note 28 above, 285. 
211. See AI Report 1983, note 24 above, 193-194; AI Report 1984, note 30 above, 218; 
Amnesty International Newsletter, london, November 1983; Heng and Shapiro, In-
tellectual Freedom, note 18 above, 51-53; Miriam London and Ta-ling Lee, "China: The 
Uses of Religion," Freedom at Issue (March-Apri\1984): 14-16; Ladany, The Catholic 
Church, note 54 above, 35-50, 54-55, 87-92. 
212. See "Our Party's Basic Policy on Religious Questions During the Period of Socialism,'' 
~ed Flag, editorial, Beijing, 16 June 1983; see also statement of james Lilley, 1985 Hear-
mgs, note 25 above, 114-118; Heng and Shapiro, Intellectual Freedom, note 18 above, 
46-48; Copper, Michael, and Wu, note 32 above, 83-84; "Protestant Seminary Re-
opened," Human Rights Internet Reporter 7 (November-December 1981 ): 413; "Chroni-
cle: Chinese Protestant Delegation to Britain, 1982," Religion in Communist Lands 11 
(UK: Keston College, Spring 1983): 93-94; China and Ourselves, no. 23, 24 (Toronto: 
Canadian Council of Churches, November 1980, February 1981). 
213. SeeP. Morrison, "Religious Policy in China and its Implementation in the Light of Docu-
ment No. 19," Religion in Communist Lands 12 (UK: Keston College, Winter 1986): 
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upon Catholic Bishops all over the world to pray for Chinese Catholics,214 
religious groups generally have kept a low profile, turning to governments 
and NGOs like Amnesty International to take up their cases privately. 
Amnesty International in fact has been the one NGO systematically and 
fully to take up the challenge of promoting human rights in China. Although 
it did not act on Chinese violations during the Cultural Revolution, both for 
lack of information and fear that doing so would be harmful, 215 in the 
mid-1970s it adopted a new position. It began to espouse the view that 
NGOs should actively seek information about the PRC, prec!sely because 
China attempted to close off information and silence those who tried to dis-
seminate it. Amnesty's Secretary-General Thomas Hammarberg described 
his organization's position in these terms: 
[M]ore efforts must be made to obtain information from those countries where 
the authorities try to close their frontiers and prevent a flow of human rights data. 
People who have been imprisoned because of their attempts to obtain, transmit 
or disseminate facts about human rights violations should be the subjects of in-
tense campaigning.216 
A second reason for Amnesty's insistence on condemning China's 
human rights violations was the importance it gave to the achievement of 
'
1political balance." In the introduction of its 1975-1976 report, Amnesty em-
phasized: 
Much attention was also given during the year to the political balance and im-
partiality which are fundamental considerations for AI. The fact that information 
on individual prisoners is more easily available from certain countries than from 
others has sometimes resulted in a degree of apparent selectivity in taking action 
on relatively accessible areas while keeping silent over the more closed 
societies .... 21 7 
Its 1978 report reaffirmed this view: 
[B]alance is not easy to establish. There are still some few countries where the 
authorities refuse to have any communication with Amnesty International: they 
will not admit observers or representatives and our letters and cables receive no 
reply. These same regimes have a restrictive approach to the international media 
242-256; China and Ourselves, no. 21, 27 (Toronto: Canadian Council of Churches, July 
1980, September 1981); AI Report 1982, note 17 above, 192; "Attacks on Unofficial 
Churches," Human Rights Internet Reporter 9 (March-June 1984): 556-557. 
214. Ladany, note 54 above, 41; Freedom at Issue (July-August 1982): 24. 
215. Prior to 1976, Amnesty did take up-through indirect means-the cases of foreign na-
tionals imprisoned in China about whom it could obtain information. It did so indirectly 
(through government representatives or parliamentarians) because it feared that doing so 
directly might harm the persons involved. 
216. Thomas Hammarberg, "Human Rights: The Battle for Information," International Herald 
Tribune, 12 April 1985. 
217. Amnesty International Report 1975-76, (london: Amnesty International Publications, 
1976), 11. 
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and little, if any, detailed information on the human rights situation in their coun-
tries therefore exists. Our movement has made great efforts to break through 
such situations .... 218 
While most other organizations remained discouraged by the difficulties 
the Chinese situation presented, Amnesty insisted on the right to operate in 
the case of China. Beginning in 1976, the organization launched a "research 
project" on China and assiduously began to collect information from 
academics, journalists, and the official and international press.219 It 
developed contacts in Hong Kong, where it sent representatives several 
times in 1976 and 1977. The organization also wrote directly to the Chinese 
government for information. 
With the advent of the post-Mao leadership in China, Amnesty decided 
that publicity and attention would help rather than harm Chinese prisoners 
of conscience. By 1977 Amnesty began to adopt Chinese prisoners of con-
science. Its first adoptees were prisoners held for more than twenty years 
about whom information had begun to surface; Amnesty acknowledged that 
research was continuing into the cases of ''people arrested recently." 220 
When it could not secure the names of those arrested, Amnesty sent appeals 
to the Chinese authorities urging the release of "categories" of prisoners, 
such as ''counter-revolutionaries." Its 1978 report emphasized that despite 
the difficulty of obtaining information about individual cases, "almost a 
quarter of the Asia region's researcher capacity was devoted throughout the 
year to the research program begun in 1976 on China." 221 
At the end of 1978, Amnesty published its first report on China, Political 
Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China. It was, in fact, the first 
report of any human rights NGO on the People's Republic. While the report 
welcomed reforms being undertaken in China, including the release and re-
habilitation of former prisoners, these positive developments did not cause it 
to close its eyes to recent abuses. The report expressed concern that despite 
announced reforms, "arrests on political grounds are continuing and that the 
legislation permitting imprisonment on such grounds is still operative." 222 It 
drew attention to unlimited pre-trial detention, forced confessions, and the 
subjection of political detainees to secret or "mass public trials." The report 
pointed to provisions in the new 1978 Constitution which called for 
punishing political offenders, limiting freedom of expression and religion, 
and depriving whole categories of peoples of their rights. While Amnesty 
acknowledged that its information on China was sparse, it contended that a 
218. Amnesty International Report 1978, (london: Amnesty International Publications 1978) 
2-3. ' ' 
219. AI Report 1975-76, note 217 above, 123. 
220. Amnesty International Report 1977, (london: Amnesty International Publications 1977) 
176, 179. , , 
221. AI Report 1978, note 218 above, 29. 
222. Political Imprisonment, note 11 above, preface. 
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credible and well-documented account of political imprisonment could be 
produced on the basis of official documents and accounts of former 
prisoners and refugees: 
Actual details have been obtained mainly from statements by former detainees 
and prisoners, by their acquaintances or by refugees familiar with aspects of the 
legal process ... the accounts of various people who do not know each other 
and who come from different places in China often present the same picture of a 
particular event and penal practice .... Although some details are difficult to 
check, such accounts present a pattern in various aspects of political imprison-
ment which is to a large extent confirmed by official documents; taken as a 
whole, they can therefore be regarded as convincing testimonies.223 
By 1980 Amnesty was able to obtain information on newly arrested pris-
oners and thereafter added to its adoption program, twenty editors and con-
tributors to unofficial journals, five Roman Catholic priests, activists in the 
Democracy Movement, and Tibetans.224 Although Amnesty continued to 
acknowledge that information about political prisoners was often "incom-
plete,'' it began to use the information it got to put together a broader pic-
ture. Its 1984 annual report thus estimated that "the prisoners of conscience 
of whom it was aware represented only a fraction of the total number of 
those detained." The report similarly extrapolated "that the total number of 
executions carried out throughout the country was far higher" than the more 
than 600 Amnesty had been able to document between August and October 
1983 during the ''anti-crime'' campaign. 225 And ''special actions'' to help 
Chinese prisoners were undertaken by Amnesty groups despite the incom-
plete information. 226 Even in the case of secret trials, the organization col-
lected whatever information it could about the proceedings and in a number 
of instances issued press releases on their fairness. 227 
A second Amnesty report published in 1984, China: Violence of Human 
Rights, pointed out that despite the major legislative changes of 1979 and 
1980, legal safeguards were not being applied in political cases. The new 
criminal codes and laws did not give adequate protection against arbitrary 
arrest nor ensure fair trials. Old laws had been revived that authorized de-
tention without trial and further diminished the rights of political defendants. 
The new 1982 Constitution included restrictive clauses on religion and omit-
ted freedom of correspondence, publication, and the right to strike. Am-
nesty listed its concerns about the PRC as the continued arrest and imprison-
ment of prisoners of conscience, prolonged detention without trial of those 
223. Ibid., xiii. 
224. AI Report 1980, note 3 above, 192-193; AI Report 1982, note 17 above, 190-194. 
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with "anti-socialist" views, unfair trials, ill-treatment of prisoners, and exten-
sive use of the death penalty in an increasingly broad range of criminal and 
political offenses.226 Because the Chinese government did not respond to an 
Amnesty memorandum setting forth these concerns, Amnesty published the 
text in the report. Actual trial verdicts, sketches of prisons, texts of laws, and 
profiles and photographs of leading political prisoners were included in the 
report, reflecting the increase in information available about China as well as 
Amnesty's effective use of such information. 
To coincide with the report's publication, Amnesty organized a ''cam-
paign" on China to draw attention to "patterns of human rights violations" 
and to put pressure on the Chinese government to halt abuses.229 The Am-
nesty campaign lasted several months, with many local groups worldwide 
participating. The effort produced a large number of press stories, letters, 
and appeals to the government, making the Chinese aware of international 
concern about their human rights practices. 
The results of Amnesty's program over the last ten years have been im-
pressive. The organization has developed an effective research system for 
China, as evidenced by the highly competent reports it has produced. On 
the basis of its information, it has undertaken a variety of actions ranging 
from quiet diplomacy to publicizing internationally Chinese violations. 
While the effectiveness of its activities is discussed more fully later, suffice it 
to say here that Chinese officials have begun to meet with Amnesty repre-
sentatives to discuss human rights issues and that several prisoners of con-
science, adopted by Amnesty, have been released. 
This is not to suggest that all NGOs should follow the Amnesty blue-
print. Amnesty is the largest and best endowed of the international human 
rights NGOs. Because of its large research staff, it can afford to carry out the 
collection of documents, translation of materials, and development of con-
tacts essential for an effective program. Moreover, its terms of reference are 
narrower than most other NGOs, which might have to collect information 
on a broader range of political, legal, and economic issues. Religious 
organizations may continue to find it more advantageous to promote con-
tacts with local groups rather than risk losing their access to China by under-
taking campaigns against its human rights violations. Nevertheless, 
Amnesty's efforts show that the premise that it is too difficult to deal with 
China because of information problems is false. Its activities also show that it 
is possibie for an NGO to assume the same watchdog role and apply the 
same human rights standards to China as it does to other countries. More-
over, Amnesty has not had to forego its right to criticize China in order to 
discuss human rights issue with the Chinese. In many respects, Amnesty's ef-
228. China: Violations, note 26 above. 
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forts in dealing with China's human rights violations sets an example for all 
other groups. 
Growth of a Lobby 
Although no organized lobby for human rights in China as a whole has 
emerged, the journal China Spring occasionally has come close to acting as a 
lobby on behalf of human rights in the PRC.230 Its founder has organized 
seminars and embarked on speaking tours throughout the United States to 
promote the journal and its objectives. Its officers have held press confer-
ences to publicize human rights cases in China. In 1984, its editors publicly 
protested U.S. denial of asylum to a Chinese physicist and charged the exis-
tence of a double standard for Soviet and Chinese asylum seekers. The jour-
nal's information has been used regularly by China experts, NGOs with 
Chinese specialists on their staffs, and publications such as Index on Censor-
ship. Recently it has begun to publish some of its editions in English to reach 
a broader audience. Although its staff is small, China Spring now has offices 
in New York, Hong Kong, and a host of West European and Asian countries. 
It has increased the interest of Chinese communities abroad in the subject of 
human rights in the PRC. All6,500 copies of the journal's first issue sold out, 
and the magazine received 2,000 letters of support and contributions from 
Chinese residents in North America. Today its circulation is 25,000 with 
1,000 additional copies distributed samizdat in the PRC. While its impact on 
decision makers in the West remains marginal, it has the potential to enlist 
groups in the West and in Asia to give China the attention in the 1980s it did 
not receive before. 
Nevertheless, no permanent China lobby can yet be said to exist. The 
Tibetan pressure group is the closest to a traditional lobby to have emerged, 
and it is led by representatives of the Dalai Lama. Beginning in the 1970s and 
1980s, Tibetans in the West and in Asia, representing their spiritual leader, 
began to put pressure on NGOs and governments to take up the religious 
and cultural rights of their people. Tibetans had mobilized considerable sup-
port after China's 1950 invasion and the Dalai Lama's flight to India in 1959, 
and they energetically renewed their activities in the 1970s after China 
opened its doors and allowed foreign visitors into the region. 
Their efforts were timely because the Chinese government, after the 
death of Mao, openly admitted the failure of its policy to Sinocize the 
Tibetans and other minorities and began to undertake steps to make 
amends. The 1982 Constitution restored and enlarged national minority 
rights. In the Tibetan "autonomous region," Buddhist religious practices were 
again allowed, although on a restricted basis, several temples and monas-
230. See note 192 above; Mathews, note 145 above. 
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teries were rebuilt, the Tibetan language was allowed to be taught, and 
travel permits were made more readily available. Chinese authorities also 
initiated talks with representatives of the Dalai Lama, although they have for-
bidden him from returning to live in Tibet.231 These steps, however, were 
meager compensation for China's earlier efforts to eradicate Tibetan culture, 
religion, and way of life, and its destruction of thousands of monasteries and 
temples during the Cultural Revolution. Nor did the improvements make 
current violations of Tibetan rights more palatable.232 
Consequently, the Office of Tibet at the United Nations in New York, 
the Tibetan Relief Fund of the United Kingdom, and the Tioetan community 
of India actively began to publicize violations brought to their attention and 
sought international support for improvement in Tibetans' status. They sent 
representatives to visit Tibet, prepared reports on human rights abuses, and 
brought to governments, NGOs, journalists, and the public specific cases of 
Tibetans arrested or imprisoned on religious and political grounds.233 They 
also sought endorsement for their goal of self-determination for the Tibetan 
people. 
While many in the academic and human rights communities shied away 
from responding for fear of offending the Chinese, a good number of NGOs, 
governments, and parliamentarians took up the Tibetan organizations' ap-
peals. The Minority Rights Group in London issued a report on the Tibetan 
situation in 1981.234 Amnesty International in the late 1970s began to take up 
the cases of Tibetans arrested for political or religious reasons.235 Freedom 
House cabled the Chinese authorities urging the release of hundreds of Ti-
betans arrested in August 1983 and a halt to executions reported 
thereafter.236 A full page ad in the New York Times on 6 October 1983, spon-
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sored by the Tibet Fund USA together with forty Canadian and American 
Tibetan groups, also appealed for an end to executions.237 
Because of the active pro-Tibetan lobby in the United States, New York 
State proclaimed March 1Oth "Tibetan Day." 236 Approximately 150 
members of Congress presented a letter to the visiting president of China in 
1985 on the situation in Tibet. Their press release pointed out that the letter's 
broad bipartisan support in both houses 
is indicative of a growing interest and sympathy for the plight of the Tibetan peo-
ple and the increasing support of their religious and political leader, the Dalai 
Lama .... China can ignore this only at the peril of creating one more cause for 
strain in Sino-U.S. relations. 239 
At the same time, members of Congress clearly wanted to avoid antagoniz-
ing the PRC, and the letter contained few specific.;. Their press release even 
noted that "no reference" was made in their letter to "sensitive questions 
such as human rights,'' or to claims that "there are some 100,000 Tibetans in 
prisons for religious or political activities." 
In Britain, the U.K. government, also harking to the urgings of Tibetan 
groups, became more forthcoming in its responses to parliamentary ques-
tions on Tibet in the 1980s. Ministers emphasized the autonomous status of 
Tibet and welcomed recent human rights improvements. Officers of the Par-
liamentary Human Rights Group met with the Dalai Lama, and in 1985 the 
group, composed of 122 members of the British Parliament, sent a letter to 
the Chinese prime minister. The letter referred to the Tibetan people's "justi-
fiable and reasoned aspirations" for the "maintenance of their cultural iden-
tity, their religious practices, their economic well-being and for their need to 
manage their own affairs." 240 
While increased attention has been paid Tibet, the issue of ''self-
determination" has been carefully skirted. No one has wanted to challenge 
China in this area. One reason is that China de facto controls Tibet and insists 
that the territory is part of China. The tendency internationally has been to 
recognize PRC sovereignty over the territories it claims, whether it is Tibet, 
Hong Kong, or Macao (Taiwan still remains Cl'J\. exception). Self-
determination has proven politically sensitive for other reasons as well. There 
are fifty-five officially recognized ethnic minorities in the PRC, and it is 
argued that claims for Tibetan self-determination could well set off claims by 
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other groups which the Chinese would not tolerate. Some China experts, as 
a result, have specifically opposed raising the "delicate" issue of minorities 
with the Chinese and even have avoided giving opinions on the status of 
Tibet.241 Governments have found the issue of self-determination threaten-
ing because it could be applied to them as well. Among China's neighbors, 
for example, India could hardly be expected to champion Tibetan indepen-
dence after annexing Goa and Sikkim and exercising extensive control over 
Bhutan. Although in the 1950s and 1960s India took in thousands ofTibetan 
refugees and deplored the PRC's violation of Tibet's autonomy, in 1983 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, while serving as chairperson of the Non-
Aligned Movement's Summit, publicly opposed the inclusion of Tibet on the 
agenda. She did so on the grounds that it would constitute interference in 
China's internal affairs. Her response followed well-publicized efforts by 
Tibetan groups in India to secure a place for Tibetans at the conference.242 
Nevertheless, Tibetans abroad have become a group with which to 
reckon. When General Secretary Hu Yaobang visited Britain in 1986, he had 
to face Tibetan demonstrators in the streets and had to answer questions 
about Tibet at a meeting he addressed at the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs.243 Clearly the "Tibetan lobby" intends to keep international attention 
focused on the plight of their people as long as the persecution continues. 
Their activities demonstrate the value of having an organized group pressing 
for better conditions in the PRC. 
Relevance of International Human Rights to China 
The argument that Western human rights standards are irrelevant to China 
and therefore should not be raised in discussions with the Chinese was dealt 
a serious blow by the democracy and free speech movement which sponta-
neously erupted in China in the late 1970s (1978 to 1980). The movement 
demonstrated a strong desire for greater civil and political rights in China and 
the belief that the exercise of these rights would contribute to the economic 
development of the country. It initially attracted popular support well 
beyond its numbers and also enjoyed endorsement in official circles. 
The movement actually began on 5 April 1976 with spontaneous 
demands for freedom in Tienanmen Square where thousands had gathered 
to mourn Zhou Enlai's death, and ended with protests against the rule of the 
Gang of Four. By 1978, tens of thousands of Chinese citizens were partici-
pating in rallies and demonstrations in major cities calling for greater political 
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and economic freedoms. 244 The demonstrators included a broad range of 
people- factory workers, peasants, students, and teachers. None was well 
known. Some were former Red Guards; others were the sons and daughters 
of officials or intellectuals persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. They 
carried banners, marched, or gathered at Xidan and other Hdemocracy 
walls'' to read posters or essays advocating free speech, more democratic 
government, and the restoration of the rule of law. 245 Scores of unofficial 
journals sprang up, such as April Fifth Forum, Exploration, and The Road of 
the People, and several human rights organizations came into being. A 
young worker, Ren Wanding, founded the China Human Rights Alliance; its 
Manifesto called for the release of political prisoners, freedom of expression 
and information, more open government, the dismantling of the secret 
police, freedom of movement, and basic economic rights. The Manifesto 
asserted: 
The nation demands that effective guarantees be written into the Constitution 
whereby we have the right to criticize and judge the leaders of the Party and the 
State .... The citizens demand freedom of thought and speech. We call for the 
release of those who have been imprisoned all over the country because of the 
opinions they hold.246 
A young woman, Fu Yueha, founded a group to help peasants present 
grievances to the authorities and organized and led them in demonstrations 
in Beijing.247 
Most democracy advocates sought reform within the prevailing 
political-economic structure. However, whether the participants of the 
movement were communists, Marxists, or supporters of a more Western-
style democracy (a distinct minority), they all generally seemed to share cer-
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tain objectives- a reduction in the power of the police and political cadres; 
the institution of legal safeguards to protect individuals against arbitrary ar-
rest; an end to torture and ill-treatment of prisoners; and greater political 
freedoms, in particular freedom of speech, association and movement.248 
The famous Li-Yi-Zhe wall poster, written by radical Marxists as early as 
1974, called for elections, democratic oversight of government, reinstitution 
of the rule of law, and greater political freedoms. Entitled "Socialist Democ-
racy and the Legal System," the essay, widely circulated in China, de-
nounced the betrayal of the revolution by the Gang of Four and its dictato-
rial rule: 
All across the land, there were arrests everywhere, suppression everywhere, mis-
carriages of justice everywhere ... in Guangdong province alone nearly 40,000 
revolutionary masses and cadres were massacred and more than a million revolu-
tionary cadres and masses were imprisoned, put under control and struggled 
against .... In the summer of 1968, the socialist legal system 'suddenly became 
inoperative,' while, on the other hand, 'the state power is the power to suppress' 
became operative.249 
In a not dissimilar vein, Wei Jingsheng, the theorist closest to Western liberal 
thought, denounced dictatorship in China in an article entitled "Democracy 
or a New Dictatorship." Wei faulted not just the Gang of Four but Mao 
Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and the communist system. He called for govern-
mental accountability, legal safeguards, and freedom of expression: 
[l]f they [the Chinese people] are content with a continuation of the Mao Zedong 
brand of proletarian dictatorship then they cannot even talk of democracy, nor 
will they be able to realise the modernization of their lives and resources .... 
We cannot help asking Mr. Deng what his idea of democracy is. If the people 
have no right to express freely their opinions or to enjoy freedom of speech and 
criticism, then how can one talk of democracy? If his idea of democracy is a 
democracy which does not allow others to criticise those in power, then how is 
such a democracy in the end any different from Mao Zedong's tyranny .... 
We would like to ask the high officials who instigate the arrest of individ-
uals- is the power you exercise legal or not? ... Only a genuine general election 
can create a government and leaders ready to serve the interests of the elector-
ate .... Only when the people enjoy complete freedom of expression can they 
help their leaders to analyse and solve problems. zso 
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Concerned with the economic development of their country, members 
of the Democracy Movement often advocated political reform as a means of 
economic modernization. They argued that without the ability to hold 
leaders to account and to protest unpopular government actions, and with-
out the freedom to pursue research and science, development would not 
take place. Wei jingsheng's "The Fifth Modernization,'' published in Explora-
tion, considered democratic reforms a precondition for achievement of the 
government's four other modernizations- agriculture, industry, science, 
and defense. Wei called democracy the necessary "fifth modernization." 251 
A wall poster on Hsitan Democracy Wall in 1978, signed anonymously by "a 
railroad worker," echoed this view. It said that economic and scientific mod-
ernization could not be achieved without "political modernizations.'' The 
unofficial journal April Fifth Forum also affirmed: 
People often look for outside explanations for Japan's revival and our backward-
ness, but internal reasons are always the most important. ... History tells us that 
without democracy there can be no science .... As a prerequisite to the Four 
Modernizations, ideological modernization and political modernization are im-
perative. 252 
The democratic movement, although hardly a mass movement, did en-
joy some popular support in the cities. Estimated to have had from several 
hundred to several thousand active participants,253 the movement expressed 
the hopes and aspirations of a far larger segment of the population. In local 
elections, allowed for the first time in several cities, candidates who ran on a 
democracy and free speech platform won large percentages of the vote. The 
student Hu Ping won 57 percent of the vote in Haidian District, Beijing, in 
what has been called one of the few free elections allowed in China. The 
Communist Party subsequently obliged him to withdraw his candidacy. 
Another candidate in a local election in Beijing who defended Wei 
Jingsheng won 70 percent of the vote, although he too was forced to 
withdraw. The factory worker Fu Shenqi won 43 percent of the vote on a 
democratic platform in a local election in Shanghai despite a vigorous cam-
paign against him.254 Democracy Movement advocates clearly expressed 
what larger numbers inwardly felt- disillusionment with past Party policies, 
the desire for both political and economic reform, and the redress of past in-
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justices. Renmin Ribao (the Peoples Daily) reported in 1978 that large 
numbers of letters were pouring in from citizens all over the country com-
plaining about police abuse of power and the violation of laws by political 
cadres.255 In 1981 the Party's Disciplinary Commission admitted to receiving 
more than 490,000 letters and visits from people seeking redress. By 1983 
the total number of letters received exceeded seven million. Moreover, sta-
tistics from seventeen of China's twenty-nine provincial units reported that 
"3.85 million cases of persecution from the Cultural Revolution in the early 
1970s had been heard by party, government and court organs." 256 
The demonstrations held in many cities were pointed to by Democracy 
Movement members as evidence of the popular support they enjoyed. Wei 
Jingsheng asserted that the "mood of the majority of the people," not ''a few 
isolated individuals" brought about the present democratic movement.257 
But such claims did not take into account the bulk of China's population, the 
BOO million peasants who lived and worked in the countryside far from the 
activists in the cities. Even in the cities, the movement was comparatively 
small. Nevertheless, the nationwide potential of the movement did become 
visible, particularly when some of its members began to develop connec-
tions with peasants in the rural areas. The arrest of Fu Yuehua for helping 
peasants bring their grievances to the capital demonstrated how the Party 
feared a possible linkage between democratic activists and a peasant move-
ment.258 A Communist Party Central Committee member warned that "the 
strength of these people should not be underestimated .... Their number is 
small but ... they have organizations ... in mutual liaison all over the 
country." 259 The Democracy Movement also had an exceptionally large au-
dience because the British Broadcasting Company, the Voice of America, 
and Radio Australia broadcasted their views to millions of Chinese who 
tuned in to hear them. In fact, one of the reasons for the movement's subse-
quent suppression was that the authorities feared it would become too influ-
ential and might even disrupt Communist Party rule. 
Well known intellectuals did not join the movement. Some abstained 
because they were afraid to join or simply because they knew better. They 
remembered that two decades earlier, during the Hundred Flowers Move-
ment (1957), when intellectuals had been encouraged to speak out, they 
later had been arrested when the conservatives reasserted control. Other in-
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tellectuals considered it more effective to work within the system for 
reform.260 But good numbers of middle-ranking Party and government 
leaders, as well as intellectuals and professionals, sympathized with and sup-
ported the movement's demands for greater democracy and human rights. 
At the Fourth Congress of Writers and Artists held in 1979, officials as well as 
writers and artists called for greater literary and artistic freedom. The writer 
Bai Hua openly declared: 
Just what sort of socialist nation is this where communist party members don't 
dare speak the truth at party meetings; where fathers and sons, brothers, sisters, 
and friends cannot confide in one another; where writers dare not jot down 
thoughts in notebooks and citizens dare not keep diaries.261 
The official Communist Party daily, Renmin Ribao, affirmed support for 
freedom of speech in an editorial in 1979: "Let the people say what they 
wish. The heavens will not fall. A range of opinions from people are good for 
a revolutionary party leading the Government. ... If a person is to be pun-
ished for saying wrong things, no one will say what he thinks." The editorial 
concluded that the country's economic modernization "depends'' on 
reforms which can unleash "the talent, initiative and enthusiasm of the entire 
population." 262 Renmin Ribao also took issue with the opponents of the free 
speech movement, describing their opposition as "the foolish tendency of 
some comrades who want to call in the public security department when-
ever someone puts up a wallposter criticizing leading comrades'~263 Several 
Party officials openly expressed sympathy for Democracy Movement objec-
tives. One high-ranking member was reported to have placed his signature 
on a wall poster urging better treatment for political prisoners.264 Deng 
Xiaoping affirmed in 1978 that "wall posters and the frank airing of opinions 
are necessary to ... inspire [the people] to accomplish the four moderniza-
tions."265 Guangming, an official intellectual journal, warned against the sup-
pression of the movement, "Violence can suppress a certain line of thought 
or force people to surrender or even destroy them completely, but it will 
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never succeed in changing the way people think." 266 Official journals also 
echoed the views of unofficial journals on the disastrous agricultural policies 
pursued by Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four. Party journals readily con-
ceded that the collectivization experiment at Dazhai in northern China had 
been a failure after the unofficial journal Exploration pointed this out. 267 
It was, therefore, not surprising that when the Party's Central Committee 
decided in 1981 to clamp down on the democratic movement and ban un-
official journals and organizations, it took to task those within its ranks who 
had assisted the publication and circulation of "illegal materials." 268 In partic-
ular, the professional print jobs of "secret publications" were emphasized to 
point out that Party cadres must have participated in their production. When 
it became clear that the Party in the future would be the sole means of effect-
ing change in China, a number of members of the Democracy Movement 
who had not been sent to prison joined its ranks.269 
The influence of the Democracy Movement on the Party continued 
even after its harsh suppression. While the movement's spokesmen were ar-
rested, and some were beaten, placed in solitary confinement, and forced to 
do hard labor, their ideas continued to be echoed by Party members, 
although in more muted form, and some of their proposals were adopted as 
official policy. One delegate to the National People's Congress (NPC), for ex-
ample, warned against making "counterrevolutionary activities'· criminal, 
arguing that this would lead to the creation of a new class of political prison-
ers in China. Another NPC delegate argued for the retention of the right to 
put up big-character posters, although he was unsuccessful. 270 Still another 
Party reformer, Hu Qili, told a national writers conference that the writer 
must "have full freedom" to choose his own subjects and called for an end to 
the Party's overbearing interference in literature and art.271 Deng Xiaoping 
himself acknowledged that some Party members had raised the question of a 
two party system in China, although the idea had been dismissed.272 Certain-
ly, the discussion of civil and political freedoms became more circumscribed 
after the suppression of the Democracy Movement, but these rights none-
theless continued to be debated almost daily in the official press and in Party 
and government circles. 
266. Nigel Wade, "Chinese Paper Backs jailed Dissidents View," Daily Telegraph, 26 October 
1979. 
267. See Statement of james D. Seymour, 1980 Hearings, note 1 above, 131-132. 
268. See Index on Censorship Briefing Paper (9 june 1981); june Teufel Dreyer, note 265 
above, 113. 
269. See Heng and Shapiro, "How Much Freedom," note 162 above, 15-16; C. S. Wren, "The 
Long March," note 260 above; Earnshaw, note 260 above; Sterba, note 260 above.· 
270. See Statement of Amnesty International, note 255 above, 169; Edwards, Henkin, and 
Nathan, note 3 above, 49. 
271. Liang Heng and judith Shapiro, "Buds of Freedom," The New Republic, 7 October 1985 
19. ' 
272. Harris, note 245 above, 67. 
72 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
Notable reforms ensued from the debate.273 Among these reforms were 
the new leadership's decisions to allow tens of thousands of its citizens to 
travel, to permit limited religious activity, to liberalize restrictions on the 
economy, to release and rehabilitate large numbers of political prisoners (al-
though others- particularly democracy advocates- were arrested and 
tried), to bring reformers into the Party, and to allow greater local participa-
tions in government (although within prescribed Party limits). These reforms 
owed some of their impetus to the Democracy Movement. Politburo 
member Peng Zhen, in drafting the new Criminal Code and Law of Criminal 
Procedure in 1979, promised that extraction of confessions through torture 
would be forbidden. So too, he said, would be imprisonment without 
authorization and the gathering of crowds to judge a person through "beat-
ing, smashing and looting." 274 Renmin Ribao elaborated on these points. It 
said that a section on "personal rights" had been included in the new 1982 
Constitution as a result of "the bitter lessons of the 10 years of internal 
disorder during which socialist democracy and the legal system were seri-
ously damaged." The section sought to ensure: 
[T]hat the personal dignity of citizens is inviolable; insulting, slandering, falsely 
charging or framing citizens through any means is outlawed; citizens have the 
right to demand compensation, according to law, for losses due to violation of 
their rights by any state organ or functionary ... .275 
As it turned out, the new legal codes did not protect democracy advo-
cates from arrest or imprisonment, even though they did restrain police 
behavior and provide trials and lawyers in certain cases. Nevertheless, the 
discussions leading to their drafting and adoption showed a greater under-
standing of civil and political rights in China than was thought to have 
existed. The Democracy Movement was quashed not because civil and 
political liberties were deemed irrelevant to China's problems, but because 
the ruling party felt threatened by the persistent attacks on the political 
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system that these rights seemed to engender.276 Whereas the official press in 
1978 and 1979 had encouraged criticism, it had strongly opposed any ques-
tioning of the supremacy of the Communist Party or of any loosening of the 
Party's control over economic or politicallife.277 The Party clearly feared that 
continued exposure of its shortcomings would undermine its leadership. 
Deng Xiaoping, while admitting that "both party leadership and the socialist 
system should be improved," warned that "bourgeois liberalism and anarchy 
are impermissible." 278 The movement's excessive criticism of Party policies, 
and in the case of Wei jingsheng, of the Party's very existence, went beyond 
accepted limits and resulted in the crackdown. Both orthodox communists 
with vested interests in the system and reformers whose power came from 
the Party would not tolerate any weakening of the political base upon which 
they depended. But the government went on to defend the reforms it did 
allow by emphasizing the value of civil and political freedoms to China. 
While its main emphasis remained economic and social needs, China's new 
leaders nevertheless gave expression to the importance of civil and political 
rights in some of the new policies and laws they adopted. 
When political reform was not sufficiently forthcoming, a movement for 
democracy erupted again in late 1986. Tens of thousands of students took to 
the streets in thirteen Chinese cities to demand greater political freedoms, in 
particular freedom of the press and democratic elections. Once again, the 
relevance of civil and political rights to China became evident. Students 
demanded the right to select their own candidates to local people's con-
gresses. Some called for a multi-party system.m 
To be sure, only 3 percent of China's two million students demon-
strated, but they had strong supporters among faculty and university admin-
istrators and in the Party. Indeed, Party and academic journals for many 
months prior to the demonstrationshad called for greater political reform. 
China's leaders had urged that greater debate of political reforms take place 
as a means of accelerating economic development, and leading Party of-
ficials and intellectuals had come forward to urge greater freedom of expres-
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sion, greater legal safeguards for human rights, and lesser Party control over 
the economy and intellectual life. The Beijing Review published the views of 
Fang Lizhi, vice president of the prestigious University of Science and 
Technology in Hefei, who called for greater intellectual freedom in aca-
demic and scientific circles and greater democracy and openness in daily 
life. Chinese students called Fang the Chinese Sakharov. He objected to 
"Marxist philosophy" as "the sole theoretical guidance'' and said that there 
should be no one doctrine at the University "that can only be upheld and 
that allows no questioning of why it must be upheld." 260 He called upon Chi-
nese citizens to "explore and make use of their rights," to ''criticize leaders,'' 
and to ''express views." He said that direct participation in political affairs was 
the only means to bring about democracy in China. A true democratic 
system could not be ''granted only from the top ... democracy itself em-
bodies the recognition of individual rights. The society is composed of in-
dividuals. This means this right is not granted from above. Rather, men are 
born with rights." 2e1 
Fang Lizhi was dismissed from his post at the University and expelled 
from the Communist Party, accused of supporting "total Westernization,'· of 
questioning Party supremacy, and of stirring up students. Other leading in-
tellectuals were expelled from the Party as well, including the president and 
vice president of the Academy of Sciences and writers Liu Binyan and Wang 
Ruowang. Liu in his writings had denounced Party campaigns, irrational eco-
nomic decisions, and corruption, while praising the role of dissenters and 
critics.262 But the most dramatic retaliatory move was against the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party, Hu Yaobang, who was forced to resign. 
Hu was criticized for allowing the student demonstrations to get out of hand, 
for tolerating the publication of politically dissenting views, and for seeking 
to reduce Communist Party influence over economic and intellectuallife.283 
Hu was nevertheless allowed to remain in the Politburo's influential Stand-
ing Committee. Once again, conservatives within the system came to the 
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fore to ensure that there was no serious weakening of Party leadership. A 
new Media and Publications Office was established to curtail political debate 
and ensure that "bourgeois liberalism" was excised from all published 
material. Students were prohibited from further demonstrations, and a 
number of Party officials and economists who had supported Hu and 
espoused political and democratic reform lost their posts. Scores of publica-
tions were forced to close and one journalist in Sichuan province was sen-
tenced to seven years imprisonment for ''counter-revolutionary" activities 
after publicly calling for democracy and freedom. 264 At the same time, some 
effort was made to appease those who had demonstrated. In Hefei, for the 
first time students were allowed to nominate their own candidates to the 
provincial legislature, and in Beijing, the city government announced that 
there would be more than one candidate for each seat in local legislative 
elections "to promote democracy." 285 
Some China hands admitted for the first time that they might have been 
mistaken in insisting earlier that democratic freedoms were irrelevant to 
China. In the words of one: "Conventional wisdom among China's scholars, 
myself included, has long held that traditional values have precluded any 
real rooting of democratic principles in contemporary China. Today's dem-
onstrations invalidate that view. Whatever the fate of the young participants, 
they are speaking a universal language." 286 Many historians and experts on 
China, in fact, have begun to acknowledge the existence in Chinese history 
of precedents for dissent, individual rights, and a system of justice. One re-
cent study concluded that "there is nothing in Chinese tradition barring 
greater respect for the physical-psychological integrity of the person, safe-
guards against politicization of the criminal process, some enlargement of 
the sphere of individual autonomy, and perhaps even some freedom of po-
litical expression." 287 The view that human rights are a foreign notion in 
Chinese history is being increasingly countered.288 In traditional China, one 
expert found, there was "a regard for humanity as profound as that of any 
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national Herald Tribune, 14-15 February 1987; Daniel Southerland, "China Said to Urge 
Moderation," International Herald Tribune, 7-8 March 1987; "China Jails Advocate of 
Democracy," International Herald Tribune, 6 February 1987; "China is Warning that Free 
Debate Will Be Curtailed," New York Times, 19 January 1987, 1, col. 1 ;,Index on Censor-
ship 16 Oune 1987): 36. 'YC/t,'"()..~;-. 
285. "Chinese Students Get Role in Election System," International Herald Tribune, 15 
December 1986; Edward Gargan, "Beijing to Offer Voters a Choice in City Election," 
New York Times, 28 December 1986, 1, col. 5. 
286. Allen Whiting, "Why China's Students Are Demonstrating," New York Times, 29 
December 1986, 21, col. 1. 
287. Edwards, Henkin, and Nathan, note 3 above, 38. 
288. See Leys, note 74 above, Edwards, Henkin, and Nathan, ibid., 78, 125-164; Copper, 
Michael, and Wu, note 32 above, 9-22; Statement of John Copper, 1985 Hearings, note 
25 above, 243-245; Goldman, "Human Rights in PRC," note 4 above, 111; Goldman, 
China's Intellectuals, note 44 above: Butterfield, China: Alive, note 4 above, 553; Shirk, 
note 33 above, 111. 
76 CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
other great culture." 289 Although the Chinese subordinated the individual to 
the group and did not develop a tradition of individual liberties and legal 
rights as known in the West, Confucianism was not incompatible with 
modern notions of human rights. In fact, certain aspects of Confucianism 
supported liberal government and the practice of dissent. The "Confucian 
literati" were expected to criticize their government for unfair treatment of 
the population and abuse of power. Although they were not allowed to chal-
lenge the system, "individuals and groups throughout China ... criticized 
political oppression and sought to curb despotic political rulers" and to pro-
pose reforms. 290 
Historians further have found that human rights have played an impor-
tant role in modern Chinese philosophic thinking and in the human rights 
movement of the early 20th century.291 One study of Chinese constitutions 
and political theory documented "the consistent desire of twentieth-century 
Chinese for a democratic political order," and concluded that, "it is no 
longer possible to accept the myth that the Chinese have no desire for indi-
vidual rights." 292 Today, the rights question has become a central issue in 
China. Government programs designed to introduce greater political partici-
pation and to codify law, however restrictive, increasingly have had to deal 
with ideas of freedom, justice, due process, and democratic participation. As 
has been seen, many of China's citizens, following the Cultural Revolution, 
sought protection against arbitrary search and seizure, a voice in the selec-
tion of local leaders, the right to appeal a court decision, greater freedom of 
expression, greater freedom of residence, and the right to practice religion. It 
clearly has become less tenable to argue that China's past is "different" and 
therefore international expectations about its human rights record should be 
lower. 
Within China, advocates of greater democracy have begun to challenge 
another assumption, namely that foreign expressions of concern could harm 
China's dissidents and damage China's national honor. Beginning in the late 
1970s, Democracy Movement leaders as well as other aggrieved Chinese 
began to bring their demands for greater individual rights to international at-
tention in order to pressure their own government to observe civil and politi-
cal rights. In their view, foreigners could help. The Manifesto of the Human 
Rights Alliance thus appealed for support "from human rights organisations 
throughout the world." 293 The unofficial journal Exploration called upon 
''every government, every organization, and every man or woman loving 
democracy and freedom" to press China to release arrested democracy ad-
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vocates: "We appeal to you to give pressure ... to the Chinese Government 
for releasing these arrested people." 294 Another unofficial journal, Enlighten-
ment, published a letter to President Carter specifically calling upon the 
United States to help promote human rights in China.295 Groups of Chinese 
at Hsitan Democracy Wall told visiting U.S. officials that they welcomed the 
United States new emphasis on human rights and expressed the hope that 
democratic elections would be held in China.296 Moreover, former victims of 
the Cultural Revolution as well as demonstrators from rural areas gave their 
stories to Western newspapers to pressure their government to institute 
reforms. 297 As arrested dissident Liu Qing explained, '"if the news happens 
to cross the ocean ... it will be given favorable attention by the leaders."' 298 
And in 1986 when the Chinese press refused to report student demonstra-
tions and then denounced the demonstrators, student representatives gave 
their stories to the foreign press in the hope that international pressure 
would have some impact on their government.299 
Governmental Initiatives Become More Possible 
The U.S. government's reluctance to promote human rights in China not-
withstanding the appeals of the Chinese, has begun to be questioned in the 
United States by NGOs, members of Congress, journalists, and China spe-
cialists across the political spectrum. 
There was little or no external pressure on the Carter administration to 
undertake human rights initiatives on China but growing numbers of aca-
demics today have begun to urge the U.S. government, now that relations 
with China have strengthened, to exert some pressure on the People's 
Republic in the human rights sphere. In congressional hearings, they have 
pointed out that "the magnitude and permanence of Sino-American differ-
ences is no reason for American citizens or our government to mute our ex-
pression of its [human rights] concerns ... the cultural relationship will ulti-
mately be healthier if differences are not suppressed." 300 Academics have 
also urged that the U.S. government "raise directly and privately with Beijing 
human rights issues that the United States finds particularly egregious,'' par-
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ticularly the harsh punishment meted out to dissidents and the persecution 
of religious leaders.301 Articles have appeared calling for an end to the dou-
ble standard, "one for the Russians, who are Europeans, and another for the 
Chinese, who are Asians,'' and urging that the same attention be paid to the 
human rights situation in China as is paid to the Soviet Union.3°2 
NGOs have also begun to take note of the exclusion of China from gov-
ernmental human rights initiatives. The president of the International League 
for Human Rights drew attention in 1983 to China's exemption from the 
Reagan administration's human rights policy because of its friendship with 
the United States.303 A report published in 1985 by Americas Watch, 
Helsinki Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights similarly crit-
icized the special treatment accorded by the Reagan administration to com-
munist governments such as the PRC. The report objected to U.S. support of 
development loans for China, irrespective of human rights considerations, 
and the failure of the administration to invite a Chinese "victim" to the White 
House to commemorate Human Rights Day.304 An evaluation of U.S. 
human rights policy in 1984 by the American Association of the International 
Commission of Jurists also singled out the United States uncritical embrace 
of China.305 Amnesty International USA on several occasions has called 
upon the U.S. government to convey its human rights concerns to the PRC 
"through both public and private channels." 306 
Members of the U.S. Congress likewise have begun to take a second 
look at the problem of human rights in China. Congress in 1980 called hear-
ings specifically to explore ''what can be done to insure the observance of 
human rights" in China and other Asian countries.307 Additional hearings 
were called in 1982 to ask, "How important a priority should the promotion 
of human rights in China be for American foreign policy?" 308 And in 1985 
hearings were again held to ensure that "in our haste to accomplish strategic 
and economic objectives ... human rights remains a fundamental compo-
nent of U.S.-Chinese relations." 309 Members of Congress have also begun to 
301. Statement of Kenneth Lieberthal, 1982 Hearings, note 57 above, 335; Statement of 
Hung-dah Chiu, 1985 Hearings, note 25 above, 93-96. 
302. Butterfield, China: Alive, note 4 above, 489-490; leys, note 74 above. 
303. jerome Shestack, "The Rise and Decline of Human Rights in US Foreign Policy," Colum-
bia Human Rights Law Review 15, (Fall 1983): 33-34. 
304. The Reagan Administration's Human Rights Record in 1984 (New York: Americas 
Watch, Helsinki Watch, lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1985): 8, 11, 15. 
305. David Heaps, Human Rights & U.S. Foreign Policy: The First Decade, 1973-1983 (New 
York: American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, 1984): 36. 
306. See Statement of Andrew Nathan (representing Amnesty U.S.A.), 1985 Hearings, note 25 
above, 84; j. D. Barber, Amnesty U.S.A. Chairman, Op Ed page, New York Times, 29 
October 1984. 
307. See 1980 Hearings, note 1 above, 1. 
308. See 1982 Hearings, note 57 above, 318. 
309. See 1985 Hearings, note 25 above, 1-2; Statements of Congressmen Stephen Solarz, 
Christopher Smith, and Gus Yatron in 1985 Hearings, ibid., 92-96, 102, 104-105. 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 79 
take up cases of Chinese human rights victims. The Congressional Friends of 
Human Rights Monitors raised the case of imprisoned dissident Liu Qing 
with the Chinese authorities in 1984.310 A member of the Congressional 
Human Rights Caucus introduced a resolution in the U.S. Congress on the 
persecution of Chinese Christians. 311 
Members of Congress also began to criticize NGOs, journalists, and 
academics as well as the U.S. government for their apparent double stan-
dard in the treatment of human rights in the PRC and in other Asian coun-
tries: 
[O]n Taiwan, the eight dissidents that were tried for a riot, they became eight in-
ternational celebrities adopted by the liberal world. Yet dissidents on the 
mainland are always faceless, anonymous, and never championed by groups or 
never become symbolic causes .... Why is there this tolerant attitude toward 
the obvious defects of the PRC? Why is it that they seem to enjoy tolerance from 
academic as well as diplomatic and journalistic sources on their many defects? 312 
They pointed out that U.S. sensitivities to Chinese culture and traditions 
were not matched elsewhere: 
[W]e are so much more careful and thoughtful and sensitive when we deal with 
the subject of human rights in China than we are with other countries in Asia who 
also have traditions and customs ... when we deal with other countries in Asia, 
we seem to forget these differences- cultural differences and differences in back-
ground.313 
While the objections voiced by China experts, NGOs, and members of 
Congress have not made any significant dent in U.S. policy toward the PRC, 
they have served to make government officials more attentive to human 
rights in China. In 1984, the State Department's Assistant Secretary for 
Human Rights, Elliott Abrams, was more forthcoming in his public pro-
nouncements on China than previously. While still cautioning that the 
United States had to be "very careful about our rhetoric," and that the United 
States had to "remember that we have some common strategic interests with 
China, ... " he did assert: 
It's a mistake to say that because we have a form of strategic relationship with 
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China, the human rights situation looks better. That's not true. We should not 
hide the fact that the human rights situation is very bad and offensive to us. 314 
Likewise, Abrams' successor, Richard Schifter, publicly characterized the 
Chinese government's crackdown on intellectuals and students in 1987 as 
''steps back." 315 
In Britain and France too, NGOs and academics have begun to prod 
their governments to take action on human rights in China. As a result of the 
urgings of Amnesty International in 1986, Prime Minister Thatcher spoke at 
least generally about human rights in her private discussions with the 
Chinese. In France a groundswell of intellectual opinion, supported by the 
media, made the government press vigorously for Chinese artist Li Shuang's 
release from detention.316 
Apart from domestic pressures, newly acquired leverage should make it 
easier for Western governments to undertake human rights initiatives with 
China. Unlike in the 1960s or early 1970s when Western governments had 
little or no influence with China, ties with the PRC have since developed in 
the economic, military, scientific, cultural, and educational spheres. 
Western capital and technology today are playing a significant role in the 
economic modernization of China. The United States recently announced 
the largest sale of military equipment by a Western government to the 
PRC.317 For the first time, U.S. human rights laws have become applicable to 
the PRC now that military equipment is being sold to China. Bilateral eco-
nomic aid is no longer restricted, and loans are being extended by the multi-
lateral development banks to support China's agriculture and industry. 
Although China's political and strategic importance makes military or eco-
nomic aid reductions on human rights grounds unlikely, diplomatic dis-
course on human rights certainly has been made more effective. 
A healthier realism also has entered Western relations with China, 
which has resulted in more forthright Western criticism of China on a variety 
of subjects. Vice President Bush on a visit to Beijing in 1985 declared, "Our 
two great independent countries do not agree on every issue and we 
shouldn't expect to." 318 Treasury Secretary James Baker while in Beijing 
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publicly criticized the "high cost of doing business in China." 319 These state-
ments reflect a new willingness to take issue with China and a new confi-
dence in the ability of the relationship to withstand conflict. Many disagree-
ments, in fact, have been allowed to surface with China, for example over 
Taiwan, nuclear nonproliferation, investment, and trade.320 Even in human 
rights-related questions, the United States has on occasion shown greater 
resolve. Secretary of State Shultz, while on a visit to the PRC in 1987, public-
ly and privately took issue with China's expulsion of two U.S. journalists. 321 
Chinese governmental monitoring of the activities of its students in the 
United States also found the United States ready to issue a warning. 322 The 
United States Information Agency cancelled a cultural exchange agreement 
with the PRC when the Chinese sought to censor American art in the pro-
gram.323 By withdrawing U.S. funds from UN population activities in China, 
the Reagan administration sent a strong message to the Chinese about U.S. 
opposition to forced abortion and sterilization. A congressional resolution 
further condemned these Chinese practices as ''crimes against humanity." 324 
In all these instances, it becomes clear that while disagreement causes 
strains, no dire consequences to the overall relationship have resulted. Both 
sides regard their new ties as too important to be significantly affected. 
Clearly the United States can afford to express its own values and prin-
ciples in the area of human rights more vigorously than it has done so far. It 
certainly would enhance U.S. credibility in the human rights area if the 
United States expanded the focus of its concerns in Asia to include China as 
well as the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. As Professor Andrew 
319. "Investors in China Urged to Hang On," The Times, 12 May 1986, 9, col. 8. 
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Nathan pointed out in testimony before the U.S. Congress, the forceful pro-
motion of human rights in China could serve both US and Chinese interests: 
First, China criticizes our political system freely in its own party- and government-
controlled press. There is no reason for us to be shy about commenting equally 
forcefully on their politics .... Second, despite differences in American and 
Chinese values, American democracy enjoys great prestige among the Chinese 
people. This good will can be lost if we do not speak in defense of Chinese who 
exercise legitimate freedom of speech and if we fail to criticize repressive acts by 
the Chinese government. Third, international attention often forces governments 
to be more respectful of individuals' rights sometimes merely to avoid embarrass-
ment but sometimes because a closer look discloses that indigenous values have 
been contradicted by the way a case was handled. Fourth, I believe that in-
creased international communication about rights issues helps educate both the 
leaders and the people of other countries about the benefits of freedom and the 
rule of law. Such a dialogue may be contentious and frustrating, but the history of 
American relations with countries in Asia and elsewhere shows that vigorous ad-
vocacy does produce results.325 
China Begins to Respond to Human Rights Initiatives 
There are several reasons why the Chinese have become more approach-
able on human rights questions. To begin with, some of the new leaders 
who replaced Mao and the Gang of Four directly suffered human rights 
abuse themselves, and therefore have greater appreciation of the need for 
legal safeguards against the arbitrary use of power. Deng Xiaoping, leader of 
the PRC since 1978, was arrested and detained twice during the Cultural 
Revolution and was paraded before crowds in a dunce cap. One of his chil-
dren was thrown out of a fourth floor window by a mob and today is a quad-
riplegic. Premier Zhao Ziyang was paraded through the streets by Red 
Guards and forced to confess his sins in a humiliating public ceremony with 
a dunce cap on his head. Former Party chief Hu Yaobang was forced to do 
manual labor for two and one-half years and was then placed under house 
arrest for five years, having been denounced as a "capitalist roader." Bo Yibo, 
vice chairman of a key Party committee charged with reform, was reportedly 
held in solitary confinement for eight years and two months during the 
Cultural Revolution. 326 While these and other officials remain fiercely 
325. Statement of Andrew Nathan, 1982 Hearings, note 57 above, 327-328. 
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dedicated to the communist system and would not hesitate to imprison or 
punish anyone with deviant views, they have, at the same time, a greater un-
derstanding of the need for institutional protections against arbitrary rule. 
Zhao Ziyang, for example, promised after the 1987 crackdown on students 
and intellectuals that a major campaign of persecution would not follow: 
"There is no mass support or market today for leftist policies in China, 
because many of us have been victims of them." 327 Indeed, following their 
advent to power, China's new leaders exposed the abuses of the Cultural 
Revolution and took steps to restore the rule of law and give greater legal 
protection to China's citizens. The PRC's first codes of criminal law and pro-
cedure were adopted, the right to defense was restored, and the training of 
lawyers was undertaken. Judicial review of previous miscarriages of justice 
was instituted and several million people unjustly prosecuted or otherwise 
deprived oftheir rights from 1949 to 1976 were rehabilitated. 328 Deng Xiaop-
ing and Hu Yaobang initially supported the Democracy Movement until it 
became too threatening to the Party's supremacy. The 1978 Constitution af-
firmed "the right to speak out freely, air views fully, hold great debates, and 
write big-character posters." Although this provision was eliminated by 1980 
and the Democracy Movement was suppressed, China's new leaders did not 
return the country to the utter lawlessness of its past. No executions or ex-
tensive purges of intellectuals or officials followed the crushing of the move-
ment. Nor were any student leaders sentenced to long prison terms after the 
demonstrations in 1987, but there were arrests and many may have dam-
aged their careers. Hu Yaobang's fall from his senior position in the Party 
was directly related to his greater tolerance of political dissension. 
While a sharp curtailment of political and personal freedoms took place 
after the suppression of each movement, China's new leaders still allowed 
and encouraged wider debate on political and economic developments 
than had been tolerated at any time since the Cultural Revolution. 329 They 
327. "Hong Kong Paper Reports China Removed Reform-Minded Security Chief," Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, 1 April 1987. 
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tional Herald Tribune, 3-4 December 1984. The millions rehabilitated included those 
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also encouraged greater local participation in the political process, although 
again within proscribed limits. These steps gave the Chinese people, how-
ever restrictive, greater political freedoms than they had since 1949. 
In the economic arena, Deng Xiaoping's insistence on "socialism with 
Chinese characteristics'' meant the lifting of economic controls at home and 
an open door policy abroad. China's new leadership challenged the more 
orthodox and conservative views of the past, and placed greater reliance on 
material incentives, a market economy, foreign technology, and investment. 
Economic decisionmaking was decentralized, workers were encouraged to 
play a more active role in management, private enterprise was introduced, 
and importance was given to those with technical as opposed to ideological 
skills. 330 Such bold experimentation demonstrated the new leadership's will-
ingness to break with ideology in the economic sphere. Hu Yaobang openly 
voiced to foreigners his regret that China "wasted 20 years'' after 1949 
because of the "radical leftist nonsense'' of Mao Zedong. 331 The new leaders' 
pragmatism and openness to ideas from abroad, coupled with their personal 
experiences during the Cultural Revolution, have made them considerably 
more receptive to human rights initiatives than their predecessors. 
Since the late 1970s, Chinese officials have on occasion exhibited a will-
ingness to make concessions on human rights, especially when economic or 
political benefits could be derived. In the controversial Hu Na political 
asylum case, the Chinese agreed to drop their protests and halt retaliatory 
measures after visiting U.S. Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige prom-
ised greater sales of high technology to China. 332 Prior to Deng Xiaoping's 
visit to Washington in 1979, at which time full U.S.-Chinese relations were 
announced, the Chinese government took a number of steps in the human 
rights area to please their American hosts. Wang Guangmei, the American-
born wife of former President Liu Shaoqi, was publicly rehabilitated. The 
Communist Party also announced the restoration of "citizens rights'' to 
former landowners and capitalists, and returned property, titles, and funds 
seized by the government.333 Deng Xiaoping in his meetings with Carter ex-
pounded on human rights progress in the system of justice, in the area of 
freedom of expression, and in reunification of divided families. Carter in fact 
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in his memoirs described productive discussions on three human rights 
questions. The first was emigration. According to Carter, Deng was quite 
forthcoming on this issue and was perfectly willing to relax emigration con-
trols to gain most favored nation (MFN) treatment in trade. Concerning the 
second question, Deng promised "there would not .be any censorship,'' of 
U.S. journalists, although there ·•would be some limit on travel." With regard 
to the third question of U.S. students, Carter told Deng, "we don't want you 
to censor which ones can go," whereupon Deng promised "that the Chinese 
would try not to screen out students on grounds of ideology." 334 
The Chinese have responded to human rights representations made by 
other governments as well. French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, when 
Mayor of Paris, raised the case of three imprisoned dissidents with Deng 
Xiaoping when Chirac visited China in 1978. The three were the authors of 
the famous Li Yizhe wall poster who had been arrested in Guangzhou in 
1974. When released and ''rehabilitated" in 1979, they publicly thanked 
Chirac for his intercession at an official rally hosted by government and party 
officials. They also publicly thanked Amnesty International for publicizing 
their case. 335 The French government subsequently intervened on behalf of 
another dissident, artist Li Shuang, the fiancee of a French diplomat. She was_ 
arrested in 1981 and subjected to two years of re-education through labor 
because of her unofficial art exhibitions and her association with a foreigner. 
Repeated protests by French government officials and the refusal to finalize a 
sale of Mystere planes resulted in permission for Li Shuang to emigrate and 
join her fiance in France. 336 The French press even speculated in 1979 that 
the Chinese adjourned the trial of democracy advocate Fu Yuehua to curry 
favor with the West while Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng was 
visiting Europe. The trial came in the wake of Wei Jingsheng's trial and the 
Chinese reportedly did not want to risk any more negative publicity. 
Although in Wei's case, the Chinese had not backed off because it was an 
important show trial intended to warn all dissidents, they were prepared to 
do so in the case of Fu: 
The general hypothesis held by observers is that the trial has been postponed 
because of the effect caused in the West and, in particular in Europe by the 
15-year prison sentence of dissident Wei Jingsheng, while President Hua Guo-
feng makes his 'historic tour.' 111 
While foreign governments often have used the argument that the 
Chinese would not tolerate foreign "interference" in their ,internal affairs," 
334. Carter, note 40 above, 207-209. 
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the Chinese have shown themselves sensitive to international opinion. The 
freeing in 1985 of Huang Hanson, a Hong Kong-born, Harvard-trained 
lawyer, sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on a spying charge, fol-
lowed a campaign of international protest.338 In a number of other political 
cases, it also has been found that Chinese courts have meted out lighter 
sentences to those who received international attention.339 International 
protests about Wei Jingsheng may have helped ease the exceptionally harsh 
treatment and punishment to which he had been subjected. Two visiting 
scholars reported in the fall of 1985: 
When we asked about Wei Jingsheng, China's most famous dissident, we were 
told he was in a labor camp in Qinghai province, reading and writing his opinions 
on the reforms, and that he was not being forced to do hard labor. Our sources, 
apparently reliable ones ... gave us the impression in April that ... some offi-
cials in the central government wanted him released .... 340 
The publicity Amnesty International has given to prisoners in China 
through their ''adoption" program has produced some results. In 1983 
Amnesty submitted to the Chinese government a list of prisoners of con-
science and detainees about whom it lacked detailed information. After 
receiving the document, the Chinese released two of the prisoners men-
tioned in it- Ren Wanding and Chen Lu.341 They had been arrested in 1979 
after founding the Chinese Human Rights Alliance. In 1984, following 
publication of Amnesty's report China: Violations of Human Rights, the 
Chinese released from a re-education through labor camp another prisoner 
whose case had been highlighted in the report.342 Chinese officials also in-
formed an Amnesty representative by letter that an unofficial journalist 
about whom the organization had inquired had not been arrested. In 1985, 
Amnesty reported the release of additional prisoners of conscience adopted 
by the organization, among them a Roman Catholic bishop and priest.343 
Since 1982, Chinese officials have been meeting with Amnesty repre-
sentatives at the United Nations in Geneva and New York as well as in other 
cities to discuss human rights issues and cases. 344 Although for many years 
the Chinese refused to participate in such meetings, they now appear more 
ready to bring their country into line with international practice. Similarly, 
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Laywer," note 193 above. Hanson Huang, however, reportedly has not been allowed to 
leave China or to receive foreign visitors. 
339. Silk, note 54 above. 
340. Heng and Shapiro, "How Much Freedom," note 162 above, 16; see also China Rights An· 
nals 1 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1985), 39. For reports that Wei suffered a ner· 
vous breakdown and remains in dire psychological straits, see Amnesty International 
Report 1986 (london: Amnesty International Publications, 1986), 215-216. 
341. See China: Violations, note 26 above, 2. 
342. AI Report 1985, note 18 above, 208. 
343. See Statement of Andrew Nathan, 1985 Hearings, note 25 above, 80. 
344. AI Report 1983, note 24 above, 191; China: Violations, note 26 above, 1-2. 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 87 
while the Chinese authorities remained silent about Amnesty's first 1978 
report on China, and a 1983 Amnesty memorandum,345 they announced in 
1984 that they would respond "at an appropriate time'' to Amnesty's 1984 
report.346 The second report, China: Violations of Human Rights, charged 
that despite Chinese efforts to restore the rule of law, thousands were still in-
carcerated for expressing their political or religious opinions and that politi-
cal prisoners were still subject to secret detention, mistreatment, and denial 
of fair trial. The justice Ministry in 1984 denied these charges in a public 
statement. Its spokesman asserted that "there are no political prisoners" in 
China, although he admitted that "people who undermine state security and 
take part in subversive activities are classified as counterrevolutionaries" and 
''are detained." 347 Two months later in November 1984, following repeated 
Amnesty denunciations of the executions of criminals and counter-
revolutionaries, the Ministry of Public Security held its first press conference 
for foreign correspondents to defend the ''anti-crime" campaign. A Ministry 
spokesperson argued that executions were necessary "to educate the 
public," but that there were ''no political prisoners or 'so-called' political dis-
sidents in China." 348 The Foreign Ministry also issued a statement to counter 
the criticism abroad of the "anti-crime" campaign. The Ministry said that 
Amnesty's calls for an end to executions and abolition of the death penalty 
reflected "Western legal opinions." 349 The Justice Ministry further defended 
the extensive use of the death penalty in information presented to the 
United Nations.350 
While the Chinese in their public statements have continued to insist 
that their human rights record is an "internal affair" into which foreigners 
should not intrude, they at the same time have begun to respond to their 
critics and engage in dialogue with them. It is interesting to note that unlike 
other governments, the PRC has never denounced Amnesty International. 
While the PRC has taken issue with Amnesty's charges, it has never criticized 
Amnesty as an organization. Its official press, in fact, has published news 
stories about Amnesty's work. For example, an official legal journal, Faxue 
Zazhi, printed information from the Amnesty book Torture in the Eighties.m 
Although the journal did not refer to the Chinese cases mentioned in the 
book, it did print information about torture of prisoners in other parts of the 
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world. Reference News, an official publication with a circulation of about ten 
million, also has published information about Amnesty. The Parliamentary 
Human Rights Group (PHRG), which made representations to the Chinese 
government about the cultural and religious rights of Tibetans, likewise re-
ceived a response from the Chinese government. In a letter to the PHRG in 
1986, the government, while insisting that Tibetans enjoyed full and equal 
rights, pointed out that it was seeking to "facilitate" the ''religious activities" of 
Tibetans and had "appropriated huge funds for the repairs and renovations of 
temples and set up Ganzhuer Sutra Printing House." 352 The letter welcomed 
further contact with the PHRG. 
In U.S. congressional hearings in 1982, a leading China specialist 
deemed the time ''opportune'' for Westerners to express concern about 
"cases of repression in China.'' Listing the cases of five dissidents- Wei 
Jingsheng, Liu Qing, Wang Xizhe, Chen Lu (subsequently released) and Ren 
Wanding (subsequently released)- he pointed out: 
For one thing, in these cases there is some convergence between American and 
Chinese values. Freedom of speech and publication and legal due process are, 
after all, Chinese constitutional guarantees .... Second, it is in precisely the areas 
of speech, publication, and due process that there is greatest support among 
Chinese dissenters and reformers for some change in the Chinese system. Our 
protests would converge with internal pressures for change. 353 
The view that foreign protest could bolster those within the system favoring 
reform was borne out by a group of U.S. university presidents who visited 
China as early as 1974. Although China at that time was ruled by the Gang of 
Four, members of the delegation ''challenged the intellectual wasteland" 
they encountered in China, the persecution of intellectuals, and the highly 
politicized education being offered. Their doing so, affirmed one delegation 
member, helped Deng Xiaoping in his internal struggle with the Gang of 
Four to lessen the degree of ideological training at the universities. "By re-
maining silent we not only would have harmed our Chinese colleagues, but 
we also would have hindered the emergence of the intellectual and political 
forces in China that would benefit our nation as well as China." 354 
China's increasing responsiveness to world public opinion has made it 
more likely that intercessions on occasion will have impact and also will lend 
support to those working within the system for greater political and eco-
nomic reforms. New York Times correspondent Fox Butterfield reported 
having been told that Deng Xiaoping's "brain trust" included some of the 
"freest-thinking people" in China. However, when they gave public talks or 
received foreign delegations, "they often took a conservative line, criticizing 
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dissidents like Wei ... to protect themselves against attacks from hard-line 
bureaucrats. But in private they were far more liberal and democratic." 355 
Certainly Western criticism of the Party's "spiritual pollution" campaign 
against political and artistic deviance in 1983 helped to bolster those in the 
Party opposed to the campaign. The campaign's subsequent halt in 1984 ap-
peared to be a response both to internal opposition and to the negative reac-
tion the campaign had engendered abroad. Premier Zhao Ziyang, while on 
a visit to the United States and Canada, heard repeated criticism of the cam-
paign for its crackdown on Western ideas and influence. Fearing that this 
might interfere with China's growing economic ties with the West, he 
publicly denied the existence of an ''anti-West campaign in China." 356 Soon 
thereafter, the Minister of Propaganda was dismissed in what was reported 
as a victory for those supporting economic reforms and China's open door 
policy. Similarly, international protests against forced abortion, infanticide, 
and sterilization in China have led to official condemnations of coercion and 
a slowing down of the program. 357 
Amnesty's persistent criticism of China's practice of parading con-
demned prisoners before mass rallies also could lend support to those work-
ing within the system to strengthen legal safeguards. Amnesty's objections to 
this practice have been based not only on international standards but on 
Chinese law. A 1979 regulation forbids condemned prisoners from being 
"exposed to the public." 358 Although Amnesty's protests to date have not 
had substantial effect, some of the public parading of prisoners has stopped 
and it can be assumed that there are those in the government who would 
like to see the rallies halted and Chinese law enforced. 
This also could be true in other instances. The Public Security Bureau, 
for example, has been violating both the spirit and the letter of Chinese law 
by not informing relatives of the arrest, whereabouts, or trial date of de-
tainees. It also has violated the criminal code by physically abusing 
prisoners. A Public Security spokesman in 1987 publicly criticized officers 
"who resort to torture during interrogation or bend the law for the benefit of 
relatives and friends." 359 
Amnesty further has called upon the Chinese government to bring its 
judicial system into conformity with international standards. It has called for 
open trials and for the publication of trial transcripts. It has urged an end to 
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the practice of retaining prisoners beyond their sentence. It has called for the 
repeal of re-education through labor, the practice widely used to detain 
critics without charge or trial. Chinese lawyers have echoed Amnesty's ap-
peals. They have spoken out against the suspension of constitutional rights 
by extralegal procedures. They have called for greater authority to be ac-
corded to the courts. They have pressed for increased legal protections for 
freedom of speech. 360 
It can be expected that the Chinese, because of their open door policy, 
will continue to undergo a process of socialization that will make them more 
amenable to hearing and discussing the views of others. The Chinese leader-
ship has learned to expect that human rights will be raised in their discus-
sions with some Western leaders, albeit with restraint, and that they some-
times will be questioned about human rights by NGOs, journalists, and 
members of the public when they travel abroad. Hu Yaobang, while on a 
visit to Britain in 1986, was publicly asked by a representative of the PHRG 
about the cases of three political dissidents imprisoned in China.361 During 
Zhao Ziyang's visit to the United States in 1984, a New York-based group 
called the Chinese Alliance for Democracy held a news conference to draw 
Zhao's attention to the need for greater freedom of speech and press in the 
PRC. 362 Members of the Council on Foreign Relations on a visit to the PRC in 
1986 raised the question of prison conditions with Chinese officials.363 See-
ing how important a role human rights has come to play in the West's rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, the Chinese undoubtedly realize that while the 
issue of human rights is not a significant part of their relationship with the 
West at present, this could change dramatically in the future. 
Increased Participation in Human Rights Fora 
At the United Nations in the 1980s China has exhibited greater willingness to 
have other nations scrutinize its human rights record. Its decision to ratify 
UN human rights treaties, such as those on genocide and racial discrimina-
tion,364 signalled a readiness to accept international standards and a willing-
ness to be judged by their terms. Under the Racial Discrimination Conven-
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tion, China h·as pledged not to discriminate against minorities or racial 
groups in their exercise of freedom of religion, expression, assembly and as-
sociation, cultural activities, or in their enjoyment of political and economic 
rights. Because the Convention is applicable to "national or ethnic" 
minorities as well as racial groups, China is now answerable to the interna-
tional community for its treatment of Tibetans and other minorities. It has to 
report regularly on its compliance to a committee of eighteen states which 
may challenge its reports or even submit questions through an interstate 
complaints procedure. It is not a coincidence that China's ratification of the 
Convention coincided with its efforts to restore limited rights to Tibetans and 
accord greater rights to minorities in its 1982 Constitution. The ratification by 
China of the Genocide Convention also coincided with pronouncements to 
allow greater cultural and religious freedoms to minorities. The PRC's 
vulnerability to the charge that China committed cultural genocide in 
Tibet 365 no doubt influenced its decision to ratify the Convention and to ad-
mit having erred in its minorities policies. 
Although the government of China has not yet ratified the International 
Covenants on Human Rights, the most comprehensive UN treaties and 
those which deal with political rights, it has agreed to their applicability to 
Hong Kong.366 The Chinese also have ratified international human rights 
treaties on the rights of women, refugees, and on apartheid. Interestingly 
enough, the Chinese have cited international standards in publicly criticizing 
other governments, such as the Soviet Union and Taiwan, for their human 
rights violations. The Chinese have taken to task the Soviet Union for the im-
prisonment and exiling of dissidents, and Taiwan for the suppression of de-
mocracy advocates. 367 
In UN human rights bodies, the PRC has begun to play a more con-
spicuous role. It joined the Commission on Human Rights in 1982 and in 
1984 became a member of its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities. In these bodies it has begun to vote for 
resolutions authorizing UN investigations into the human rights practices of 
member states. In 1984 it supported the appointment of a rapporteur to ex-
amine the human rights situation in Afghanistan, despite Soviet and East 
European protests that this would constitute interference in internal 
365. SeeP. Wangyal, "Tibet: A Case of Eradication of Religion Leading to Genocide," Toward 
the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Con-
ference on the Holocaust and Genocide (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); International 
Commission of Jurists reports on Tibet, Geneva, 1959-1960; and notes 158 and 233 
above. 
366. See note 148 above. For texts of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, see note 70 
above. 
367. See Copper, Michael, and Wu, note 32 above, 37 n.2; Freedom Appeals 9 (March-April 
1981): 19. 
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affairs.366 ln 1985, it supported a UN investigation into the human rights situ-
ation in Chile.369 
Support for investigations of human rights in other countries will make it 
more difficult for the PRC to shun inquiries into its own practices should 
these be proposed in the future. In 1985, for the first time critical information 
on China was submitted by NGOs to the Commission on Human Rights. 
Amnesty International forwarded information on executions in China to the 
Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions. Although the 
Rapporteur's 1985 report did not refer to China by name, it drew attention to 
''executions" in one country "for a wide range of criminal offences normally 
not punishable by death'' resulting from a nationwide ''anti-crime'' cam-
paign.370 The International Fellowship of Reconciliation (I FOR), an NGO ac-
credited to the United Nations, raised China's "discriminatory" policies and 
practices against Buddhists in Tibet in an oral statement before the Commis-
sion. I FOR called upon China to allow the United Nations entry in order to 
advise China on the restoration and preservation of religious rights in Tibet. 
China's representative in response criticized IFOR for raising the issue and 
rejected UN assistance as unacceptable interference in its internal affairs. 
But at the same time, the Chinese delegate delivered a detailed report on 
how the Chinese government was working to reinstate freedom of religion in 
Tibet and also admitted past mistakes: 
We do not deny the truth that during the ten-year disturbance of the Cultural 
Revolution, because of the sabotage by the 'gang of four,' the nation and people 
of various nationalities suffered a great deal. In Tibet, as in other parts of the 
country, normal religious life was prohibited, lamaseries were shut down, some 
were demolished, with serious consequences. After the ten-year disturbances of 
the Cultural Revolution, however, the Chinese Government has adopted effec-
tive measures to eliminate those consequences.371 
While China continues to defend the domestic jurisdiction of states in 
the human rights area, its own actions have undermined this position, and in 
a number of other fields it has begun to accept the UN 's authority. For exam-
ple, the PRC surprised many in the international community when it agreed 
368. lain Guest, "UN Human Rights Panel Authorizes Naming an Afghan Investigator," Inter-
national Herald Tribune, 16 March 1984; see also Resolution 1984/55, Commission on 
Human Rights: Report on the 40th Session (6 February-16 March 1984), U.N. Doc. 
E/1984/14, E/CN.4/1984/77, 10, 94. 
369. See Resolution 1986/63 on Chile, Commission on Human Rights: Report on the 42nd 
Session (3 February-14 March 1986), E/1986/22, E/CN.4/1986/65. The PRC, however, 
continued to abstain or not participate in votes on other fact-finding missions. Examples 
are the human rights conditions in El Salvador and Iran. 
370. See Report by the Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions 12 February 
1985, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/17, 2. See also, A/ Report 1985, note 18 above, 13. 
371. Rene Wadlow, "Tibet Discussed in UN Commission on Human Rights," Tibetan Review, 
May 1985,8-10, 15. 
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that the International Atomic Energy Agency could inspect its nuclear facili-
ties.372 Although it had joined the agency in 1983, China had regularly re-
fused to allow access to its plants. Soon after, the PRC began to permit the 
World Food Programme to visit areas of poverty and hunger in China closed 
off to outsiders for years. 373 It is conceivable that in time the Chinese will 
concede to the United Nations the right to a fact-finding mission in the PRC 
in the human rights area. In 1983, China announced that it would resume 
participation in the International labour Organization (ILO). At the ILO, it 
will come under the scrutiny of the Committee on Freedom of Association 
which actively takes up infringements of trade union rights. In March 1983, 
seventy-eight cases were pending before this committee on forty-one coun-
tries.374 The ILO also will undoubtedly scrutinize the Chinese re-education 
through labor system under which political prisoners, common criminals, 
and detainees have been forced to do hard labor under exceptionally harsh 
conditions. The Soviet Union's reported use of prison labor to build the 
Siberian gas pipeline already has been the subject of a widely publicized ILO 
investigation. 375 
Chinese cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) further has begun to develop. In May 1987 for the first time China 
hosted a conference with the ICRC in Beijing to publicize international 
humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions. 376 Closer ties with the ICRC 
could possibly lead to ICRC visits to Chinese prisons and labor camps. Fol-
lowing the Chinese-Vietnamese border war of 1979, the government of the 
PRC surprised many by allowing immediate ICRC access to prisoners held by 
China. 
The potential for international human rights action on China has also in-
creased at the regional level, where the United Nations with Chinese con-
currence, has been encouraging the development of regional efforts to pro-
mote and protect human rights. 377 A UN seminar held in 1982 to promote 
the establishment of human rights machinery in Asia adopted a series of rec-
ommendations to speed up regional human rights protection. Although 
372. "China to Allow Inspection of Nuclear Plants," International Herald Tribune, 25 
September 1985. 
373. "Peking Looks to the UN," The Times, 6 May 1986, 12, col. 4. 
374. Human Rights Internet Reporter 8 (April-june 1983): 428 summarizing an ILO Press 
Release, Geneva, 4 March 1983. 
375. See USIA Wireless File AF-833: "fLO to Investigate Charges of Soviet Forced Labor," 1 
June 1983, Washington, D.C. 
376. International Committee of the Red Cross, Bulletin, june 1987. 
377. See Resolution 1986/57 on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights in the Asian-Pacific Region, Commission on Human Rights: Report on the 
42nd Session, note 369 above, and Resolution E/CN.4/1987/L.71 adopted at the Com-
mission's 43rd Session. See also Report on UN Seminar on National, Local & Regional 
Arrangements for the Promotion & Protection of Human Rights in the Asian Region, 21 
June-July 2, 1982, Colombo, Sri Lanka, UN Doc. A/37/422, Annex; and Human Rights 
Internet Reporter 8 (September-November 1982): 56-62. 
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agreement could not be reached on the establishment of a human rights 
commission for Asia, several nongovernmental bodies formed in the region 
to promote human rights. These include the Regional Council on Human 
Rights in Asia, the Asian Coalition of Human Rights Organizations, the Law 
Associations for Asia and the Western Pacific (Lawasia), and the Asian Legal 
Resource Center.378 Although these organizations are new and currently 
have no members from the PRC, they have begun to pay some attention to 
China. Lawasia's Human Rights Bulletin, for example, has already included 
information on the PRC in its surveys of human rights legislation. Should 
these groups develop into activist human rights bodies that deal with all 
states in the region, the PRC will have to become more responsive to them. 
The government of Australia, active in South Asia in matters of human rights, 
reportedly began in 1984 to raise human rights questions with the Chinese in 
private meetings at the United Nations. Australian delegates in particular 
called attention to the mass executions of the ''anti-crime" campaign and to 
discriminatory practices against Catholics and Protestants. The Australian 
government further has urged the PRC to ratify the UN Covenants on 
Human Rights. 
378. The Regional Council on Human Rights in Asia was founded in 1982 in Manila by jurists 
and human rights advocates from Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand to pro-
mote a regional human rights declaration, encourage ratification of the International 
Covenants, receive petitions of human rights violations, and publish findings on human 
rights conditions. The Council in 1983 issued a aDeclaration of the Basic Duties of Asian 
Peoples and Governments" and a "Statement on the Promotion of Human Rights in the 
Asian Region." In 1984 it called on governments in the region to provide information on 
those detained, to lift restrictions on freedom of association and expression, and allow 
the formation of independent organizations. The Asian Coalition of Human Rights 
Organizations was established in 1982 by Lawasia to bring together NGOs active in 
human rights in the Asian region. The Coalition held its first meeting in the Philippines in 
1983 and became an independent organization in 1984. It studies legislation relevant to 
human rights and has adopted resolutions on preventive detention and on extra-legal 
killings of criminals and dissidents. The Law Association for Asia and the Western Pacific 
(Lawasia), headquartered in Australia, is an association of lawyers to promote ad-
ministration of justice, rule of law and the protection of human rights in Asia. Its Human 
Rights Bulletin surveys human rights laws in Asia, including in the PRC. Its Human Rights 
Standing Committee issues reports on human rights conditions, makes reports to govern-
ments on human rights violations, and sendsobservers to trials. It includes lawyers from a 
broad range of Asian countries. The Asian Legal Resource Centre and Asian Human 
Rights Commission were established in Hong Kong in 1984 to investigate complaints of 
human rights violations, seek solutions through mediation, publicize violations when 
conciliation fails, and promote greater awareness of human rights in the region. They 
were founded by forty-three concerned Asians from fourteen countries. The All-Asia Bar 
Association was founded in 1981 in Japan to promote international human rights law in 
Asia, further the establishment of regional human rights bodies, and safeguard the in· 
dependence of the judiciary and the role of lawyers in the region. Seventy-two lawyers 
from thirteen countries, including Taiwan and Hong Kong, attended its founding 
meeting. For additional information, see Human Rights Internet Reporter 10, 
(September-December 1984): cover page, 203-205. 
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CONCLUSION 
While greater potential exists today for dealing with human rights in the 
PRC, most governments, intergovernmental bodies, and private groups still 
hesitate to act vigorously on human rights violations in China. Apart from the 
efforts of Amnesty International, there are relatively few demarches, 
documented reports, or diplomatic initiatives, and no systematic pressure. 
Western inaction can only make it easier for those Chinese officials who 
oppose the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping and his followers to push 
China back to the political oppression and economic orthodoxy of its past. 
Neither the political nor the economic reforms have strong enough roots to 
prosper without encouragement. Old ways are entrenched. The policies of 
Deng and his colleagues have come under attack by hardliners in the mili-
tary, the Communist Party, and the government, despite the turnover of 
leadership in these bodies. In the economic sphere, conservatives suppor-
tive of centralized planning have come more to the fore, and decentraliza-
tion, market incentives, and price reform reportedly have been slowed 
down.379 Even before General Secretary Hu Yaobang's ouster, concerned 
scholars warned against hailing "the advent of capitalism in China." 380 They 
pointed out that the state, while encouraging private initiative, also guided it 
with a strong hand. A too rapid growth of private enterprise could produce a 
backlash from Party conservatives and from local officials resentful of the 
new found wealth of entrepreneurs and fearful that a growing private sector 
could diminish Party and army influence. Cases were reported of highly suc-
cessful private enterprises being taken over by the state, since there were no 
legal institutions to protect private property. 381 Free economic choice, ac-
cording to knowledgeable observers, remained "the exception, not the rule" 
in China, where "the system is still based on the assignment of jobs tying 
people to the kind and place of work, separating families, preventing labor 
mobility, and for millions working in reeducation or detention camps, forced 
labor." 382 There is no right to strike. Although China's new leaders have 
brought an economic revolution to the country, much remains to be accom-
plished. No guarantees exist that economic reforms will flourish unhindered 
even though the leadership's commitment to them is strong. Sustained inter-
national support is clearly necessary. 
379. See Daniel Southerland, "China's Road to Change Sudden ly Turns Bumpy,'' Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, 8 April 1987; William Drozdiak, "Deng Says Problems are Ended," 
International Herald Tribune, 4 March 1987. 
380. Merle Goldman and Marshall Goldman, "The Change on Goldfish Lane Could be 
Reversed," International Herald Tribune, 23 july 1986. 
381. Merle Goldman, "Muddling After Mao," The New Republic, 16 june 1986, 40. 
382. Copper, Michael, and Wu, note 32 above, 96. See also Edwa.rds, Henkin, and Nathan, 
note 3 above, 33. 
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In the political sphere, where there has been far less progress towards 
reform, prospects are even shakier. No effective legal safeguards exist to pro-
tect freedom of expression. Although the legal system now provides more 
protection for individuals, the parameters of acceptable expression of opin-
ion are still subject to political whim. judicial redress is not applied in politi-
cal cases, and Party control over judicial decisions remains pervasive. The 
removal of the president and vice president of the Academy of Sciences is a 
recent case in point. Although the two officials were elected by the 
Academy in its first and only election in 1981, they were relieved of their 
positions at the behest of the Party, which objected to their endorsement of 
greater intellectual freedom. The courts did not challenge the Party's over-
ruling of the Academy's election results and cannot be expected to. The 
clauses in the Constitution that provided for free speech were restricted in 
1980, as emphasis was given to the requirement that citizerrs uphold the 
four principles of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist thought, Communist Party 
leadership, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the socialist road. While 
intellectuals periodically have been encouraged by the Party to speak out 
and expression of opinion broadened considerably in the 1980s, intellec-
tuals still must proceed at their own risk. In 1983, intellectuals fell victim to 
the ''spiritual pollution" campaign because they did not sufficiently applaud 
the overriding role of the Party in art and literature. Others came under at-
tack in 1985 for calling upon economists to "free themselves from Marxist 
books." 383 More recently, intellectuals were fired from their jobs and public-
ly pilloried for advocating greater political freedom and diminished Party 
controls. Although the Party has promised to never again subject intellec-
tuals to the violence of the Maoist period, intellectuals still risk punishment, 
and many as a result are refraining from expressing their views on political 
and economic subjects to the detriment of economic development. 
Nonetheless, continuation of political reform is likely to depend on the 
extent to which China pursues economic reform. China's leaders, because 
of their desire for rapid modernization, will have to continue to encourage 
their professionals to speak out in order to unleash the creativity and enthu-
siasm needed for development. Greater material benefits and economic lib-
eralization will also spur demands for greater participation in the political 
process. The tens of thousands of Chinese studying abroad, exposed to eco-
nomic and political freedoms unknown in their own society, can be ex-
pected to push in this direction when they return home. Unlike the Soviet 
leadership, China has been sending its youth and professionals abroad, in 
particular to the West, because of its desire to bring new ideas into the PRC 
on a host of political and economic subjects. 
At the same time, there is no guarantee that greater economic liberaliza-
383. Southerland, "China Urges," note 329 above; "see also Goldman, "Muddling After Mao," 
note 381 above. 
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tion will generate greater political freedoms. Economic and political devel-
opment do not necessarily proceed on parallel tracks. Scholars, in fact, 
widely differ over the potential for human rights development in China 
under the reforms and the extent to which greater freedoms have already 
developed.384 One leading observer recently commented that the reforms 
thus far have only changed China from "a terror-based totalitarian dictator-
ship to a 'mature' administered dictatorship of the post-Stalin or Eastern 
European type." 385 Another commented, following the detention and expul-
sion of the New York Times bureau chief in 1986, that it was a "useful re-
minder" that "deep strains of authoritarianism, traditionalism, secretiveness 
and suspicion are widely prevalent" in reformist China. 386 
While outside support and encouragement for the reforms are clearly 
essential, support for the reforms is not a sufficient response to the persistent 
and serious human rights violations in the PRC. Unfortunately, applause for 
the reforms has become the new rationale for brushing aside the fact that 
China remains one of the most repressive countries in the world. Western 
political conservatives seem to have become so taken with China's budding 
free enterprise system and the Western business it has generated that they 
tend to overlook the civil and political transgressions that preoccupied them 
in the past. Some even have taken to gloating over China's new capitalism. 
Western liberals, although more bothered than in the past by human rights 
violations in China, too readily see in the reforms a reason to take a wait and 
see approach and to argue that China's policies are relaxing repression faster 
than Western intercessions might. The Washington Post essentially fell into 
this line of thinking when it observed in a recent editorial that "the general 
tendency to cheer for dissent in police states is tempered in some quarters 
by awareness that China ... has at least been inching toward a free market 
and experimenting with a degree of political openness." 387 
Western governments in particular have found it convenient to argue 
that in order to encourage a more open society in the PRC, it is enough to 
support the reforms, maintain exchange programs with China, beam the 
Voice of America into the country, and participate in China's economic 
384. See Jonathan Mirksy, "Cracks in the Wall," Amnesty International: 25 Years Against In-
justice, British Section, no. 21, June-July 1986; Jonathan Mirsky, review of Chinese 
Democracy, by Andrew Nathan, The Observer, 25 May 1986; Mab Huang, note 248 
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China, Ronald Morse, ed., Problems of Communism Uanuary-February 1985): 83-87; 
Silk, note 54 above; statement of Harry Harding, 1985 Hearings, note 25 above, 7-56; 
Edwards, Henkin, and Nathan, note 3 above, 38, 75; Heng and Shapiro, "How Much 
Freedom," note 162 above; Copper, Michael, and Wu, note 32 above, 6, 26-27,71-73, 
95-100. 
385. See Mirsky, review of Chinese Democracy, note 384 above. 
386. Paul Kreisberg, "'New China' Retains Old Ways," International Herald Tribune, 31 July 
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387. "Telling China to China," Washington Post, editorial, reprinted in International Herald 
Tribune, 15 January 1987. 
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modernization.388 This position easily rationalizes already established poli-
cies of placating China. As one shrewd observer pointed out, because China 
will become one of the major economic and military powers of the next cen-
tury, Western governments have become "terrified of truthful talk'' about it 
and have fostered the growth of a "lobby devoted to pleasing Beijing." 389 
When U.S. Secretary of State Shultz visited the PRC in March 1987, he loud-
ly applauded the open door policy and Chinese efforts at modernization. He 
asked for and received assurances about continued economic reforms and 
U.S. investment, but he essentially ignored China's human rights 
violations.390 In Britain, at a Chatham House meeting in 1986, when the 
Honorary Secretary of the PHRG asked Hu Yaobang about three political 
prisoners held in China, the moderator, james Callaghan, a former Labour 
Prime Minister, interrupted the questioner twice. As Callaghan did not inter-
rupt any other questioner, it would appear that he did not want the subject 
of human rights raised or the names of prisoners Liu Qing, Wei jingsheng, 
and Wang Xizhe mentioned. Representatives of the U.K.-China Friendship 
Society also protested to the PH RG representatives. They evidently feared 
that good relations and trade with China would be jeopardized by raising 
embarrassing points. Even British press accounts of the session called the 
questions "delicate" and "sensitive," 391 adjectives not used to describe 
human rights questions asked of other visiting foreign officials. 
The sympathy felt internationally for Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues 
because of the reforms has been serving to erode vital concern for those 
whose rights are abused in China. Although it is to be expected that PRC of-
ficials will bridle or act defensively when human rights issues are raised, the 
real danger is when foreign observers supportive of Deng react the same 
way. It is not, after all, surprising that a government which arrests Wei 
jingsheng and has him beaten in prison, which publicly humiliates and 
punishes Fang Lizhi for his views, and which executes thousands without 
due process would like everyone to focus attention on China's reforms. 
What is surprising is that there are governments and people in the West who 
are willing to do just that and by their silence relieve Deng and his col-
leagues of accountability for their misdeeds. 
The contrast with the Soviet Union could hardly be more stark. There, 
388 . .See Statement of Harry Harding, 1985 Hearings, note 25 above, 92; see Statement of 
james Lilley, 1985 Hearings, note 25 above, 122; Freedom House Conference, note 57 
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390. See Secretary of State George Shultz, "China and the U.S.," Current Policy 930 (Depart-
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irrespective of the economic and political reforms introduced by Mikhail 
Gorbachev, Western leaders have used their leverage to insist on human 
rights concessions. When Secretary Shultz was in Beijing in March 1987, he 
neither met with Chinese dissidents nor said anything publicly about human 
rights violations. On visiting Moscow in April, he took reporters and televi-
sion cameramen with him to meet Soviet refuseniks Oews denied permission 
to emigrate) and used the occasion to declare that "we never give up, we 
never stop trying'' to advance human rights in the Soviet Union.392 
Similarly, Prime Minister Thatcher, while visiting Moscow in 1987, 
openly met with Soviet dissidents, most notably Andrei Sakharov, and 
publicly called for greater freedom of expression, information, movement, 
and religion. Western leaders were not deterred from raising human rights 
concerns out of reverence for glasnost or out of fear that doing so would 
undermine relations with the Soviet Union. Although for many years it had 
been argued, as is now the case with China, that Western expressions of 
concern would impair political, economic, or military relations, the record 
has largely shown that Western intercessions with the Soviet Union have not 
served to jeopardize other objectives. Arms control agreements have been 
successfully negotiated at the same time that human rights issues have been 
brought to the fore. Concessions on the part of the Soviet Union, when 
made, are usually seen as a sign of improvement in East-West ties. But most 
important, Western human rights initiatives have achieved important results 
for individuals and groups suffering abuse. The initiatives have led to the 
release of political prisoners, to better treatment for detainees, to exit visas, 
and to family reunifications, and overall have exercised a restraining influ-
ence on Soviet authorities. 393 The freeing from exile and imprisonment of 
dissidents Andrei Sakharov, Yuri Orlov, Anatoly Sl,(.aransky, Anatoly 
Koryagin, to name but a few, came about only after years of sustained inter-
national pressure by governments, NGOs, scientific, literary, and medical 
organizations, parliamentarians, and many eminent individuals. Not all of 
the Soviet leadership was immune to the urgings of the international human 
rights community, and the reformers who are now at the fore find it benefi-
cial to the growth and development of Soviet society to eliminate some of 
the more blatant human rights violations which were publicized inter-
nationally. 
Although China's new leadership and open door policy present oppor-
tunities to governments, private groups, prominent individuals, and interna-
tional NGOs to make their concerns known, little has been done by com-
392. Gary Lee and Don Oberdorfer, "Shultz Meets Dissidents At Embassy in Moscow," Inter-
national Herald Tribune. 14 April 1987. 
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parison to the Soviet Union. Unrike the names of Soviet human rights 
monitors, the names of the still incarcerated members of the Democracy 
Movement are not widely known. No brochures with photographs have 
been produced pointing out their harsh terms of imprisonment and lengthy 
sentences. Apart from Amnesty International, no sustained efforts have been 
made to pressure the authorities for their release. Yet Wei jingsheng, now 
half way through a fifteen-year sentence, reportedly has been "driven mad" 
by long years in an isolation cell and has been treated for schizophrenia, 
although some reports say he now is receiving better physical treatment. Xu 
Wenli, jailed for fifteen years as well, was reportedly placed in solitary con-
finement after describing in a document smuggled out of prison the screams 
of prisoners being beaten and electrically shocked. Xu also was confined to a 
windowless cell where his rations were cut, exercise was forbidden, and 
reading and writing materials were denied. Liu Qing's sentence was length-
ened from three to ten years after he publicized the brutal abuse to which he 
had been subjected in an account that appeared in the West.394 Maintaining 
near silence about the democracy advocates will certainly not speed their 
release or lead to better treatment for them. 
But unfortunately human rights commentary has tended to dwell on the 
reforms. Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro have emphasized that ''a greater 
degree of dissent is tolerated today," that former members of the Democracy 
Movement have joined the Party, and that ''very few people are being ar-
rested today for political offenses." 395 It is as if a trade-off has been made. 
Fewer political arrests today can justify overlooking the thousands of politi-
cal prisoners languishing in jail for past offenses, whether they be democracy 
activists, religious believers, ethnic minority members, counter-revolution-
aries, radical leftists, or former members of the Kuomintang still held for 
"crimes" committed prior to 1949.396 
In the same way, the release and rehabilitation of hundreds of 
thousands of prisoners has caused many to ignore the prisoners who remain 
in China's pervasive labor camp system. What are their numbers, their treat-
ment, their sentences? What were their offenses? The State Department's 
human rights report for 1986 reports a total prison and labor camp popula-
tion of between two to five million.397 Yet little attention is focused interna-
tionally on the political prisoners who work side by side with common 
criminals in mines, limestone quarries, factories, and farms. Scholar Simon 
Leys has explained that Western opinion has not yet really registered the 
394. See AI Report 1986, note 340 above, 215-216; Davies, note 182 above; "Inside the 
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atrocities of the Cultural Revolution, although it finally conceded that the 
atrocities took place. He predicts that Chinese Solzhenitsyns will come for-
ward in the future to document today's "Gulag,'' which though reported, is 
not yet fully registered either. 398 
The summary execution of thousands of common criminals and coun-
terrevolutionaries has been going on since 1983, notwithstanding the new 
leaders' promises to end official violence. Surprisingly little attention has 
been paid to these killings. The U.S. government estimates that between 
7,000 and 14,000 persons were executed without due process between 
1983 and 1986. Other sources put the numbers higher.399 China's minorities, 
totalling about sixty million people, reportedly undergo continuing discrimi-
nation as well, despite greater legal rights on paper. The execution and im-
prisonment of Tibetans has continued into 1987, together with the Sinociza-
tion of the region. Some 3,000 to 4,000 Tibetans are reported to be in prison 
for anti state activities. 400 
The plight of those being persecuted in the wake of student demonstra-
tions should not be minimized either. Scientific and professional groups in 
the West have often required in exchange for their cooperation with the 
Soviet Union an easing in persecution of Soviet intellectuals. They similarly 
should insist on respect for the human rights of those Chinese intellectuals 
urging greater freedoms. The purges of 1987 will probably not stop there. 
Magazine editors continued to be dismissed. Greater numbers of scientists, 
writers, economists, and journalists supportive of political reform could 
become targets in the future. 401 
Western support for the reforms has made it difficult to see the dissatis-
faction that exists in China. When student demonstrations erupted at the 
end of 1986, a New York Times correspondent wrote that "the pro-democ-
racy demonstrations by university students over the last several weeks have 
revealed a depth of discontent among the elite of China's youth that was un-
suspected until now." 402 One might ask why this discontent was unsus-
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pected. Is it so strange that the Chinese might have found it unacceptable to 
have so little say in the running of their country? The New York Times article 
went on to point out that "the absence of substantive liberalization in the dai-
ly lives of Chinese has become increasingly apparent to students on Chinese 
campuses. Students have no decision in who their representatives to student 
councils are, have no role in picking student candidates to local people's 
congresses ... and no freedom to choose where they will work after 
graduation." 403 
In the past, the international community not only ignored the millions of 
Chinese suffering through the Cultural Revolution but gullibly gave credence 
to the rosy official version given out by the PRC at the time. More recently, 
enthusiasm in the West for China's economic reforms has not only over-
shadowed concern for China's human rights problems but has contributed 
to the West ignoring or minimizing the aspirations and goals of those 
Chinese seeking greater freedoms. It is too readily assumed that because 
China has made strides in the fields of health, education, food, and housing, 
and has introduced market incentives, the Chinese must be satisfied. The 
economic strides of other Asian countries- more substantial in most cases 
than those of China- have never blinded the human rights community to 
the aspirations of their people for greater political and social freedoms. Inter-
national human rights efforts, in fact, have intensified on behalf of groups in 
South Korea and Taiwan seeking greater political liberty. But China's eco-
nomic accomplishments have lulled foreign observers into not pressing 
vigorously for political and legal institutions that could better protect China's 
citizens and strengthen the underpinnings of its economic modernization. 
Two scholars have wisely pointed out that the task of the West "is to respect 
their [Chinese] humanity by assuming their oppressions to be as keenly felt 
as those of other similarly-situated peoples, and their potential desire for 
freedom to be as great." For the Chinese, they observed, ''are not a separate 
breed of humanity, gathered into an undifferentiated mass with mass in-
terests. They are people, and people with individual and changing 
concerns." 404 Certainly no other government, whether communist or non-
communist, has been able to persuade the outside world that its people 
were not entitled to the full range of rights in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Yet China's minimization of civil and political freedoms has 
continued to be viewed by many with tolerance. 
Undoubtedly, many governments will continue to exempt China from 
human rights standards. Many NGOs will continue to focus on those coun-
tries of Asia about which there is less political contention and where they 
can send missions and trial observers, engage in debates with governments, 
work with local dissidents, and more easily spur change. They will be guilty 
403. Ibid. 
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of the selectivity that Amnesty International has warned against. More im-
portant, they will be guilty of a great disservice to the Chinese people, in par-
ticular those who have begun to look to the international human rights 
system for support. And ultimately, of course, they will compromise their 
own values. For if when faced with a challenge the international community 
backs away from its human rights responsibility, it will erode its own inner 
strength. Andrei Sakharov, who in 1979 issued an appeal to the Chinese au-
thorities on behalf of Wei Jingsheng, warned the West that it will subvert its 
own freedom if it shrinks from protesting human rights violations in coun-
tries like China: "If he [Western man], his children, or his grandchildren ever 
live under a system even remotely resembling ours or the Chinese, they will 
understand- it isn't too late." 405 
Certainly it is true that the human rights changes that ultimately come 
about in China will essentially result from the dynamic of China's own inter-
nal developments. This is true for any country, but probably even more so 
for China than for the Soviet Union or other countries, because of China's 
long isolation, its secrecy, its suspicion of foreigners, its pride in its own civil-
ization- sometimes bordering on xenophobia- and the communist system 
it has chosen. At the same time, China's increased participation in the inter-
national political system and in economic, legal, and educational programs 
exposes it to the institutions and values of others and invites foreign in-
fluence and involvement. There is no longer a valid reason to believe that 
the Chinese leadership will not take into account what the outside world has 
to say. There are clearly sufficient numbers of Chinese within and outside 
the power structure attracted to the values and standards of the international 
human rights system. 
At the very least, China's problems will become better known. In a poi-
gnant appeal, Soviet dissidents years ago urged their Chinese counterparts to 
establish lines of communication with the outside world in order to pre-
vent the authorities "from crushing them without a trace in the remote labor 
camps and prisons." 40& They pointed out that international exposure of 
human rights violations was the only sure way to deter governments and 
bring about change. It is timely for the international community to make its 
views about China known, to seek out Chinese officials, to exert diplomatic 
pressure, and to expose violations publicly when needed. International 
human rights efforts will have a restraining influence on China's govern-
ment, if not in the short term, then over time. They could prevent a return to 
the much harsher methods of the past. 
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